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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Dick DATE: March 1, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-945 Harlow 
I think the Chambers draft of Februar 27 generally 
is excellent. I have raised a question or two, and 
suggested minor language changes. 
As I reviewed the draft, I had in mind Byron's 
view that we should take this opportunity to confine the 
applicable standard to whether the official "knew or 
reasonably should have known that the action he took" was 
unconstitutional. In his view, the frustration of what the 
Court intended in Butz results primarily from the "malice" 
component of the wood v. Strickland standard. Incidentally, 
Byron says this was first announced in an earlier decision. 
He agrees now that virtually every plaintiff can make a jury 
case by alleging malice - a subjective issue of an 
official's good faith. Although he recognizes that the 
"constitutional" standard - at least the "should have known" 
portion of it - may be viewed in some cases as subjective, 
this should be a question of law for a court to decide. 
I am inclined to accept Byron's view for two 
reasons. First, I think he is basically right. Second, as 
he moved to this position last Term in his memorandum in 
Nixon, and seems firmly of this opinion, we probably would 
have a badly fractured Court if I retain the "malice" 
component. Byron thinks - and he may be right - that the 
Chief and possibly even Rehnquist - would join this 
reformulation of the standard. 
The principal negative, as we have discussed, is 
that it would be necessary partially to overrule prior 
decisions. This may be justified in light of experience. 
2 0 
I therefore suggest that you make the necessary 
revisions. The principal changes will be in Part IV. When 
we have a draft, I will submit it to John Stevens in view of 
our prior collaboration. 
It may be, Dick, that this change would provide 
the protection against insubstantial suits going to trial 
that our present IV is intended to provide. If we make 
clear that the application of the standard normally presents 
a question of law, I may conclude that shifting the burden 
of proof is unnecessary. What do you think? 
But first, I would like to see how adoption of an 
objective standard writes. I would make sure that the print 






TO: nick DATE: March 1, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-945 'Harlow 
I think the Chambers draft of Februar 27 generally 
is P.xcel1ent. J. have raised a question or two, an~ 
suggested minor language changes. 
As I reviewed the draft, I had in mind Byron's 
view that "'e shoultl take t.h is oppor.tuni t:v to confine the 
applicable standard to whether the official "knew or 
reasonably should have known that the action he took" was 
unconstitutional. In his view, the frustration of what the 
court inten~ed in Butz results primarily from the "malice" 
component of the wood v. Stricklano standard. Incidentally, 
Byron says this was first announced in an earlier decision. 
He agrees now that virtually every pl.aintiff can make a jury 
case by alleging malice - a subjective issue of an 
official's good faith. Although he recognizes that the 
"consti.tuti.onal" standard - at least. the "should have known" 
portion of it - may be viewed in some cases as subjective, 
this should be a question of law for a court to decide. 
I am inclined to accept Byron's view for b7o 
reasons. First, I think he is basically right. Second, as 
he moved to this position last Term in his memorandum in 
Nixon, and seems firmly of thi.s opinion, we probably would 
have a badly fractured Court if I retain the "malice" 
component. Byron thinks - and he may be right - that the 
Chief and possibly even 'Rehnquist - would join thi.s 
reformulation of the standard. 
The principal negative, as we have discussed, is 
that it would hP necessary partially to nverrule Prior 
decisions. This may be justified in light of experience. 
I therefore suggest that you make the necessary 
2. 
revisions. The Principal changes wi~l h~ in ~art IV. When 
we have a draft, I will submit it to ,John Stevens in vie\\7 of 
our prior collaboration. 
It may be, Dick, that this change would provi~e 
the protection against insubstantial suits going to trial 
that our present IV is intended to provide. tf we make 
clear that the application of the standard normally presents 
a question of law, I mav conclude that shifting the burden 
of proof is unnecessary. Nhat do you think? 
~ut first, I would like to see how adoption of an 
objective standar~ writes. I would make sure that the print 




March 10, 1982 
JOHN GINA-POW 
To: Dick Fallon 
From: LFP, Jr. 
Subject: 80-945 - Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
In a talk with Justice Stevens this morning, he advised 
that he will join Nixon as now written and thinks it is an 
excellent opinion. 
Justice Stevens also likes the Harlow draft, but has 
some suggestions only one of which I view as substantive: 
1. He would add to fn 10 (p.S) a more explicit 
reference to the subject of fn 36. We might simply add a 
sentence saying that the question whether a private cause of 
action may be inferred is not presented, and then refer to 
fn 36. 
2. Referring to fn 16, page 10, John thinks that 
separation of powers considerations may be implicated to 
some extent by suits against high officials. I think he 
would be satisfied if we simply change the last sentence in 
2. 
the note to read: " suits against other high officials -
including presidential aides - generally do not to the same 
extent invoke the special separation of powers 
considerations ..•. " 
3. On page 13 we have the sentence that identifies the 
"societal costs". John likes what we have said, but would 
add, possibly in a separate sentence, the thought that 
decision making should not be affected by personal concerns 
of possible liability. we said this in Nixon. It would be 
easy to repeat it here. 
4. As usual, John has some innovative ideas. He 
thinks that the Wood v. Strickland standard (referred to on 
p. 14) is internally inconsistent, and that the malice 
component is meaningless. For example, if it were found 
that the defendant neither knew nor reasonably should have 
known of the asserted constitutional right, how could there 
have been a malicious intention to violate it? Thus, John 
thinks that by abandoning the malice component we really 
aren't making a substantive change. He will give us some 
language for a note. 
5. On page 18, John would like for us to add a note -
perhaps in an existing note - a statement that there also 
often will be a recovery against the government itself, as 
was true in this case. John thinks we should repeat, 
briefly, as we said in Nixon, that Butterfield already has 
made a substantial recovery against the government. 
3. 
6. Recognizing that he was "kicking me in the shins" a 
bit, John asked if I wouldn't recognize stare decisis enough 
to include in footnote 36 a reference to his opinion in 
Merrill Lynch, noting that it infers an intent of Congress 
to create a private cause of action where it deliberately 
accepted an established line of federal court decisions. 
Assuming that Merrill Lynch comes down before Harlow, I 
suppose I can do this. Incidentally, perhaps to make it 
easier for me, John says that from now on unless there has 
been a history similar to that in Merrill Lynch, he will be 
as strict as I have been about implying unexpressed damage 
suit rights. 
7. Finally, and not surprising, he has reservations 
about our Part C (p. 19). He makes the arguable valid 
comment that there may be some question as to the source of 
our authority to change the burden of proof except where due 
process is implicated. John does say, and would be willing 
to accept a change on page 18, that judges appropriately 
should be able in most cases to decide whether an official 
reasonably could have been expected to know about the law. 
Although I do not entirely agree that we lack the power 
to identify the burden of proof with respect to an immunity 
we have created, I am nevertheless inclined to omit sub-part 
c. I would, however, make the change in the last sentence 
in the first full paragraph on page 18 that he would accept. 
4. 
Also, I would like to give Judge Gesell a more 
prominent billing than you have done. At one point in 
drafting Nixon, we had included both of the paragraphs from 
Gesell's opinion, one that emphasized the burdens of 
protracted litigation and the other that purposed a change 
in the burden of proof. I do not recall why we omitted 
these from Nixon. I certainly would like to include the 
former in Harlow. Gesell has tried a number of these cases, 
others will certainly come before him, and he is a respected 
district judge. 
*** 
I suggest that you make the changes indicated above, 
and I will show them to Justice Stevens before we go back to 
the printer. I would like to be able to say to Justice 
White that the draft has been approved by Stevens. 
LFP, JR. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~lqfl"tutt Qfoml d tltt ~ttb '~httti\' 
,ra~drhtghtu, ~. <!f. 2ll~'!!~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 10, 1982 
Re: 80-945 - Harlow & Butterfield v. 
Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
Perhaps the footnote that I suggested could be 
added on to the end of footnote 24 on pages 14-15 and 
might read something like this: 
"The two-pronged standard as phrased in 
Wood is, of course, somewhat redundant. For if 
it is determined that the defendant neither knew 
nor should have known that his conduct would 
violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, 
it would necessarily follow that the defendant 
could not have acted with malicious intention to 
cause a deprivation of a constitutional right 





March 12, 1982 
80-945 Barlow 
Dear John: 
Here is the draft (3/8/82) of my opinion in this 
case that you previously reviewed. Almost all of the 
changes i.ndicated are made i.n response to your suggestions. 
Two explanations may be helpful. First, I have 
made no reference in the final footnote (n. 37, p. ?.0) to 
your decision in Merrill Lynch. At the same time that I am 
trying to make your opinion look dreadfully wrong, it would 
look a bit curious to include it in another opinion I am 
circulati.ng. Nhen Merrill r,ynch comes down, however, twill 
refer to it as our latest expression on implied actions. 
Now, back to Harlm~. In view of your reservations 
about Subpart c of Part IV (p. 19), I have substantially 
revised the prior draft. I very much hope the substance of 
the revision will have your approval and become a ~ourt 
opinion, or at least command sufficient support to encourage 
District Courts to assume greater responsibi.lity in cases of 
this kind. For example, if .Judge Gesell had not felt 
constrained by the views of c~oc, I think it is evident from 
what he wrote in Halperin that he would have dismi.ssed a 
case like this one on the basis of the plaintiff's marginal 
summary judgment showing. 
We emphasized in Butz that District Courts should 
be able to identify early the insubstantial suits, and 
prevent them from dragging on for years - as is now taking 
place. The assumption that District Courts would be 
sensitive to their duty to do this underlies the distinction 
we have drawn between qualified and absolute immunity. 
Again, I express my appreciation for your 
willingness to helP me put the draft in a form that both of 
us can sup~ort before I circulate. I will await further 




March 15, 1982 
PERSONAL 
Dear John: 
Again I thank you for reviewing my Harlow draft, 
and the suggested revisions. 
I consider your support essential. Sandra favors 
qualified immunity. But, unless the opinion persuades the 
Chief and Bill Rehnquist, they will go for absolute 
immunity. Whether Byron will be content with the way I have 
written Harlow remains to be seen. If he joins us, we will 
still need one of our Brothers who were with Byron last 
Term. 
In this uncf">rtain post.ure of the case, I would 
like to have Harlow satisfactory to you so that you could 
join promptly after circulati.on. I therefore am eliminating 
Subpart c. I t7ould like, however, to keep a gentle 
admoni-tion in the opinion somewhere, and suggest the 
enclos~d footnote to be added as a paragraph on page 16 at 
the place indicated. The note is faithful to the Court's 
opinion in Butz. 
I add, in response to your letter, that I do think 
Subpart c is well within the authority of the Court. 
Qualified immuni.ty is a judge-made doctrine, and I would 
think we properly may define safeguards to its aopli.cation. 
Because of the strong public interest in a case of this 
kind, it differs from the relevant considerations on summary 
judgment in the typical civil litigation. I make this point 
only in response to your view - but in recognition that you 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~upuutt Clfltltriltf tJ.r~ ~ ~mt~g 
'~lbtgltittghtn. Jl. Clf. 2.ll.;t'1~ 
March 15, 1982 
Re: 80-945 - Harlow & Butterfield v. 
Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for sending me a copy of your revised 
draft of the opinion. I think it is a fine job: it 
satisfies my concerns in all except the two respects 
you mentioned in your letter. 
You are, of course, entirely correct in 
postponing any reference to Merrill Lynch until that 
case comes down. 
Your rewrite of Subpart C of Part IV is a 
substantial improvement and certainly makes good 
sense but I am still troubled by our lack of power to 
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for one 
class of litigants. The problem is the same basic 
issue that separated us in cases like Duke Power, New 
York Telephone, Snepp, and most recently, Mite. I-n--
all of those cases, your vote was consistent with 
wise policy and mine may have reflected nothing but 
an out-of-date notion about the scope of our power. 
Nevertheless, I do not believe I will be able to join 
IV-C. I suggest that you circulate it in its present 
form anyway. It may well command a Court. I will 
not respond to it immediately, and ultimately may 
simply write a sentence or two noting my inability to 
join that portion of your opinion. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
March 17, 1982 
PERSO~tJ\L 
80-945 Harlow 
Dear Chief and Bill: 
I am circulating this afternoon draft opinions in 
Nixon and narlow. 
taxon is written, I beli.eve, in full accord with 
your respective views. In writing Harlow, I have followed -
as ! feel obligated to do - the Court's decision i.n Butz v. 
Economou, a decislon that I know displeases both of you. 
You wiii recall that last Term, in each of the eight 
separate drafts of my memoran~um in the Kissinger case, I 
also applied the Butz qualified immunity rationale with 
respect to the claims against Kissinger, Mitchell and 
Halderman. I did recognize, however, that even where an 
official normally has qualified i:mmunity only, certain 
functions are sufficiently sensitive to justify absolute 
protection, e.g., national defense. 
I invite your attention today particularly to one 
major change that I have incorporated in the flarlow opinion. 
I propose a modification of the Wood v. Strickland standard 
to eliminate the •malice" component. Byr.on suggested this 
laet Term, and I am happy to accede to the suggesti.on. My 
guess is that most of the protracted trials have resulted -
as in this case - from allegations of subjective malice 
which generally create jury questions. In sum, if there is 
a Court for Harlow the way it is written, t think nietrlct 
Courts will be encouraged to identify and dismiss 
insubstantial claims. 
I add that the apparent alternative to a Court 
along the lines of my draft is a fractured Court, perhaps 
splitting three ways that may leave the malice component in 
the standard, and the CAOC opinion in ~issinqer as the law 
at least of this Circuit. 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~uputttt <lfMlrl .ttf ut~ '.Jlniua ~tat~­
JI'•Jrin:ghtn. ~. <If. 2llp"'~ 
March 18, 1982 
Re: 80-945 - Harlow and Butterfield 
v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
If my presently circulating opinion in Merrill Lynch 
becomes a Court opinion, I will ask you to make a modest 
language change in footnote 35. On the assumption that 
we will have no difficulty ~ing on an appropriate 
change in that footnote, please join me in your opinion. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 






JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR. 
~uprtntt Clfottrl of tlrt ~nittb ~hdeil 
~asltington. 19. <!f. 211~'-1~ 
March 18, 1982 
80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear John: 
Thank you for your "join" in the above case. 
This will confirm that I will add appropriate 
language in footnote 35 to reflect a Court opinion in 
Merrill Lynch. As I am dissenting in that case, and even 
though my cause may be "lost", I will await the final 




cc: The Conference 
March 18, 19B? 
80-945 Harlow and ~utterfieJ~ v. Fitzq~rald 
Dear .lohn: 
'T'hank. vou for vour "join" i.n the above case. 
This will confirm that T will add appropriate 
language in footnote 3Cl to reflect a Court opinion in 
Men:i.ll t.ynch. As I am di~sentinq tn that case, and even 
though my cause may be "lost", t wtl1 at..rait the fi.nal 




cc: The Conference 








From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: liAA 3 0 1982 
Recirculated: _____ _ __ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-945 
BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. 
BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v. 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982] 
Memorandum of Dissent, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER. 
The Court today decides in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, No. 
79--1738, what has been taken for granted for 190 years but 
not explicitly decided by this Court: it is implicit in the Con-
stitution that a President of the United States has ·absolute 
immunity from civil suits arising out of official acts. Nixon 
v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 17. I agree fully that absolute immu-
nity for official acts of the President is, like Executive Privi-
lege, "fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the 
constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 
(1974). l 
In this case the Court decides that senior aides of a Presi-
dent do not have the same immunity as the President. I am 
at a loss, however, to reconcile this conclusion with our hold-
ing in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 616 (1972). In 
' Presidential immunity for official acts while in office has never been se-
riously questioned until the last 10 years. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
21, n. 36. I can find only one instance in which a citizen sued a former 
president for acts committed while in office. A suit against Thomas J ef-
ferson was dismissed for being improperly brought in Virginia, thus pre-
cluding the necessity of reaching any immunity issue. Livingston v. J ef-










80--945-MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT 
2 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
Gravel we held that it is implicit in the Constitutiort that 
aides of Members of Congress have absolute immunity for 
acts performed for Members in relation to their legislative 
function. We viewed this immunity as deriving from the 
Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that "for any 
Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Represent-
atives] shall not be questioned in any other place." Art. I, 
§ 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Read literally, the Clause would 
limit absolute immunity to only the Member and to speech 
and debate only within the Chamber. But we have read 
much more into this plain language. The Clause says noth-
ing about "legislative acts" outside the Chambers, but we 
concluded that the Constitution grants absolute immunity for 
legislative acts not only "in either House" but in committees 
and conferences and in their reports on legislative activities. 
Then, far beyond the words to be found in the Constitution 
itself, we held that a Member's aides who implement policies 
and decisions of the Member are entitled to the same absolute 
immunity as a Member. It is hardly an overstatement to say 
that we thus avoided a "literalist approach", Gravel, supra, 
at 617, and instead looked to the structure of the document 
and the function of the legislative branch. In short, we drew 
this immunity for legislative aides from a functional analysis 
of the legislative process in the context of the document 
taken as a whole. 
In Gravel we very properly recognized that the central 
purpose of a Member's absolute immunity would be "dimin-
ished and frustrated" if the legislative aides were not also 
protected by the same broad immunity. Speaking for the 
Court, Justice White stated: 
"[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of 
the modern legislative process, with Congress almost 
constantly in session and matters of legislative concern 
constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to 
perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides 
80-94~MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT 
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 3 
and assistants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is 
so critical to the Members' performance that they must 
be treated as the latter's alter egos; and that if they are 
not so recognized, the central role of the Speech and De-
bate Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by 
the Executive and accountability before a possibly hos-
tile judiciary ... -will inevitably be diminished and 
frustrated." 408 U. S., at 616-617 (emphasis added). 
I joined in that analysis and continue to agree fully with it, 
for without absolute immunity for the aides, who are indeed 
"alter egos," a Member could not effectively discharge all of 
the assigned constitutional functions of a modern legislator. 2 
Since the Court has made this reality a matter of our con-
stitutional jurisprudence, how can we conceivably hold that a 
President of the United States, who represents a vastly 
larger constituency than does any Member of Congress, 
should not have aides with comparable immunity. To per-
form the Constitutional duties assigned to the Executive 
would be "literally impossible, in view of the complexities of 
the modern [Executive] process ... without the help of aides 
and assistants"-"alter egos" as we described them in 
Gravel. 3 408 U. S., at 616-617. These words reflect the 
2 A Senator's allotment for staff varies significantly, but can range from 
as few as 17 to over 70 persons. S. Doc. No. 19, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 
27-106 (1981). House Members have roughly 18 to 26 assistants at any 
one time. H.R. Doc. No. 97-113, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 2&-174 (1981). 
3 In the early years of the Republic, Members of Congress and Presi-
dents performed their duties without staffs of aides and assistants. Wash-
ington and Jefferson spent much of their time on their plantations. Con-
gress did not even appropriate funds for a presidential clerk until 1857. 
Lincoln opened his own mail, Cleveland answered the phone at the White 
House and Wilson regularly typed his own speeches. S. Wayne, The Leg-
islative Process 30 (1978). Whatever may have been the situation begin-
ning under Washington, Adams and Jefferson, we know today that the 
presidency functions with a staff that exercises a wide spectrum of author-
ity and discretion and directly assists the President in carrying out Con-
80-94&-MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT 
4 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
precise analysis of Gravel, and this analysis applies with even 
greater force to a President. The primary layer of senior 
aides of a President-like a Senator's "alter egos"-are liter-
ally at a President's elbow, with offices a few feet or at most a 
few hundred feet from his own desk. The President, like a 
Member, may see those aides many times in one day. They 
maintain regular communication with Cabinet officers and 
heads of the vast network of the federal bureaucracy to im-
plement directives and policies of the President. They are 
indeed the President's "arms" and "fingers" to perform his 
Constitutional duty "to see that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted." Like a Member of Congress, but on a vastly greater 
scale, the President cannot conceivably personally implement 
a fraction of his own policies and decisions. 
Consist-ent with history and reality, the Court today cor-
rectly holds that the Constitution affords a President of the 
United States absolute immunity from civil liability for offi-
cial acts. This places the President and Members of the two 
Houses of Congress on essentially the same basis with re-
spect to civil liability for their official acts, the former under 
what we hold is implicit in the Constitution, the latter's im-
munity is express. 4 The Court in Gravel included legislative 
aides within the constitutional immunity of Members of Con-
gress, not because the Constitution said so explicitly but be-
cause it is implicit in the function of the legislative branch 
under that document. 
If, as we held in Gravel, "it is literally impossible, in view 
of the complexities of the modern legislative process ... for 
Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks with-
out the help of aides," is this not at least equally true of a 
President? 408 U. S., at 616-617. And if the "day-to-day 
work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance 
stitutional duties. 
' It is not insignificant, as a matter of history, that the immunity of a 
chief of state long preceded recognition of legislative immunity. 
• 
80-94&--MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT 
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that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos," why is 
this not true of a President's aides? Ibid. If we assume 
each Member of Congress has only 10 aides-and many have 
more-who are entitled to share in the Member's absolute 
immunity, that means that more than 5,000 legislative aides 
are entitled to absolute immunity under the Constitution, as 
construed by this Court. Yet the Court today holds that the 
Constitution does not provide equal immunity for two per-
sonal "alter ego" aides of a President! 
For some inexplicable reason the Court declines to recog-
nize the realities in the workings of the Presidential office, 
despite the Court's cogent recognition a decade ago in Gravel 
concerning the workings of the Congress. Absent equal pro-
tection for a President's aides, how will Presidents be free 
from the risks of "intimidation . . . by [Congress] and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary?" 408 
U. 8., at 617. Under today's holding the functioning of the 
Presidency will inevitably be "diminished and frustrated." 
Id., at 616-617. 
Precisely the same public policy considerations on which 
the Court now relies in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and that were-
lied on only 10 years ago in Gravel, are fully applicable to se-
nior presidential aides. The proposed opinion points out that 
if a President were subject to suit, 
"the President and his advisers naturally would have an 
incentive to devote scarce energy, not to performance of 
their public duties, but to compilation of a record insulat-
ing the President from subsequent liability." Ante, at 
19 (emphasis added). 
This same negative "incentive" will permeate the inner work-
ings of the office of the President if that officer's "alter egos," 
comparable to Congressional aides, are not protected deriva-
tively from the immunity of the President. In addition, ex-
posure to civil liability for official acts will result in constant 
judicial questioning, through judicial proceedings and pre-
80-94~MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT 
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trial discovery, into the inner workings of the Presidential of-
fice beyond that necessary to maintain the traditional check 
and balance of our constitutional structure. 5 
By construing the Constitution to give only qualified immu-
nity to senior presidential aides we give those key "alter 
egos" nothing more than lawsuits, winnable lawsuits per-
haps, but lawsuits nonetheless, with stress and effort that 
will disperse and drain their energies and their purses. I 
challenge the Court to say that their effectiveness as presi-
dential aides will not "inevitably be diminished and frus-
trated," Gravel, supra, at 61f:H>17, if they must weigh every 
act and decision-every discretionary Executive act in which 
they participate-in relation to future lawsuits. The Court 
now adds to the other burdens of senior presidential aides-a 
burden we removed from congressional aides: the stress of 
long hours, heavy responsibilities, constant exposure to ha-
rassment of the political arena, and now the risk of lawsuits 
while in or on leaving office. 6 
• The same remedies for checks on presidential abuse also will check 
abuses by the comparatively small group of senior aides that act as "alter 
egos" of the President. The aides serve at the pleasure of the President 
and thus may be removed by the President. Congressional and public 
scrutiny maintain a constant and pervasive check on abuses, and such aides 
may be prosecuted criminally. See Nixon, ante, at 23-24. A criminal 
prosecution cannot be commenced absent careful consideration by a grand 
jury at the request of a prosecutor; the same check, however, is not 
present with respect to the commencement of civil suits in which advocates 
are subject to no realistic accountability. 
' The Executive Branch may as a matter of grace supply some legal as-
sistance. The Department of Justice has a long-standing policy of repre-
senting Federal officers in civil suits for conduct performed within the 
scope of their employment. In addition, the Department provides for re-
tention of private legal counsel when necessary. See Senate Subcommit-
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Ju-
diciary, Justice Department Retention of Private Legal Counsel to 
Represent Federal Employees in Civil Lawsuits, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978). The Congress frequently pays the expenses of defending its mem-
bers even as to acts wholly outside the legislative function. 
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In this Court we witness the new filing of 100 cases a week, 
many utterly frivolous and even bizarre claims. Thousands 
of other cases are disposed of without reaching this Court. 
When we see the myriad irresponsible and frivolous cases 
regularly filed in American courts, the magnitude of the po-
tential risks attending acceptance of public office emerges. 
Can anyone rationally think such potential risks will not be a 
factor in discouraging able men and women into public 
service? 
We-judges collectively-have provided absolute immu-
nity for ourselves with respect to judicial acts, however erro-
neous or ill advised. See, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 
U. S. 349 (1978). Are the lowliest of 27,000 judges and 
50,000 or more prosecutors in America entitled to greater 
protection than the senior aides of a President whose abso-
lute immunity derives directly from the Constitution? 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), does not dictate 
that senior presidential aides be given only qualified immu-
nity. Unlike the present case, Butz did not consider the 
question of constitutionally required immunity for the Presi-
dent. Butz rejected a claim that all federal officials exercis-
ing discretion were entitled to absolute immunity; we need 
not abandon that holding. In this case we are not dealing 
simply with the exercise of discretion in the implementation 
of congressional acts; rather, we are dealing with the "alter 
egos" of a President-as Gravel dealt with "alter egos" of 
Senators. Without these aides neither the President nor 
Members of Congress could conceivably carry out their 
sworn duties. 
By ignoring Gravel the Court gravely undermines to a 
large extent the Presidential immunity today recognized in 
Nixon. This· is not an instance in which petitioners request 
an "undifferentiated extension" of presidential immunity. 
Harlow & Butterfield, ante, at 10. The sole question is 
whether senior "alter ego" aides who work daily with the 
President in implementing Executive policy directives from 
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the President are entitled to the same immunity we con-
strued the Constitution to provide for the 5,000 or more aides 
of the 535 Members of Congress. 
There is not the remotest indication in the Constitution 
that any kind of derivative absolute immunity should be 
given to Congressional aides yet we recognized that implicit 
in the presence of express absolute immunity for Members of 
Congress was a corresponding immunity for the aides who 
carry out the Members' legislative duties. I find it 
inexplicable-and indeed it is unexplained-why the Chief 
Executive of the Nation cannot be assured that his senior 
staff aides will have the same protection as the aides of Mem-
bers of the House and Senate and accordingly I dissent. 
. -
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prttttt (!fcttrl cf tlft ~tb ~tatts 
.asfringto:n. ~. Of. 2llP:~6J 
April 1, 1982 
Re: No. 80-945 Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
I basically agree with the approach you have taken in 
this case. I too think that the inquiry of courts in suits 
against high executive officials should, in those cases 
where absolute immunity cannot be established, be limited to 
"objective" good faith. You correctly state that "there 
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative 
of subjective intent," and that "[j]udicial inquiry into 
subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging 
discovery and deposition of numerous individuals." Draft 
Opinion at 16. 
As I understand your opinion, cases will proceed past 
the summary judgment stage only if the trial court 
determines {1} that the allegedly violated constitutional 
rights were well established at the time of the official's 
action, and {2} that the particular defendant reasonably 
could be expected to have known about the existence of those 
rights. I think this approach will facilitate resolution of 
cases at the summary judgment stage: but I think such 
resolution would be even easier if the second part of your 
test required courts to determine whether a "reasonable 
p~n" -- as opposed to this particular defendant _.; would 
nave ~known of the existence of the asserted constitutional 
rights. Perhaps there is not much difference between what a 
"reasonable person" should have known and what this 
defendant "reasonably should have known." But by placing 
the focus on this defendant, I fear that courts will permit 
"broad-ranging discovery and deposition[s]" in an effort to 
determine what past exposure this defendant has had to 
constitutional law. With such a focus, courts may also be 
slow to grant summary judgment if there is some question as 
to the extent of the defendant's familiarity with legal 
matters. 
- 2 -
I think that such a possibility could be foreclosed by 
two minor changes in your opinion. First, the third full 
sentence on page 18 could be changed to read: "Consistently 
with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore 
hold that at least high executive officials are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate 'settled, indisputable' legal rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known." Second, the 
third full sentence on page 19 could be amended to read: "On 
summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine what 
the law was at the time the action occurred and what a 





.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
Juvrtmt <!fcurt cf t4t ~ttittb 'Jhdt.s' 
'~llht.&'lfittgtctt, ~. <!f. 2ll~Jt~ 
April 1, 1982 
No. 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
J 
You have accomplished a difficult task in drafting 
opinions in this and the Nixon case. They are both well 
thought out and I am in general agreement with your 
treatment of this case. I am prepared to support the td / 
~dopt~on of an "objective" good faith standard for qualified .. \ ,... D 
1mmun1ty. lEi '~ {) 
I would not go so far, however, as to immunize i-H gal J Y b yt5~ ._,"'i 
actions undertaken in ignorance of rbasic, unquestioned" or ~~ 
"settled, indisputable" constitutional rights. "High 
executive officials" should be charged with knowledge of 
such rights and should be encouraged to seek the advice of 
the counsel available to senior officers whenever doubts 
arise. An ordinary citizen running even a small business 
must conform to myriad statutes and regulations and acts at 
his own peril when he acts in ignorance, whether the law is 
settled or not. We should, I think, expect no less from our 
officials, at least as regards well-established rights. 
Moreover, demanding something less invites much litigation 
over how much law a given official should have been aware 
of. 
For these reasons, I am troubled by the following 
language on page 19 of your draft: "Charged with 
decisionmaking under pressures of time and limits of 
information, not every official fairly could be held 
responsible for areas of the law remote from his experience 
or duties. Nor is it reasonable to expect every such 
official to be familiar with the most recent judicial 
developments." Would you consider eliminating these 




JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
j;n.vumt ~llltd cf tqt 1!lttittb :itatt.e' 
'Jl!t$ftittgton, ~. ~· 2llP:'!~ 
April 5, 1982 
No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. 
v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
Your changes are excellent and I am well 
satisfied with the draft as revised. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: Justice Rehnquist 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.iuvumt Qlltltrt .o-f tqt ,uittb ~taft.&' 
Jla,gfti:ngtcn. ~. QJ. 2ll~~~ 
April 5, 1982 
No. 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me in your proposed opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
To: The Chio.f Justice 
Mr. Justice Bronna.n 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. JustiC'e Marshall 
Mr . Justi02 Blackmun 
..,6. Tu s v .t'f' .ve 11 
Mr. J u. t .h·hnquist 
Mr. J t..J' :e Stevens 
From: Mr . Juutice White 
~-'31.;31 
Circulated: ____________ __ 
Recirculated: __ 9_A_P_R__,1(1 .... ~_1_ 
c~~~ 4th DRAFT (Version I) 
SUPREME COURT OF THE U~ITED STATF! 
No, 79 ... 880 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
Henry Kissinger et al., Petitioners, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Dis-
Morton Halperin et al. trict of Columbia Cir· 
cuit. 
[February - , 1981] 
Memorandum of JusTICE WHITE, 
I approach this case a good deal differently than do Lewi! 
and those who agree with most or all of his submission. 
This memorandum first reviews the posture of this c~ 
as it comes to us. It then deals with the wiretap stattlte, 
concluding that while Title III does not disturb the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority, wh~tever that may be, to 
wiretap without a warrant in national security situations~ it 
does declare illegal and provide a remedy for any warrant-
less interceptions for which the Constitution requires a mag-
istrate's prior approval, as well as for any unre8$0nable wire• 
taps whether or not the ConstitutiQn requites · a warra,nt. 
Hence, Title III affords a remedy at least as broad as that 
afforded by an implied Biv~ns cause of ·action fQr a Fourth 
Amendment violation. Therefore, th~ latter cause of action 
need not be pursued in this case,. This seems to me by. far 
the most sensible reading of Title III and its legi$lative 
history. 
It is then submitted that because this is primarily a Title 
III case, there is no necessity or occasion to address the Pres-
ident's immunity from damages in a Bivens c~. The im-
munity question, if there is one before us, is whether the 
President and his aides are immune from Title III liability. 
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The petitioners concede they did not bring that issue here, 
although they do not by any means concede that the Presi-
dent would not be immune· from, congre~siOJ!ally created rem-
edies such as those contained in Title III. We could prop-
erly postpone addressing this issue, as Lewis seems tO do, but 
because absolute · immunity is meant in part to 'relieve a de-
fendant of the burden, of litjgat~on in cases such as this one, 
it would not be improper to decide the question · sua sponte. 
At least, I take this COUl'Se in ~his memorandum, concluding 
that Congress may not only establish the ground rules for 
Presidential wiretapping in national security cases, a matter 
which does not appear to be in dispute. but may also impose 
remedies for the violation of those 'rules. 
Finally, I offer a few comments o'n Lewis' treatment of the 
immunity of the petitioners from damages liability.1 
][ 
The respondents claimed damages a.gainst petitioners under 
both Title III of the Omnibus·Crime Cont'rol and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §. 2510 et seq., and the Fourth Amend-
ment. The District Court dismiss'ed the statutory claim on 
the ground that "defendants'· determination that· Title ·III 
was inapplicable to the Halperin ·wiretap· was reasonable dur-
ing the period of surveillance [ahd there was] no genuine 
issue of fact in the record controverting· this good faith belief 
' on defendants' part." '66A. 
1 I would agree with petitioners that Keith should not be applied retro-
actively and would not oppose saying so, since that is one of the questiqns 
presented in the petition and will be involved in the Title III proceedings 
remanded to the District Court. · Also, although the -question is not here 
and there is no need to addre55 it, I would agree with petitioners that on 
this record the Halperin tap, though warrantless, was reasonable at· the 
outset . and that even if the tap at some point became unreasonable and 
hence violative of the Constitution and of Title III, the President might 
be exonerated on the ground that he was not responsible for the unr~Oll-
. -able tontihuation of the tap. 
.-
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On the constitutional claim, the court held that the warrant 
requirement was inapplicable during the period of the Hal-
perin tap, which was prior to this Court's decision in United 
States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U. S. 297 
(1972), but observed that there could be "no serious conten-
tion" that the independent requirement, under the Fourth 
Amendment, of reasonableness was suspended in the area of 
national security : "Even if § 2511 (3) and prior presidential 
practice could be invoked to authorize warrantless wiretaps, 
national security surveillance still must be 'exercised in a 
manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment,' " 67 A, 
quoting from Keith, supra, at 320. The court did not ques-
tion that the Executive had been "justifiably" concerned with 
unauthorized disclosure~ injurious to the public interest and 
that wiretapping had been adopted to "investigate and curb 
leaks." 68A. But without stopping to determine whether 
there was probable cause to select Halperin as one of the 
wiretap targets, 68A, the Court determined that in any event 
the Halperin tap was unreasonable : "Even granting the ino 
applicability of the general warrant requirement ... [the 
Halperin tap was] per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment and unjustified by any possible exception 
thereto." 70A. Specifically, the District Court found: 
"The evidence here reflects a twenty-one month wiretap 
continuance without fruits or evidence of wrongdoing, 
a failure to renew or evaluate the material obtained, and 
lack of records and procedural compliance, a seemingly 
political motive for the later surveillance and dissemina-
tion of reports, and an apparent effort to conceal the 
wiretap documents. . . . Regardless of intention, they 
violated plaintiffs' basic, constitutional right to freedom 
from unreasonable search and seizure. Like any other 
citizen, these officials are charged with knowledge of 
established law and must be held accountable for per· 
sonal misconduct/' 74A. 
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The District Court further held that none of the defendants 
could claim absolute immunity 11for their excessive improper 
actions" ; nor was the defense of qualified immunity available 
since petitioners' claim of 11subjective good faith" was con-
troverted by 11the undisputed record in this case," 73A. After 
further proceedings, the court determined that only nominal 
damages should be awarded. 
The Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the District 
Court and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of 
Appeals held that Title III was available to respondents aa a 
basis for liability : If, as was alleged, the Halperin tap was 
not instituted for one of the purposes exempted from Title 
III by § 2511 (3), the statutory remedies would be available. 
Title III would also apply to "any period during which the 
wiretap did not involve the primary purpose of protecting 
national security information against foreign intelligence ac-
tivities." 28A. In the Court of Appeals' view, the holding 
in Keith was retroactive and, therefore, the warrant require--
ment of the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the Hal-
perin tap. Petitioners could, however, escape liability for 
failing to secure a warrant by proving their defense of quali-
fied immunity. Furthermore, if for any period of time the 
Halperin tap failed the Fourth Amendment test of reason,.. 
ableness, petitioners would be liable for the constitutional 
violation. Finally, the court rejected all claims of absolute 
immunity, concluding that qualified immunity was ampl~ 
protection for the conduct involved in tbis case. 
The Court of Appeals remanded the <;ase to the District 
Court for further proceedings ·to determine whether and to 
what extent petitioners were liable under Title III, as wen 
as to determine the exact period of time during which the 
Halperin tap was unreasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. On remand, the District Court was also 
to reconsider the issue of damages. 
Petitioners raised three questions in their petition for cer-
:tiorari ~ whether the President .and his Closest advisors arre 
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absolutely immune from personal damages liability for deci-
sions made in the exercise of the President'-s official author-
ity; whether these federal officers are entitled to qualified 
immunity as a matter of law for authorizing electronic sur-
veillance for national security purposes prior to this Court's 
decision in Keith,· and whether the Keith case should be ap-
plied retroactively to create personal damages liability for 
federal officers. Petitioners did not seek review of the Court 
of Appeals' holding with respect to Title III nor of the re-
mand for further proceedings on the statutory claim. Peti-
tioners do not suggest that Congress is powerless to define the 
circumstances and the procedures under which electronic sur-
veillance may be employed by the Executive Branch, whether 
for national security purposes or otherwise. Nor do they ask 
us to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that 
at least for some period of its existence it was 11most likely" 
that the Halperin wiretap violated Title III. 
II 
Section 2520 of Title III expressly provides that 11any per ... 
!50n whose wire or oral communication is intercepted ... in 
violation of this chapter shall ( 1) have a civil cause of action 
against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or pro-
cures any other person to intercept ... such communica-
tions. . . ." The section further specifies the damages an 
aggrieved individual shall be entitled to recover against the 
person or persons who violate the statute: 
"(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated dam-
ages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of 
violation or $1,000, whichever is higher; 
u (b) punitive damages; and 
u (c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation 
costs reasonably incurred." 
Finally, the section provides violators a limited defense to 
s.uch private damage claims ~ ''A good faith reliance on :a court 
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order or on the provisions 6f section 2518 (7) of this chapter 
shall constitute a complete defense." 
Petitioners do not claim that they fall within the statu-
torily provided defense : No court order was ever obtained, 
and although petitioners could perhaps have made use of the 
emergency procedures specified in § '2518 (7), this section re-
·. quires that application for a court order be made within ·48 
hours after the inception of a warrantless wiretap. No such 
·application was made here. 
The sparse 'legislative "history on the civil dama.ges provi. 
sion of the statute indicates that Congress intended it ·to 
·be the exclusive feaer9J remedy for wiretaps violating the 
terms of the statute and that Congress intended the remedy 
'to extend as far as the statute's prohibitions: "The scope of 
' the remedy is intended to be ' both comprehensive and exclu-
sive, but there is no intent to preempt parallel State law." 2 
· The scope of this remedy is "limiteu only· by the definition of 
the term "person" in the statute: " '[P] erson' means any 
employee, or a.gent of the ·uniteu States ... ;" § 2510 (6) .3· 
This definition is surely so broad as to include petitioners, 
unless they are otherwise exempteCl from the substantive ·re-
. quirements of the Act. 
Section 2511 prohibits, except as otherwise specifically pro-
. vided in Title III, any person from intercepting or disclosing· 
any wire communication. 'This broad prohibition on wire-
taps that do not conform to the proceoures established ·by 
the Act is subject to several exceptions. §§ 25U (2), (3) . 
'The only execption relevant to this case ·is that contained ·in· 
§ 2511 (3), which provides:' 
81Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit the· 
2 S. Rep. No. '1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 107. 
8 The Senate Report emphasized that the definition was intended to be 
·«comprehensive" and that it "expliCitly includes any officer or employee 
"Of the United States," excluding only the governmental units themselves. 
ld., at 90-91. 
" Thete waa some dispute in .United States w. United St.ates District. 
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eonstitutional power of the President to take such meas .. 
ures as he deems necessary . .. to protect national secu-
rity information against foreign intelligence activities .... 
The contents of any wire or oral communication inter-
cepted by authority of the President in the exercise of 
the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in 
any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such 
interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise 
used or disclosed e"cept as is necesary to implement that 
power." 
JusTICE PowELL understands this subsection to exempt 
from Title III any wiretap with a "Bational security pur-
pose," at least when the wiretap is carried out pursuant to 
presidential authorization. For JusTICE PowELL the scope 
of Title III's application to petitioners depends upon an 
analysis of their subjective intent: A wiretap that was objec-
tively unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, may not fall 
within the prohibitions of 'title Ill if it "retained a national 
security purpose." Ante, at 11. Such a reading of § 2511 
(3) is inconsistent with the plain language of Title III, with 
this Court's previous interpretation of § 2511 (3), and with 
the legislative history of Title III. 
In United States v. Un£ted States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297 (1972), (Keith) the Court addressed and rejected the 
Government's claim that § 2511 (3) recognizes or affirms the 
power of the President to conduct warrantless searches in 
pursuit of the national security : "[T]he statute is not the 
measure of the executive authority asserted in this area.'~ 
ld., at 308. ·The Court found that Congress did not intend 
Court, 407 U. S. 297 ( 1972), as to whether § 2511 (3) is more appropriately 
characterized a.s an "exemption" or a ''disclaimer;'' The label used is 
not important : "it is apparent from the face of the section and its legisla-
tive history that if this interception is one of those described in § 2511 (3), 
it is not reached by the statutory ban •..• " !d., at 338 (WHJTE, ;r •• 
•conourr."J.Il,g). 
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"to take anything away from [the President]," 3 but only to 
''[leave] presidential powers where it found them." ld., at 
303. Keith found that Congress had no intent il). enacting 
Title III to limit the President's constitutional powers in cer-
tain specific areas; Keith did not address, and no reasonable 
inference can be drawn from that opinion concerning, the 
reach of the sta.tutory prohibition with respect to actions by 
the President that do not fall within ·his "constitutional 
. powers." e 
8 United States District Court, supra., at 307, quoting Senator McClel-
lan. 114 Cong. Rec. 14751. 
6 JusTICE PowELL would draw such an inference from Keith. He cites 
the following statement from Keith to support his argument that Title III 
is inapplicable to wiretaps engaged in for a national security purpose, re-
. gardless of their constitutionillity: "We ·therefore thinK: the conclusion 
inescapable that Congress only intended to n:1a'ke clear that the Act simply 
did not legislate with respect to national security surveillances." (Empha-
sis added by JUSTICE PowELL.) Ante, at '12 .. In the aostract, this state-
ment appears to support JusTICE PowELL's position; in · the context 'in 
which it was written, it aoes not. 
Title III was introduced into· the Keith case by the Government, not 
the respondent. Tht:! Government's position in · that case was· that ·-the 
President had the authority to conduct warrantless wiretaps for national 
security purposes. In support of this position the Government relied on 
§ 2511 (3), arguing' that in it "Congress recognized the · President's au-
thority to conduct such surveillance wit1wut prior -judicial approvaL" 
Thus, the discussion of the statute in· Keith was directed only at this one 
issue: was § 251i (3) a "recognition or affirmance of a constitutional au-
thority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveil-
lance" ? 407 U. S., at -303. 
The Court's analysis of the statute emphasized. that contrary to the 
Government's position the section "confers no power." Ibid. It was in 
this context that the statement that JusTICE PowELL relies upon was 
made : It meant only that Congress expressed no view as to any power 
the President may or may not ha.ve in this regard . Having rejected the 
Government's position ·that · Title III conferred such power upon the 
President, the Court went on to examine the question of whether the 
President had such power under the Constitution . The Court concluded 
that 'he did not , .and that ended the inquiry in Keith : as the Court saw 
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·The plain language of the exception indicates that the 
President is exempted from the requirements of the Act only 
to the extent that he pursues the specified substantive ends 
according to the powers given to him by the Constitution.7 
it Keith presented no occasion to go on to the further question of whether 
the "constitutional warrant requirement for domestic-security surveillances 
was incorporated into the statutory requirements of Title IIL" Ante, at 
13. I do not agree, therefore, that the failure to reach this issue in Keith 
supports an inference that Title III did not incorporate constitutional 
limits on presidential power. 
The analysis of the structure of Title III presented in Keith, in fact, 
supports the position taken in this memorandum. The Court there con-
trasted the language of § 2511 (3) with that of the four exceptions in 
§ 2511 (2), which state : "It shall notbe unlawful under this chapter ..• 
to intercept" some particular type of communication. This language ex-
empts the type of communication involved from the otherwise blanket 
prohibition on wiretaps not in conformity with the statute, regardless of 
the legality of those wiretaps under ·tbe Constitution or other· laws. ·As 
the Court noted in Keith, 'this language is not used inT2511 (3): "Rather 
than stating that warrantless ·presidential uses of ·electrohic surveillance 
'shall not be unlawful' arid thus employing 'the standard language of 
exception, sUbsection 13) merely disclaims any' intention to · 'limit ·the con-
stitutional power of 'the President.'" ld., at· 304. ·JusTICE PowELL's 
present reading of s'ubsection (3) ignores this' difference. 
Nor does JusTICE PowELL accurately read my concurring opinion in 
Keith . Ante, at 13. · JusTICE- PowELL forgets ·that prior to Keith the 
application of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to national 
security wiretaps was not Clear; Katz v. United States; 389 U. S. 347, 358, 
n. 23 (1967) . It was my position In Keith that the Court need not re-
solve that. issue because the Government agreed that the wiretap was 
illegal under Title III unless saved by § 2511 (3) and because, as I saw 
it, even if the warrantless tap was one the· PreSident could impose with-
out violating · the Constitution, it was nevertheless not within the cate-
gories of wiretaps saved by § 2511 (3) . · Of course, if, as the government 
argued, § 2511 (3) exempted the tap from the statutory prohibition, then 
'it would have been necessary, as the Court believed it was, to determine 
whether the tap was constitutionally permissible. There is no incon-
·sistency: between my position now and my positioh in Keith . 
· 1 " [T]he limitation on the applicability of § 2511 (1) was not open-
' \~tnd~c;l; ~. it -was confined tQ those situations that § 2511 (3) specially.~~ 
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!flhe language does not say that the President is exempt from 
the Act's provisions whenever he takes "such measures as he 
deems necessary ... "; rather, it specifies that he may · t~ke 
such measures independently of the requirem~nts of the Act. 
only to the degree that he has the "constitutional power" to 
do so.8 As Senator Holland put it during the Senate's con-
sideration of this exception: 
"We are simply saying that hothing herein shall limit. 
such power as the President has under the Constitution. 
If he does not have the power to do any specific thing, 
we need not be concerned.H 
Because the Act specifica.lly addresses the scope of a presi-
dential exemption from Title III, it c~n properiy be inferred 
that Congress intended presidentiai acts failing outside of the· 
iimits of the language of the exception to be covered by the 
provisions of the Act.9 if "l(ei{h, for e'Xampie, had been de-
scribed. Thus, even assuming the constitutionality of a warrantless sur-
veillance authorized by the President to uncov~r private or official graft ... 
the interception would be illegal under § 2511 {1) because it is not the 
type of presidential action saved by . .. § 25li (3) .;. United States Dis-
trict Court, supra, at 338, n. 2 (WHITE, J., concurring) . 
8 Petitioners conceded beiow and do not contend otherwise here that 
the President is subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fcurth 
Amendment . 
9 There is one possible contrary indication · in the language of the .. Act .. 
Section 2515 pro~ibits the use in any proceedi~g of any materials recei,·ed 
in violation of the Act. The fact that § ~511 (3) further restricts the· 
use of information gathered from wiretaps that fall within that exception 
to instances in which "such interception was reasonable" might be read, . 
therefore, as indicating that the scope of the exception was greater than 
the President's constitUtional authority. That is, the exception might 
cover all wiretaps authorized by the President, regardless of whether those· 
taps fall within the Fourth Amendment1s reasonableness requirement. I 
believe that the leglsl~tive history discussed below indicates that .the "rea-
sonableness requirement" was included in § 2511 (3) only because Congress 
was not certain how broad the President's power was. It. intended, there-
fore, to put clear limits on the use of evidehce derived from such taps, 
-=re~a-fdles& of the llltlma.te decisiQll on the scope of the Preaid.ent1s a'uthorhy _ 
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cided before § 2511 (3) was enacted, there could be no doubt 
that warrantless wiretapping for domestic security purposes 
would violat-e Title III as well as the Fourth Amendment. 
The Senate debate over the exception for national security 
wiretaps sheds light on the scope of the exception for the 
President in two ways.H) That debate demonstrated consid-
erable uncertainty in the Senate itself over the reach of the 
exception. Senator Yarborough objected to the provision on 
the ground that it "declares that the President has the con-
stitutional power, without any order of the court, to take any 
measure he deems necessary to protect the Nation against 
actual or potential attack or danger." 11 Senator Long urged 
rejection of the bill because it gave "unlimited power to au-
thorize tapping in national security cases" to the President. 
Senator Fong argued that the President does have, as Com-
mander in Chief, power to authorize certain warrantless wire-
taps, but that the proposed exception went too far. 12 Re-
sponding to this expansive reading of the exception. Senators 
Hart, McClellan, and Holland engaged in the colloquy re-
viewed in the Keith decision on the meaning of § 2511 (3).U 
Senator Hart emphasized his fear that the provision would 
be read as a grant to the President of unlimited authority 
to tap and Senator McClellan, the sponsor of the bill, and 
Senator Holland responded that there was no such intent. 
Rather, the section used neutral language to indicate that 
the scope of the exception was no broader than the scope of 
the President's power. As Senator Hart concluded: "[I] f 
the President has such a power, then its exercise is in no way 
affected by title." 14 
10 This provision was never discussed on the floor of the House. 
11 114 Cong. Rec. 14730 (1968). 
12 /d., at 14704. 
1 8 See United States District Court, supra, at 306-307; 114 Cong. Rec. 
14750-14751 (1968). 
14 JusTICE PowELL properly reads this statement by Senator Hart to 
mean that Congress did not jntend to "IaffectJ the assumed .Power of the 
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The debate also indicates that there was some uncertainty 
over the power of Congress to place limits on the President. 
Senator McClellan was convinced that the Senate had no 
power to restrict the constitutional powers of the President: . . . 
"I do not want to undertake to detract from any power 
the President already has. ·I do not think we could do 
so by legislation ~?-yway. In fact, I know we 'could ·not." 
From his point of view the purpose of the section was more 
formal than substantive: Whether it was there or not,. the 
President's constitutional powers remained what they were. 
There were, then, two grounds for including § 2511 (3): 
a desire not to restrict whatever. constitutional authority the 
President had in this area and a belief that any attempt 
President ... to wiretap in the national security area." Ante, at 13. But 
to create a statutory remedy for actions that t~e President· concededly has 
no authority to perform under the Constitution is hardly to affe.ct the 
power of the President-except in a most indirect manner. J;usTICE 
PowELL assumes that such a Temedy would somehow have such an effect 
and therefore infers that Congress had no intent to incorporate the con-
stitutional reasonableness requirement into Title III. Senator Hart's 
statement does not support such an inference: He· casts his statement as 
a conditional statement; the condition he interposes iS the limit placed on 
presidential authority by the Constitution. I do not see how one can 
read this to imply that if tl1e President does not have such power, then in 
that case too he is "in no way affected by Title III." , 
Although Senator Hart in his exchange with Senators McClellan and 
Holland was particularly concerned with emphasizing that ·§ 2511 (3) was 
not to be interpreted as implyipg congressional authorization for war-
rantless wiretaps by the President, he also made clear that-he rejected a 
reading of §2511 (3) that turned on. the subjective intent of the.President: 
"But if, in fact, we are here sayjng that so long as· the -President thinks 
it is an activity that constitutes a clear and present danger to the struc-
ture or existence of the Government, he can put a bug on without re-
fltraint, then clearly I think we are going too far." · ll;l Gong. -Rec.-14751. 
At least in his view, § 2511 (3) was not intended to serve as. a .shield 
behind which the President could retreat simply by interposing a claimed 
nationalJ security intent. · · 
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to restrict this authority would be unconstitutional. Under 
either rationale, the scope of the exception for presidentially 
~uthorized wiretaps is no broader than the scope of the con .. 
stitutional power of the President to engage in wiretaps to 
pl'otect national security information. 'The reverse side of 
this, however, is that Congress intended that the statute 
cover the President insofar as it would be constitutional and 
insofar as the President did not have constitutiona:l authority 
ln this area. 'Thus, the civil damages remedy created by the 
Act is applicable 'to the President insofar as his actions do 
not fall within the scope of the exception. 
III 
No one in this case suggests that Congress is powerless to 
forbid, impose restrictions on, or establish the procedures for 
wiretapping in national security cases. 'Similarly, no one 
suggests that Congress may not provide remedies for wire-
taps that the Constitution forbids. ·Nor ·is ·it ·urged, as 'I 
understand it, that ·congress may not forbid or regulate na-
tional security wiretaps that the Constitution · might other-
wise permit to be carried out without a warrant.15 ·Indeed, 
petitioners note that § 2511 (3) ·has been repealed: "Congress 
had recently demonstrated [in the 19'78 ·Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act] its capacity to oversee the actions of · the 
Executive Branch, including "Executive action in the areas of 
national security and foreign affairs." -Petitioner's Brief ·-ao, 
n. 27. 
' Petitioners conceded below and do not indicate otherwiee 
here that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement 
applies to the ·President : The President has no constitutiona1 
authority to en·gage in unreasonable wiretaps. It follows 
15 Specifically, had Keith been decided the other ·way and held that 
warrantless national security wiretaps in domestic cases are not subject to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, Congress could 
uonethele6s require a warrant or other conditions for such interceptio~. 
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from . t4e ab9ve analysis of Title .III that ~nsofar as the wire· 
tap involved in this case was unreasonable under the Fourth 
· Amendment, it was also illegal under Title III. The Crime 
Control Statute is a complex law but it clearly makes illegal 
a Pre$identially auth~rized wiretap that complies neither· with 
the procedures of Title III nor· with the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.' If that is -the case, respondents- are 
entitled to the dama.ges remedy specifie.d in the Act-in fact, 
that is their exclusive federal remedy-unless appli:cation of 
the damages provision of the statute to the President and ~is 
aides is unconstitutionaL 
· When Title III is understood in this way, unconstitutional 
wiretaps are proscribed by the Act and fully adequate rem-
e<lies are provided by that law. Congress has occupied the 
field in this regard and there is no occasion in cases such as 
this to pursue a cause of action directly under the Constitu-
tion. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that there could 
not be double punishment for an unconstitutional wiretap 
· that also violated Title III. 31A, n. 5: Lewis Powell has 
similarly observed that where Title III and the ·Bivens cause 
of action overlap, the latter need not be given further con-
sideration. Ante, at n. 50. On remand, it is to be deter-
mined whether for any period of time the Halperin wiretap 
required a warrant or was otherwise unreasonable under· the 
Constitution : In either event, the statute would ha.ve been 
violated. The Bivens cause of action will, therefore, be be-
side the point on remand. If a statutory violation is found, 
the question of whether Congress may constitutionally sub-
Ject the President and his aides to damages liability for vio-
lating an otherwise valid statute will have to be faced . 
This raises the question of whether we should now address 
the question of the President's immunity from Title -III dam-
ages liability. 'Petitioners have not . brought the Title -III 
issue here. · They say they are quite confident they ·will)2re-
vail in the· courts below:· Perhaps they iWill, at least · wi.th. 
• • 0 \... 
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respect to the President. On this record, it could be held 
that the Halperin tap was a valid national security intercep-
tion at the outset; if it became unreasonable at a later time, 
the President and perhaps others may not be responsible for 
that development. In that event, the immunity issue, how-
ever it might be decided, would not be relevant. 
I am nevertheless persuaded that we should deal with the 
Title III immunity question at this time. A major reason 
for extending absolute immunity to the performance of cer-
tain official functions is to protect the official from the un-
avoidable distraction that defending serious litigation inevit-
ably entails. In the present posture of this case, the Title 
III litigation contemplated by the Court of Appeals' remand 
will go forward in the District Court, and petitioners must 
defend that litigation. It is true that immunities are usually 
defenses to be pleaded and proved by the defendants, but 
considering and passing on a dispositive defense at an early 
stage of the litigation is within the anticipation of the gov .. 
erning rules, and in an immunity case, there is every reason 
to do so. 
Furthermore, although petitioners have brought here only 
the question of immunity from damages for having violated 
the Constitution, they have not abandoned their position that 
the President is absolutely immune from damages under Title 
III as well. The immunity argument they present is based 
on constitutional text and history as well as upon a functional 
analysis of the Presidency in the light of the sepa.ration of 
powers doctrine. These arguments would also have to be 
faced in dealing with the question whether Congress may con-
stitutionally create a cause of action for damages against the 
President. The upshot is that although the question of Title 
III immunity is not among the questions raised in the peti-
tion for certiorari, we ·have the authority to reach that ques .. 
tion, and 1 would do so. 
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whether these petitioners should have ~ juqic_ially createq 
i~munity to a judicially created cause of action. Rather, it 
is whether Congress may not only establish rules for national 
security wiretaps but may also provide a damages remedy 
against those federal officials, includii)g the President, who 
breach those rules. This is a considerably different question' 
than the one that Lewis Poweii answers. Indeed, he ex-
pressly withhoids judgment on "whether the statutory dam_. 
J~,ge remedy fot illegai wiretapping estabiished by 1\tle III, 
18 U. S. C. § 2S20 ... appiies to the President, and whether, 
if so, this remedy is within the power of Congress." Ante; 
at n. 35. 
IV 
As I see it,· only two of the. argu;ments that the Governmen ~ 
makes in support of an absolut.e immunity for the Pres:dent' 
from civil liability need be adc,iressed: absolute immunity is 
an "incidental power" Qf th~ P~esidency, historically recog.:. 
nized as implicit in the Constitution, and absolute immunity 
is required by the separation of powers doctrine. 
A 
.. 
The Constitution, in the Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, 
§ 6, guarantees absolute immunity to Members of Congress;' 
nowhere, however, doe~ Jhe Constitution .~irectly address the 
issue of presidenti~l _it;nmuni~y.16 • Nevertheless, petitioners. 
argue that the debates at ,the Copstitutiqnal Convention and 
the early history of constitutional interpretation demonstrate 
an implicit assumption of absolute presidential immunity. 
In support of this position, petitioners rely primarily on three 
separate items : first, remarks made during the discussion of' 
16 In fact , insofar as the Constitution does addre..."S the issue of Presi~ . 
dential liability,it takes a very different approach from that taken in the 
Speech or Debate Clause. The possibility of impeachment assures: .that. 
the President can be held accountable to the other branches qf Go¥ern-
mentl for his a,ctions and the .Constitution further states that impeacbhient 
I t • 1 I ~ 
c:l.oes not bar criminal l?rosecutton, 
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f>l'esidential impeachment at the Convention; second, re· 
marks made during the first Senate; and third, the views of 
Justice Story. 
The debate at the Convention on whether or not the Presi-
dent should be impeachable did touch on the potential dan-
gers of subjecting the President to the control of another 
branch, the Legislature.11 Governor Morris, for example, 
complained of the potential for dependency and argued that 
11 [the President] can do no criminal act without Coadjutors 
who may be punished. In case he shc-uld be re elected, that 
will be sufficient proof of his innocence." 18 Col. Mason re-
sponded to this by asking if "any man [shall] be above Jus-
tice" and argued that this was ieast appropriate for the mall 
"who can commit the most extensive injustice." 19 Madison 
agreed· that "it [is] indispensable that some provision should 
be made for defending the Community agst the incapacity, 
negligence or perfidy of th~ chief Magistra.te." 20 fi!J.kney 
responded on the other side, believing that if gran~
power, the Legislature would. hold impeachment "as a rod 
over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his 
independence." 21 
Petitioners conclude from this that the delegates meant 
impeachment to be the exclvsive means of holding the Presi-
dent personally responsible for his misdeeds, outs:de of elec-
toral' politics. This conclusion, however, is hardly supported 
by the debate. Although some of the delegates expressed 
concern over limiting presidi:mtial'independence, the delegates 
voted eight to two in favor of impeachment. Whatever the 
fear of subjecting the President to the power of another 
branch, it was not sufficient, or at least not sufficiently shared, 
17 The debate is recorded in 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787; 64-69 (1934) . 
18 /d., at 64. 
19 !d., at 65. 
20 Ibid. 
21 /d; at 66.~. 
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to insulate the President from political liability iri the im-
peachment process. 
Moreover, the Convention debate· did not focus on wrongs 
the Presi'dent might commit against individuals, but rather 
on whether there should l:,e a method ef holding him account-
, able for · w.hat might be termed wrongs against the state. 
'Thus, examples of the abuses with which the de egates were 
concerne<! ·were betrayal, oppression, and bribery; the dele-
gates feared that the · alternative to an impeachment mech-
anism woqld be "tumults and insurrect1ons" byt he people 
in response to such abuses. "The only conclusions that can 
be drawn from this debate are that the independence of the 
Executive was not understood to require a total 'lack of ac-
countability to the otper branches and there -was·no general 
desire to insulate the· President from the -consequences of-.his 
improper acts. 
The second piece of historical evidence cited by petiti9ners 
is an el!:change at the "first meeting of the Senate involving 
Vice-President Adams aud Senators Ellsworth and Maclay. 
The debate started over whether or not the words "the Presi-
dent" should be included at the--beginning of Federal writs, 
similar to the manner ip which English writs ran in the 
King's name. Senator Maclay thought that this would im-
properly combine the executive and judicial branches. ·This, 
in turn, led to a discussion of the proper relation between the 
two. Senator Ellsworth · and Vice-President Adams defended 
the proposition that 
uthe President, personally, was not subject to any proc-
ess whatever ; could have no action, whatever, brought 
against him; was above the power of judges, justices, &c. 
For [that] would put it 'in the power of a common_ jus-
tice to exercise any authority over him, and stop the 
whole machine of government." 22 
'22 W. Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of · the United 
~ St~tes in -1789- 1791, 152 (1969). ' 
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In their view the impeachment process was the exclusive 
form of process available against the President. Senator 
MacClay ardently opposed this view and put the case of a 
President committing "~er .. in the stre~t." In his view, in 
such a case neither impeachment nor resurrection were the 
, exclusive means of holding the President to the law; rather, 
there was "loyal justice." Senator MacClay, who recorded 
the exchange, concludes his notes with the remark that none 
of this "is worth minuting, but it shows clearly how amaz-
ingly fond of the old leaven many people are." 28 In his 
view, Senator Ellsworth and his supporters had not fully 
comprehended the difference in the political position of the 
American President and that of the British monarch. Again, 
nothing more can be concluded from this than that it was no 
clearer then than now what was the proper scope of presiden-
tial accountability and whether the President should be sub-
ject to judicial process. 
The final item cited by petitioners clearly supports their 
position, but is of such late date that it contributes little to 
understanding the original intent. In his Commentaries on 
the Constitution, published in 1833, Justice Story described 
the~wers" of the President: 
"Among these must necessarily be included the power 
to perform [his functions] without any obstruction or 
impediment whatsoever. 'The President cannot, there-
fore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, 
while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; 
{ J and for this purpose his person must be deeme~, in civil 
fj cases at least, to possess an official inviolability. In the 
exercise of his political powers he is to use his own discre-
tion, and he is accountable only to his country and to his 
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is subject to no control, and his discretion, when exer-
cised, is conclusive." 24 
While Justice Story may have been firmly committed t<J 
this view in 1833, Sena,!?r Pinckng, a delegate to the Con-
vention, was as firmly committed to the QID?Osite view in 
1800.23 Senator Pinckney, arguing on the · floor of the Sen-
ate, contrasted the pri~:iles.es ex~nded to members of Con-
gress by the Constitution with the lack of any such privileges 
extended to the· Pre~ident.20 ' He argued that this was a · de-
liberate choice of the delegates to the Convention, who "well 
lcnew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had· 
been exercised in Great Britain, and were determined no such 
authority should ever be exercised here." Therefore, "[n]o 
privilege of this kind was intended for your ·Executive, ~or· 
any except that ... for your· Legislature." 27 
:c 2 J . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution · 372 (1873). 
~3 It is not possible to detennine whether this is the same Pinckney that 
Madison recorded as Pinkney, 'who· objected at the Convention to granting 
a _power of impeachment to· the Legislature. Two·· charles Pinckneys.at-
tended the Convention. Both were from South Carolina.· See 3 · M. Far-
tand, 8'!lpra, at 559. 
26 Senator Pinckney's comments are recorded at 10 Annals of Congress 
69'-83. Petitioners argue that these remarks are not relevant because 
they concerned only the aut~,!!!it.z of Con~.§J:.o inquire into the ori in of 
an ... !JJ.l~~Ji.belous news~aper article. ·Although this was the occasion for 
the remarks, Pinckney dld discuss the ·immunity of members of Congress 
as a privilege embodied in the Speech and Debate Clause: "our Constitu-
~ion slij)j)OS~ no man ... to be infallible, l:iut consiifers them all as mere· 
~en. to be 81.1bject to. all the passions and frailties, an~es, that men 
generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of such as ought 
to be tried, and Jeave8 the members of the Legis~, for their proceed-
~ngs, to be amenable to their constituents and to public opinion .... " Jd., 
at 7J. This, then, was one of the privileges of Congress that he was con-
t~asting with those extended (or not· extended) to the President. 
27 Nor are Thomas Jefferson's views on the relation of the President to · 
the judicial process quite so clear as JusTICE PowELL suggests. It wopld' 
be surprising if President Jefferson had not argued strongly for such im-
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In previous immunity CMes the Court has emphasized the 
importance of the immunity afforded the particular govern-
ment official at common law.. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U. S. 409, 421 (1976) . Clearly this sort of analysis is not 
possible when dealing with an office, the presidency, that did 
not exist at common law. To the extent that historical in-
quiry is appropriate in this context, it is constitutional his-
tory, not common law, that is relevant. From the history 
discussed above, however, all that can be concluded is that 
absolute immunity from civil liability for the President finds 
no firm support in constitutional text or history, or in the 
explanations of the early commentators. This is took weak a 
ground to support a declaration by this Court that Title III 
is unconstitutional as applied to the President. 
munity from judicial process, particularly in a confrontation with Chief 
Justice Marshall. Jefferson's views on this issue before he became Presi-
dent would be a good deal more significant. Unfortunately he does 
not appear to have commented on the issue; perhaps because he was out 
of the country during the Constitutional Convention. It a.ppears, how-
ever, that in Jefferson's second and third drafts of the Virginia Con~ti­
tution, which also proposed a separation of the powers of government 
into three separate branches, he specifically proposed that the Executive 
be . subject to judicial process: "he shall be liable to action, tho' not to 
personal restraint for private duties or wrongs." 1 Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson 350, 360. Also Significant is the fact that when Jefferson's 
followers tried to impeach Justice Chase !n 1804-1805, one of the grounds 
of their attack on him was that ·he had refu~ed to subpoena President 
Adams during the trial of Dr. Cooper for sedition. See Corwin, "The 
President: Office and Powers" 113. Finally, it is worth noting that 
even in the middle of the debate over Chief Justice Marshall's power to 
subpoena the President during the Burr trial, Jefferson looked to a legis-
lative solution of the confrontation: "I hope however that ... at the 
ensuing session of the legislature [the Chief Justice] may have means pro-
vided for giving to individuals the benefit of the testimony of the [Execu-
tive] functionaries in proper cases." X Works of Thomas Jefferson, 407 
n. (P. Ford Ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to Geo~e 
Hay, United States District Attorney for Virginia). · 
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'l'here is no bright line that can be drawn between consti .. 
tutionally based separation of powers arguments in favor of 
·a,bsolute immunity and public policy arguments in favor of 
such immunity. This lack of a bright line necessarily fol-
lows from the Court's functional interpretation of the ~e:p .. 
aration of powers doctrine : 
"[l]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper 
balance between the coordinate branches, the ·proper in· 
quiry focuses on the extent to 'which it ·prevents the 
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 433 U. S. 425', 433 (1977). . 
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-707 (1974); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v: Sawyer, ·-579; •635 (19q2) 
(Jackson, J ., concurring) . Similarly, petitioners argue ·that 
public policy favors ab'solute immunity 'because · absent such 
immunity the President's ability to execute his constitutionQ 
ally mandated obligations will be impaired. The difference, 
then, is only one of degree. While abso1ute immunity might 
maximize executive efficiency and therefore be a worthwhile 
policy, lack of such immunity may not so disrupt the func-
tioning of the presidency as to vio1ate the separation of 
powers doctrine. Since liability in this case is of congressional 
t>rigin , petitioners must demonstrate that subjecting the .Presi-
dent to private damages actions fpr constitutional violations 
will prevent him from "accomplishing [his] constitutionally 
assigned functions." I do not 'believe that petitioners have 
met this burden. 
First, there can be no serious claim that the separation of 
powers doctrine insulates presidential action from judicial 
review or insulates the President from judicial process; · No 
claim is made here that the President; whatever his liability 
for-ll\on:ey damages, is not &ubject to the cQutts' · inj:uncttve 
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powers.28 See, e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co, supra; 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 38 (1935). Petitioners, in 
fact, argue that the possibility of judicial review of presiden-
tial actions supports their claim of absolute immunity: Judi-
cial review "serves to contain and correct the unauthorized 
exercise of the President's power," making private damages 
actions unnecessary in order to achieve the same end. Peti-
tioners' Brief, at 31. Regardless of the possibility of money 
damages against the President, then, the constitutionality of 
the President's actions can and will be reviewed by the courts. 
Nor can private damages actions be distinguished on the 
ground that such claims would involve the President per-
sonally in the litigation in a way not necessitated by suits 
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against certain presi-
dential actions. The President has been ·held to be subject 
to · judicial process at least since 1807. Aaron Burr case, 25 
Ped. Cas. 30 (1807) (Chief Justice Marshall sitting as cir-
cuit justice) . Burr usquarely ruled that a subpoena may be 
directed to the President." Nixon v. Sirica, - U. S. App. 
D. C. -, 487 F. 2d ·700, 709 (1973) .29 Chief Justice Mar-
28 Nor have petitioners contended that the President is absolutely im-
·mune from criminal prosecution. Obviously the Constitution contem-
plates criminal liability in providing that impeachment does not exclude 
the possibility of criminal prosecution. 
29 Contrary to the sugg&>tion of JusTICE PowELL, ante, at n. 26, Missis-
~ippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475 (1866), carefully reserved the question of 
whether a court may compel the President himself to perform ministerial 
executive functions: 
"We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection, 
without expressing any opinion on the broader issues ... whether, in any 
case, the President ... may be required, by the process of this court, to 
perform a pu;ely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held 
amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime." 
"Similarly, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), also cited by 
Xu51'ICE PowELL, did not indicate that the President could never be sub-
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shall flatly rejected any suggestion that all judicial process, in 
and of itself, constitutes an unwarranted interference in . th.e 
Presidency: 
'
1The guard, furnished to this high officer to protect him 
from being harassed by vexatious arid unnecessary sub-
' · poenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after 
those subpoenas have issue·d; ·not in any circumstance 
which is to precede their being issued." · 25 Fed. Cas., at 
34. 
This position was recently rearticulated by the · Court ~n 
United States v. Nixon, 418' U. S. 683,· 706 (1974): 
"Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the 
need for confidentfality ... without more, {)an sustain 
an absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immu-
nity from judicial process under all circumstances:" 
These two lines of cases establish then that neither sub-
jecting presidential actions to a judicial determination of 
their constitutionality, nor subjecting the President to judi-
cial process violates the separation of powers doctrine. · With 
respect to the intrusion oi the judicial process itself on ·Ex, 
ecutive functions, subjecting the President to private claims 
for money damages; however, involves no more than this. 
If, therefore, there is a ·separation of powers problem here, · it 
must be found in · the nature of the remedy and not in · the 
process involved. 
The functional analysis of the separation of powers· doc-
ject to judicial process. In fact, it implied just the contrary in reject-
ing the argument that the mandamus sought involved an unconstitutional 
judicial infringement upon the Executive Branch : 
"The mandamus does not seek to direct or control the postmaster general' 
in the discharge of any official duty, partaking in any respect of ·an• 
of executive character; but to enforce the performance of a mere minis-
'terial act, which neither he nor the president had any r authority; .:tOJ 
deny or' cQntr.oJ." ld, .. .a.t .filO~ 
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trine and the Court's more recent immunity decisions so con-
verge on the following principle: The scope of immunity is 
determined by function, not office. The wholesale claim that 
the President is entitled to absolute immunity in all of his 
actions stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that 
all presidential communications are entitled to an absolute 
privilege, which was rejected in favor of a functional anal-
ysis by a unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, supra. 
Therefore, whatever may be true of the necessity of such a 
broad immunity in certain areas of executive responsibility,S1 
the only question that must be answered here is whether the 
use of wiretaps falls within a constitutionally assigned execu~ 
tive function, the performance of which would be significantly 
impaired by the possibility of a private action for damages 
resulting from constitutional violations. I believe it does 
not. 
In Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), we said that 
"it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should 
know he is acting outside the law, and ... insisting on an 
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not 
unduly interfere ~ith the exercise of official judgment." ld., 
at 506-507. The obvious fairness of this principle has been 
found by the Court to be outweighed orily in instances in 
which potential liability may have the effect of making one 
set of alternatives personally more attractive to the decision-
maker, without producing a similar social advantage. See 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 438 (1976) (WHITE, J ., 
concurring) . ·Thus, prosecutors and judges are absolutely 
immune because claims would only be filed against them for 
decisions to prosecute and decisions adverse to a party able 
to bring a civil damages action; society's interest, however, 
30 See Virginia Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the United States, 
No. 79-198, June 2, 1980 ; Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 511 (1978). 
81 I will not speculate on the presidential functions which may require 
absolute immunity, but a clear example would be instances in which tbe 
:President participates in prosecutorial decieion.a. 
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may be in just those alternatives which would open these 
officials to a damage claim. No such social/personal tension 
is present in this situation. 
Potential liability_ would certainly not encourage the use of 
wiretaps. The use or nonuse of wiretaps, however, is not an 
area in which society's interest is equally strong in both al-
ternatives. Rather, this is an area that Congress has thought 
proper to place within strict procedural and substantive 
limits 32 and that some recent Administrations have v;ewed 
as posing a substantial ·danger to the public interest.83 · The 
Court has also recognized the dangers posed by the nonpub-
lic-i. e., secret--character of executive actions in this area: 
"The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment ac-
cepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too 
readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and 
overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech." 
United States District Court, supra, at 317. · In an area so 
susceptible to uncorrected constitutional abuse, id., at 314, 
absolute immunity is inappropriate.84 
32 See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of' 
1968, supra, Foreign Intelligence Sun•eillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 
92 Stat. 1783. 
83 The Johnson Administration was oppcsed to Title- III of · the · 1-968 
Act on the ground that wiretapping was an unne~ees:try and an unneces-
s::trily dangerous form of intrusion. See '114 Con g. Rec. 11598 ( 1968), quot-
ing Attorne~· Gcnrral Rarrsc~· Clark. The Carter Ad'T'inistration supported· 
the substantive and procedural limits enacted in the Foreign Intelligence 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. See Statement of Attorney 
General Bell before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures 
of the Senate Ccmmittee on the Judiciary, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance· 
Act of 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13 (1977) . 
84 The lack of a public check on executive wiretapping distinguishes ¢is' 
function frcm all those in which the Court has preY-iously upheld absolute 
immunity-judicial, quasi-judicial, and legislative functions. The common 
feature of all of these, which the Court has heavily relied upon in justi-
fying absolute immunity, is their public character. This public character· 
reduces the need for "private damages actions as a means of controlling; 
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The argument that there will not be any int:-rference of 
constitutional dimensions with executive responsibilit:es here 
is particularly strong given that an executive official, includ-
ing the President, may insulate himself from potential liabil-
ity by obtaining a judicial warrant. It is difficult to argue 
that obtaining a warrant is itself an intrusion of constitutional 
dimensions on executive functions given the manner in which 
the Fourth Amendment separates and allocates powers in 
the area of government searches, including wiretaps: 35 
"The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial 
judgment, not the riek that executive discretion may be 
reasonably exercised. This jt· dicial role accords with our 
basic constitutional doctrine that indiv:dual freedoms 
will best be preserved through a separation of powers and 
division of functions among the different branches . ... " 
United States District Court, supra, at 317. 
Neither history nor doctrine support petitioners' argument. 
I conclude, therefore, that neither the judicial procees nor the 
damages liability to which Congress has subjected the Presi-
dent in this Act is unconstitutionaL 
v 
Although I think the Title III immunity issue shodd be· 
decided, if it is to be put aside and only the immunity of the· 
President and his aides from damages liability for the implied 
cause of action brought under the Constitution is to be ad-
judicated, then, as might be inferred from what has gone· 
before, I am in disagreement with JusTICE PowELL's d;sposi-
tion. In the first place, he deals with the immunity issue in 
constitutional terms. The strong preference of this Court 
has been to avoid constitutional questions rnnecessary to the-
disposition of a case. The cause of action that Bivens rec-
ognized is not expressly provided for in the Constitution; 
uSee Berger v Neu York , 388 U. S 41 (1967) ; Katz v. Uvited States • 
. 3.89, U. S, 347 (196.7 l. 
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rather, it was irnplied by this Court, Because it is a judi-
Cially ·created cause of action, any immunity from StlCh a 
claim need only be expressed as a judicially recognized im-
munity, not necessarily required by the Constitution. ·we 
did not suggest in Butz v. Economou, supra, that the immu-
nities recognized for federal officials were required by ·the 
\ ' ' ' 
-
1Constitution. We simply determined that the cause of ac-
tion the Court had fashionea in Bit:ens would not reach 
certain kinds of official conduct. Similarly, it was history, 
n.ot the Constitution, that dictateCI the immunities accorded 
state officials in § f983 actions. Pierson v. Ray, "386 U.S. 547 
(1967); Scheuer v. Rhoaes, 416 U. B. 232 (1974); Stump v. 
'Sparkman, 435 U. S. ·349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, supra. 
Although we were formally engaging in statutory construction 
in those cases, we have long since recognized that the scope 
of immunity from § 1983 actions 'has been 1arge1y of "judicial 
making." See Barr v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959), 
quoted in Butz, supra, at 502. 1 am, therefore, quite sure 
that the President could be held absolutely immune in the 
Bivens aspect of this case without rooting the judgment in 
the Constitution. 
We should eschew making constitutional judgments broader 
than necessary in any particular case. Despite JusTICE 
PowELL's disClaimer that 'he is not deciding the -question of 
whether Congress 'has the power to apply to the President 
the statutory damage remedy for illegal wiretapping estab-
lished by ·Title ·nr, 1 do not believe that the argument he 
presents leaves the question open. As I understand it, Jus--
TICE PowELL's argument for absolute presidentia1 immunity 
is basically a separation of powers argument: damages suits 
would impermissibly interfere with the performance of the 
President's constitutional functions and would impermissibly 
interject the judiciary into the sphere reserved for the Execu-
tive Branch. These reasons would apply equally to a stat-
;utory damage suit against the President. ·certainly it is the 
I' 
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Government's view that acceptance of the constitutionally 
grounded arguments put forth by JusTICE PowELL would 
settle the Title III issue as well: 
11 [I]f, as we submit, the President (and his closest ad-
visers) are entitled to immunity from damages liability 
for decisions made in the exercise of the President's offi-
cial responsibilities under Article II of the Constitution, 
that immunity could serve as a defense to statutory a~ 
well as constitutional causes of action." Petitioners' Re-
ply Memorandum, at 1-2. 
It is unwise and unsound to make the broad pronounce-
ment that a President is to have absolute immunity for all 
of his official acts and thus the same protection from damage 
suits as is accorded to Members of Congress under the Speech 
·or Debate Clause. If we are to reach the question of im-
munity from an implied cause of action brought under the 
Constitution, I would limit the holding to the narrow ques-
tion of whether the President is absolutely immune from 
damages for violating the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
·citizen through the imposition of a warrantless wiretap. 
This would be much more consistent with the functional ap-
proach the Court took in Butz and with the pre-Butz abso-
lute immunity decisions. Even under Barr v. Mateo, 360 
U. S. 564 (1959) , and Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), 
the Court would have to determine whether the warrantless 
wiretap of the Halperin family phone fell within the "outer 
perimeter of [the President's] line of duty," 360 U. S., at 
575, before it could decide that the President was absolutely 
immune for his actions in this case. 
My problems with JusTICE PowELL's approach, however, are 
not limited to the scope of the holding he suggests. I be-
lieve that his argument is not consistent with the reasoning 
of our previous immunity cases. With respect to presiden-
tial immunity, his argument makes three errors. First, it 
improperly extrapolates from Scheuer v, Rhodes, supra. Sec.-
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ond, it misapplies the rationale . the Court adopted in Butz. 
Third, it draws an unfounded analogy between the immunity 
appropriate to the President a~d the immunities afforded 
officials in the two other branches of the federal government. 
·with respect to the immunity extended to the other petition-
' ers, JusTICE PowELL develops a subjective standard that h~s 
no basis in any of our previous cases. 
Evaluation of the appropriate scope of a judicially created 
\ presidential immunity should begin, as· I believe · JusTICE 
PowELL begins, with the holding in Scheuer that 
"[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available 
to officers of the executive branch ·of government, the 
variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion 
and responsibilities of the office and all of the · circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the 
action on which liability is sought to be based."· ·416· 
U. S., at 247. 
JusTICE PowELL concludes from this that because the discre-
tion and responsibilities of the President· are so much broader-
than any other offiCial's, so ·must his immunity be broader-
so broad, in fact, as to be absolute. 
Scheuer does indeed create a sliding scale in the scope of' 
official immunity.' But that scale is implicit in the applica-
tion of the single standard for executive -immunity stated 
there : "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief 
formed at the time and in light oi all t.he· circumstances. cou-
pled with good-faith 'belief, that affords· a basis -for qualified 
immunity of executive officers .... " I d., at 248. 
Scheuer contrasted the narrow range of options open to the 
police officer with the vastly greater range of options open 
to a governor acting in a civil crisis : The governor must be 
free to choose from within that broad range on the basis of 
the information he -currently has. Under the standard arti-
culated in Scheuer, he is free to choose without incurring 
liability any of the many options he has, · so long · as he goes 
:'&O in ~ood faith -.and has .reasonable .grounds· for his choice... 
.'1 . ..u 
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As the responsibilities of an official become greater so does 
the range of choices within which he may exercise reasonable 
discretion. That is, the standard articulated in Scheuer it· 
self provides a "greater protection" to higher officials. 
At no point did we imply in that decision, or any other, 
that the fact of a greater range of duties and choices is in 
itself a reason to protect an official for choices made in bad 
faith or made without "reasonable grounds." This, however, 
is precisely the effect of granting the President an "absolute 
immunity," because he has the broadest responsibilities and 
therefore the broadest range of options within which to exer-
cise his discretion. JusTICE PowELL, in short, confuses the in-
creased quantitative protection implicit in the application of 
the qualified immunity standard to the President, with a 
qualitatively different kind of protection. 
While Scheuer articulated the general rule for the scope 
of executive immunity from damages liability for constitu-
tional violations, Butz articulated the basic approach to be 
taken in deciding whether a particular official's "special func-
tions" require absolute immunity. I agree with JusTICE Pow-
ELL that Butz took what can best be described as a "func-
tional" approach. It rejected the Court of Appeals' "undue 
emphasis" on the location of the official within the executive 
branch and looked instead to the functions performed by the 
particular official. In each instance in which absolute immu-
rtity was extended to an official, it was extended only to the 
degree that the officer participated in a function that had 
previously been found to require absolute immunity for its 
proper execution. Butz stands for the proposition that no 
official deserves absolute immunity simply by virtue of his 
rank or position ; rather, some officials may perform functions 
that require absolute immunity and such officials are immune 
from damages liability for the acts they take in executing 
those functions. 
Thus, under Butz there may very well be functions within 
.the President's responsibilities for the performance of which 
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he is absolutely immune. JUSTlCE POWELL acknowledges tha~ 
j3ut~ suggests such a function by function approach, ante, at 
n . 24, but rejects the suggestion. Instead, he argues t~at 
the possibility of damages suits for constitutional violations 
would hinder the President iri the performance of all of his 
functions: 
"The likelihood that Presidents 'vill face large numbers 
of constitutional damage suits creates a risk that Presi-
dential decisionmaking will be interfered with unduly ..• 
a sitting President. may be diverted from the pressing 
duties of his office ~y the requirements ·of defending 
numerous lawsuits .... " Ante, at n. 22. 
I have two problems with this reasoning. · First, in no in-
stance have we J:lreviously held legal accountability in itself 
to be an unjustifiabie cost. "'the avaiiabiiity of the courts to. 
vindicate constitutional wrongs has been perceived and pro-
tected as one of the v!rtues of our system of delegated and 
limited powers. As argued in §IV, our concern in fashion-
ing absolute immunity has been that liability may pervert 
the decisionmaking process in a particular function by under-
cutting the values we expect to guide those decisions. - ·The 
caution that comes from requiring reasonable choices in areas 
that may intrud~ on individua1s1 constitutionally protected 
rights has never before been counted as a cost. Second, Jus-
TICE PowELL's practical concerns are, at this point, specula-
tive. He admits that "there is no historical record of numer-
ous suits against the President''; nor is there any reason to· 
think that. the protection afforded by summary judgment ·pro-
cedures w()uld not be adequate to protect the President, as 
they curr~ntly protect other executive officers from unfounded 
litigation. Finally, even if judicial procedures are not suffi-
cient, Congress remains free to . address this problem if and 
when it develops.~ti 
a6 Juf:!nce PoWJ<!LL also suggest::; that thi::; case illu:;trates "a dang«:>r of I 
unfaitneSll when otficial::l face per~onal liabihty for decisions made in areas· 
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I understand JusTICE PowELL to have one final argument 
for absolute immunity: It would somehow be inconsistent 
with "our constitutional structure" to accord absolute im-
munity to Members of Congress and Members of this Court, 
but not to the President. That is, it would not be consistent 
with the "importance of the role of the chief executive office 
of the Nation" to afford him a lower level of immunity than 
that accorded to his counterparts in the other two branches 
of the Federal Government: "[T]he Founders gave the Pres-
ident, as an individual official, a separate and equal footing 
with Congress and this Court as corporate bodies." Ante, 
at 19. Analogizing the President to the members of the 
other branches, however, is wholly out of place. The ap~ 
propriate analogy under our cases would be between the 
President and other executive officers, both state and fed-
eral, and not between the President and officials who perform 
functions that have nothing in common with those of the 
President. 
Our decisions with respect to judicial immunity have been 
founded on an analysis of history and policy. Insofar as 
particular executive functions share a similar history and/or 
policy we have not hesitated to recognize absolute immunity 
for them as well. See Imbler, supra; Butz, supra. To draw 
this simple analogy between judges and the President is to 
avoid the complexity that our previous cases in this area 
have held to be unavoidable. Similarly, it is to depart from 
what I took to be well-founded law. 
Our decisions did not create the immunity afforded Mem-
bers of Congress: the Constitution did. Precisely because 
the Constitution explicitly affords Congressmen-and not the 
President-immunity from judicial process, analogizing the 
President to Congressmen is inappropriate. What is more, 
of legal uncertainty." Ante, at 21. But the qualified immunity stand- I 
ard takes into account "legal uncertamty," so this is not an argument 
in favor of absolute immunity. 
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the constitutional history reviewed above, § IV (A), shows 
it to be unfounded as well! JusTICE PowELL realizes that 
there is nothing in the Constitution similar to the Speech 
or Debate Clause to support his argument. He tries, how~ 
ever, to draw support from this explicit difference in treat~ 
ment of Members of Congress and the President: 
"The omission [frotn the Constitution] of an explicit 
exemption of the President from personaJ damages suits 
may be explained by a general understanding at the 
time that no explicit exemption was necessary." Ante, 
at 19. 
It may, of course, equally be explained by a quite different 
intention of the drafters: The most obvious explanation for 
the different treatment in the written text of the Constitu-
tion is that the drafters intended different treatment in fact. 
It adds a new twist to constitutional interpretation, to say 
the least, to conclude that the President has absolute immu-
nity under the Constitution because the Framers did not 
provide for it. In any case, it is· difficult · to believe there 
was any "general understanding at the time," when there 
had never before been an office quite like that of President. 
Without substantial historical support JusTICE PowELL's as-
sertion is mere speculation; but the only historical support 
that JusTICE PowELL offers is a one-sided account of the 
lively debate described iu §IV (A) above. 
JusTICE PowELL's treatment of the immunity to be af-
forded petitioners Mitchell, Kissinger, and Haldeman again 
fails to carry out an analysis of the effect of damages liabil-
ity on the proper performance of their official functions; The 
argument of the memorandum is based on one proposition: 
"if the purpose of immunity is in part to avoid excessive cau-
t~on on the part of officials who fear personal liability, that 
purpose must be served where the Nation's security is at 
stake." Ante, at 27. Not only is this far too simple an 
approach to the complex problem of the appropriate scope 
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of the immunity to be afforded petitioners, but even if it 
were adequate, JusTICE PowELL fails to apply it consistentiy. 
As I argued in §IV (B), absolute, as opposed to qualified, 
immunity, cannot be justified simply • pointing to a need by 
for forthright governmental action: that rationale is far too 
broad. Rather, whether absoiute immunity is appropriate 
depends 'on a careful analysis of the potentially conflicting 
values implicated in the part1cuiar function at issue. Supra, 
a.t 25-27. But JusTICE PowELL writes as if society's inter-
ests were aligned wholly on the side of encouraging wiretaps 
here and not equally, if not more, aligned with that of dis.: 
couraging unreasonable, warrantless searches. 
Thus, he notes that Attorney General Mitchell was the 
11key person" in determining when wiretaps were required to 
protect national security, and from this observation alone 
concludes that these "functions were sufficiently unique and 
important to justify a rule of absolute immunity." Ante, at 
21. Similarly, the memorandum moves from the observation 
that Kissinger "had special responsibility and discharged spe-
cial functions with respect to national security," ibid., to the 
conclusion that he too shouid be absolutely immune. De-
spite the fact that Haldeman was involved with what might 
have been a national security wiretap, jUSTICE PowELL denies 
him the absolute immunity afforded the others. JusTICE 
PowELL, however, does not distinguish Haldeman from the 
others on the basis of the principle he purports to be apply-
ing-avoiding excessive ca.ution in the national security area. 
Rather, Haldeman is denied absolute immunity because he 
functioned only on the basis of an "ad hoc assignment from 
the President." Ib-id. Why the perhaps temporary nature 
of the assignment, rather than the duties performed, is rele-
vant remains a mystery. This kind of argument is clearly 
the antithesis of the functional analysis that we adopted in 
Butz, and which JusTICE PowELL purports to be applying. 
ll also suggest that the absolute immunitY. that Jus'riCS· 
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PowELL grants Mitchell and Kissinger is, in fact, absolute in 
name only: It bears a much closer resemblance to qualified 
immunity, for petitioners must prove that they acted with a 
particular subjective inte t. A defendant who possesses ab-
so ute Immunity need only prove that the challenged action 
fell within th~ "outer perimeter of [his]hne of duty," Barr 
v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 564, 575 (1959), not that ·the action was 
performed with a certain intent or under certain conditions. 
On the other hand, a qualified immunity defense is not avail-
able "if [the defendant] knew or reasonab1y should h~e 
known that the action he took within his sphere of official 
responsibility would violate ·the constitutional rights of the 
[plaintiff], or if he too'k the action with the malicious int~n-
tion to cause ~~rivation o ~stltu wna ng s or ot er 
inFiry .... " · Strickla!!:!1J'420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). 
JusTICE PowELLs proposeastandard of "absolute immunity" 
for Kissinger and Mitchell t~ature of 
the defendant's "subjective intent": ----
"The effect of th1s absolute immunity is to limit the pos-
sible liability of Mitchell and Kissinger to any period in 
which they remained responsible for the wiretap and its 
purpose no longer related to national security concerns." 
Ante, at 32. 
~ . 
We have resisted previous attem ts to make ualificd im- A ,jJ, /,j. ~ 
munity turn solei on the subjective in~ent of the defen ant. ~.:::;;_;-::::~ 
Woo , supra, at 321. ather, we ave insisted that an officer· · · 1r - .. 
be charged with knowledge of well-established constitutional L. ....... )£~--f '-" 
law and be liable for damages when his conduct violates a 
standard of objective reasonableness. The subjective ele- 7 ? ment of the qualified immunity standard was not designed 
to shield those who act with "good intentions"; rather, it was 
designed to bar· an immunity defense to those who acted with 
I \ 
"malice": We have held that even if an action is obj'ectively 
reasonable, a malicious intent to injure or deprive will bar 
t~. defense of qualified immunity. See Wood, supra; at 322: 
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(quoted above). I have suggested before, to no avail, that 
the qualified immunity defense require only objective rea-
sonableness and should not be defeated by a defendant's ill 
will. As I see it, that would be the better rule. However 
that may be, there is no basis in any of our immunity cases 
for a 'tholly subjective standard/and Lewis' memorandum 
does no~ 
The subjective test is particularly puzzling in the circum-
stance of this case. Petitioners have not proposed such a 
test; in fact, they have argued in favor of just the opposite. 
In their view, 'the subjective element of 'the qualified immu-
nity test imposes too great a ·burden on "high federal officials 
because it limits the · availability of summary judgment. 
·Thus, petitioners ar ued for a wholly objective test to deter-
mine qua 1 e immunity for a1 ege const1 u 10na:I violations 
by high executive officers: 
11The same reasons that support the conclusion that these 
officials are absolutely immune for their official acts ... 
also indicate that, if their immunity is orily qualified, 
they should not be required to disprove alleg_atiO_!!,.S of 
'mali e' in er nal aama es actions . . . charges of 
malice can be easily maae. . . . [T]he conventional doc-
trine of qualinea immunity is entirely inadequate to 
safeguard the e'Xecution or presiaential duties .... " 
Petitioner's Brief, at 61. Judge Gesell, in his concurring 
opinion below, expressed a similar belief that the subjective 
. e~tht_.~fied_ i~st required rethinking 
in this context: 
'iit is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to 
·create a material issue of fact on some element of the 
. immmiity defense where subtle questions of constitu-
tional law and a decision maker's mental process are in-
volved." 52A. 
Conditioning immunity on subjective intent will exascer-
. bate the burden of"'J.itigation for executive officials. ·.Because 
• J • 
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motive is one of the issues least amenable to summary ad-. 
judication, this standard will require the trier of fact to ex-
amine the defendant's motives in virtually every case. This 
result is not consistent with a major goal of official immunity 
in cases like this, which is substantially to remove the threat 
'of litigation from the decisionmaking process of high execu~ 
tive officials in the field of national security.87 
37 JusTICE PowELL appears to present two arguments in support of 
this subjective test. First, he suggests that a qualified immunity stand-
ard would present "a daJJger in this area that defendants will be unable 
to mount a successful defense without breaching the secrecy they are 
sworn to protect.'" Ante, at n. 41. This problem, however, has not 
arisen in this case and respondents conceded at oral argument that 
"if a damage claimant runs into a properly claimed state secret privilege 
assertion, ... [t]he suit will be dismissed. . . . So those interest will 
be protected." Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. 
Second, he indicates that his proJJOsed standard would ease the litiga-
tion burden on the defendant: 
"[S]uch a rule would still require [government officials] to litigate the 
!;;sue of the real purpose of an act. . . . But this rule would still be 
more protective of petitioners than a rule of qualified immunity, because 
'it would 'be much ea;;ier to establish a defense based on the national 
security purpose of an action than it would be to establish that one 
acted in 'good faith' with respert to plaintiff;;' con::;titutional rights." 
Ante, at n. 43. 
I doubt the empirical basis for this claim . The aspect of the "good 
faith" defense that ha.Q been most difficult to deal with through summary 
procedures has been that of subjective purpose-up until now, allega-
tions of malice. But JusTICE PowELL's proposed staJJdard will require• 
~xtensive litigatioJl •on juJ:;t such a subjective i;;sue in every case .. 
lfp/ss 05/19/82 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Dick DATE: May 19, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Byron called me about WJB's letter. I told him 
that I had not read it and was in the middle of reading tax 
cases. He nevertheless, in substance, said the following: 
He referred to the "last paragraph" (I believe) of WJB's 
letter where - according to BRW - the suggestion is made 
that we should explicitly leave open some right to discovery 
on the question of whether the official "knew or should have 
known" that he was violating the Constitution. 
BRW said that he had tried to make clear in 
Navarette his present view that th~ law must be "clearly 
established" (and BRW used this phrase several times) before 
an official is held liable, and we should say nothing to 
encourage protracted discovery. 
I believe I argued in my Wood v. Strickland 
dissent that particularly in constitutional law, there are 
wide areas in which officials of various kinds operate daily 
where "the law" is not clearly established. As you observed 
recently, it is one thing to know that the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated by an ordinance requiring blacks to sit 
in the rear of a bus. It is something else for a school 
board member in California or washington to know today what 
the law is with respect to busing. 
2. 
I told BRW that after I had had an opportunity to 
consider WJB's letter, I would call him back. 
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80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
'Byron called me about. WJB' s letter. T tnlo him 
that I had not read it and was in the mid~le of. reading tax 
cases. He nevertheless, in substance, said the following: 
He referred to the "last paragraph" (I bel i.eve) of ~T.JB's 
letter where - according to BR.W - the suggestion is made 
that we should explicitly leave open some right to discove-ry 
on the question of whether the official "knew or should have 
known" that he was violating the Constitution. 
BRW said that he had tried to make clear in 
Navarette his present view that the law must be "clearly 
established" (and BRW used this phrase several times) hefore 
an official is held liable, and we should say nothing to 
encourage protracted discovery. 
I believe I argued in my Wood v. Strickland 
dissent that particularly in constitutional law, there are 
wide areas in which officials of various kinds operate daily 
where "the law" is not clearly estab]ished. As you observed 
recently, it is one thing to know that the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated by an ordinance requiring blacks to sit 
in th~ rear of a bus. It is something else for a school 
board member in California or washington to know today what 
the law is with respect to busing. 
2. 
I told BRW that after I had had an opportunity to 
consider WJB's letter, I would call him back. 




CHAMI!IE R S OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.Ju:prtmt <!ftturi ttf tfrt ~b .Jtattg 
Jfu~ ~. elf. 2ll.;t,.~ 
May 19, 1982 . 
/ 
No. 80-945 -- Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald . 
Dear Lewis, 
I am still unsettled in this case . Your draft of 
course effects a substantial change from the standard 
adhered to in Scheuer v . Rhodes, Wood v. Strickland, 
and Butz v . Economou, in which we recognized a "good 
faith" defense that incorporates both objective and 
subjective elements . But I am inclined to agree with 
you that "substantial costs attend the litigation of 
the subjective good faith of high officials of the Ex-
ecutive Branch." Draft at 15-16 . At the same time, 
however, I am troubled by several points in your draft . 
(1) You limit the benefit of the new, objective 
standard to "high executive officials , " at least for 
the time being . Draft at 18 . I do not think that I 
could join in such a limitation, because it appears to 
be favoring high officials over their subordinates --
an approach of doubtful symbolic value at best . In-
deed, I would have thought it arguable that high gov-
ernment officials, since they have greater resources 
and legal advice available to them, should be held to a 
higher standard of behavior . All in all, the whole is-
sue of differential treatment according to hierarchical 
status would be better avoided , in my view. And it 
seems to me that this is easy to do, since we have al-
ready recognized (as you observe in footnote 29) that 
qualified immunity is of "varying scope . .. dependent 
upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of 
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably 
appeared at the time of the action on which liability 
is sought to be based ." Scheuer v . Rhodes , 416 u.s . , 
at 24 7. In sum, if we are to reformulate the good 
I 
I 
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faith immunity doctrine, should we not announce a rule 
applicable across the board, subject to the Scheuer 
limitation noted above? 
(2) You have defined the new substantive standard 
of liability to be objective in the sense that an offi-
cial's "qualified immunity would be defeated if [hel 
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility 
would violate the constitutional rights of the [plain-
tiff]." Draft at 14 (emphasis yours). You persuade me 
that, at least with respect to constitutional actions 
having no ready common-law analogue (~~' false ar-
rest, imprisonment), a "malicious intention to cause 
••. injury," ibid. (emphasis yours), is an anomalous 
basis upon which to rest personal liability: To my 
mind, the relevant intent inquiry should focus on the 
official's attentiveness to ascertainable law, on what 
the official "knew or should have known." Therefore I 
am willing to accept your view that personal liability 
should not be imposed upon an official who reasonably 
believes his conduct to be lawful. And sometimes the 
law is simply too obscure for us to expect it to be 
known even to an official who is attentive to the 
responsibilities of his office. Where the law is thus 
unsettled, the official ought not to be culpable if he 
exercises his best judgment. 
But while I can travel that far with you, I am 
troubled by your use of the term, "indisputable legal 
rights." True, that wording appears in Wood v. 
Strickland and other opinions. But am I not right that 
every action may be the subject of some legal dispute? 
And of course every case may be distinguishable, if 
only on its facts. Thus even when the law on a point 
is apparently settled, the question of good faith turns 
on whether the official has attempted to ascertain that 
law, and whether his actions were taken in accordance 
with a colorable view of it. I do not think that we 
are far apart on this point, but I do fear that "indis-
putable law" sends out quite the wrong signal. I would 
feel more comfortable if the references, in outlining 
the substantive standard, were to refer to "ascertain-
able law," or simply "the law." Of course, under this 
standard summary judgment would still be readily avail-
able to public-official defendants in two very common 
No. 80-945 -- Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald. 3. 
situations: (a) where the state of the law was ambigu-
ous at the time of the alleged violation -- so that the 
law could not have been "known" then, and thus liabil-
ity could not ensue -- and (b) where the plaintiff can-
not prove, as a threshold matter, that a violation of 
his constitutional rights actually occurred. 
(3) Given the substantive standard that you an-
nounce -- imposing liability when the public-official 
defendant "knew or should have known" of the constitu-
tionally violative effect of his actions -- it seems 
inescapable to me that some discovery may sometimes be 
required to determine exactly what the defendant did 
"know" at the time of his actions. In this respect the 
issue before us is very similar to that in Herbert v. 
Lando, 441 u.s. 153 (1979), in which the Court observed 
that "To erect an impenetrable barrier to the plain-
tiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is 
a matter of some substance, particularly when defen-
dants themselves are prone to assert their good-faith 
.... " Id., at 170. I think that the possibility of 
such discovery needs to be acknowledged, if only in a 
footnote sentence with a comparing reference to Lando. 
Of course, it could also be noted at that juncture that 
summary judgment procedures could be arranged so as to 
allow public-official defendants an opportunity to gain 
summary judgment in their favor on grounds such as 
those outlined in the previous paragraph, before dis-
covery of the defendants' "knowledge" would be permit-
ted. Cf. id., at 180, n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
!J:Oly, 
,;;W • J • B • , J r • 
Justice Powell. 
Copies to the Conference. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.juvrtutt <qonrt of Urt'Juitro'Jta±tS' 
~ftinghm. ~. <q. 20,?~~ / 
May 21, 1982 
Re: 80-945 - Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
Under Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555, and 
like cases, a defendant with qualified immunity is not 
liable for violating a statutory or constitutional 
right of the plaintiff unless that right was clearly 
established under the law in existence at the time of 
the '1ti!egea conduct and the defendant knew or should 
have known of that established right. I would not 
think this part of the test would be more of a legal 
than a factual problem: whether the law is clearly 
established is of that nature, and if the law is clear, 
it is doubtful that the defendant can absolve himself 
by claiming that he neither knew nor should have known 
the established rule applicable to his conduct. 
You will also recall that in early circulations in 
Navarette, I unsucessfully proposed eliminating the 
good faith-malicious intention prong of the Scheuer-
Strickland formulation of the qualified immunity test. 
That requirement has never made a great deal of sense 
to me. At the end of my memorandum last term in the 
Nixon case I also suggested that the rule be modified 
and have renewed that suggestion to you earlier this 
term. Hence, it will come as no surprise to you that I l 
agree with Bill Brennan that the modification, if it is 
to be made, should not be confined to the President but 
should be a general rule. 
\ 
As indicated, if the immunity turns on the~tate t 
of the law, I would not think the immunity de~ ion 
would be burdened with factual determinations~or 
would it be if the the law is clearly established --
there must be probable cause to arrest, for example --
and the facts are also not in dispute. The question 
then would be a legal one: was the officer's mistake a 
reasonable one, as it surely would be in cases where 
judges divide on whether probable cause exists. Of 
course, there will be recurring hassles on what the 
facts are and what the officer knew, but at least the 
qualified immunity rule, if modified as I hope you will 




Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
May 22, 1982 
80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Byron: 
Thank you for your helpful letter of May 21. 
As you know from our several conversations, I am 
in entire agreement as to the desirability of eliminating 
the good faith-malicious intention component of the Scheuer-
Strickland formulation of the qualified immuni.ty test. In 
the draft I circulated on April 6 in this case, I limited 
the opinion to senior aides of the President only because 
the petitioners in this case were in that category. 
Since our conversations, I have been in touch with 
the Justices who joined my draft, and they also are 
agreeable to the view that our opinion should not be so 
limited. 
I am presently making revisions to accomplish this 
change, and hope to be recirculating early next week. 
I also agree with your identification, in the last 
paragraph of your letter, of the issues that normally would 




cc: The Conference 
rhf May 25, 1982 
Draft letter to WJB concerning Harlow 
Dear Bill: 
0-1~.., ~ ~ .&.r ~ 
Pl-ease _par a on m¥-- eelay in responding to your letter of 
-1 
May 19. I ~eeil not i~ri'A-jtOJJ....h Glel busy these ga¥-S._h~ 
~- ~ 
In working on the enclosed draft, I have ReTd your 
~ 
.A ...... 
suggest ions in mind. The opin::1 now ~e"ilow.s you £ 
~~~~vu-v~ ~~)~~ 
1\ s.Y.'Jg~~R tha t ...th4ropo!!!e~ good faith immunity standard 
should extend "across the board." J'Pfle~t ~
responsiy e te ~ seeoftd-conceru abou t W¥ relianc~ the 
"" term "settled, indisputable rights." Although that 
formulation did appear in Wood v. Strickland, the current 
draft defines the substantive standard in terms of "clearly 
established" statutory and constitutional rights. See pages 
17-19. ,{ r:i;:~~~~-
~ Yoll? th1rd sug es 10n h s p 
and I have not attempted explicitly to 
/ 
t f r apart, especially in light of the changes I have 
ndertaken in the cu~;~traft opinjon.-----~ 





I delivered today to JPS a copy of a third draft 
of this case. For identification purposes this is dated 
5/24/82 in pen, and has not been circulated. 
The draft contains changes designed to meet 
Byron's views. I wanted to make sure that John Stevens 
approved before submitting the draft to Byron. John advised 
me this afternoon that the changes are entirely agreeable to 
him. Th next step is to ascertain Byron's views. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§u.prtutt ~O'Url d tlrt ~ta ~titUs 
._as!ringtcn. ~. ~· 2!lp'!$ 
May 26, 1982 
Re: No. 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: 
I think it is very important to maintain the language 
about abuse of discovery to which you refer in the third 
paragraph of your letter to Bill Brennan dated May 26th. 
After all, you have a Court for that language, and I would 
see no advantage in weakening it in order to get a couple 
more votes for the opinion. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Powell 
C HAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST 
.:§u:p:rtmt <!Jou:rt of tlrt 'J!Uri.ttb~tafts 
jifas~tittgtcn. ~. <!J. 2!IgtJ!~ 
May 26 1 19 82 
Re: No. 80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis: • ~t 
. \-
I think it is very important ~q maintain the language 
about abuse of discovery to which yo·u refer in the third 
paragraph o ~r-Te~~~~~trr-~efl~~~~~d May 26th. 
After all you age 1 and I would 
see no adva to get a couple 




.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~nvrtmt Qfonrt ltf tftt ';!Jlnit~b .§taft.s' 
'~Jhurlyittgt on, ~. Qf . 2:11.? Jl. .;l 
' 
May 26, 1982 
No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
As you know, I have previously joined this opinion 
and I am still with you. I write this only to seek 
clarification of the last full sentence on page 18. It 
states that knowledge by an official that his conduct will 
violate statutory or constitutional rights is sufficient for 
liability. However, on the preceding pages, and at page 17, 
I understood the draft to indicate that the subjective 
element is being discarded and that liability will be 
imposed only when the official conduct violates clearly 
established rights of which a reasonable person would have 




May 26, 1982 
80-945 Harlow v. ~itzgeral~ 
Dear Sandra: 
Although the last sentence on page 18 was not 
intended to reintroduce a subjective test, there may be - as 
you suggest - some ambiquity. 
Accordingly, in my next circulation J will make 
the changes indicated on the enclosed copy of paqe 18. 
I commend your care in weighing every word, a 
deqree of care that we rarely find here during the last few 
weeks . 
Sincerely, 
.. Just ice 0 'f'onnor 
lfp/ss 
Dick: I would not recirculate until we give other Chambers 
a. chance to comment on our changes - comments I hope will 
not be made. 
80-945-----0 PIN 10 N 
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. . 
sion to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not 
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of 
subjective intent. 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's I 
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established 
1aw,31 should avoid excessive disruption of goverrunent and 
pennit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine what the law was at the time the ac- . 
tion occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person 
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this 
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery 
generally should not be allowed. . 
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely .in "ob-
jective" terms, we provide 'no license to lawless conduct. 
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in 
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that fo-
c~~es on the objective legal reasonabl~:...Vffi_c1~a_'_s-.----t 
act:s.-wD~~ that ~ conduct-~-vio ate . . -----
statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to pesk _ _..9----
tate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such ~o · . 
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's 
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504. I 
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently avail-
able to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of 
this scope. 
"This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
37 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumsta.nces under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to .the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
"'Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not r easonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
..... -
\ 
~ay 26, 1982 
80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Bill: 
Again I am a bit tardv in responding to your 
letter of May 19. 
In workinq on the draft I am circulating this 
morning, I have had your suggestions in mi.no. The opinion 
is now in accord with your view and Byron's that the good 
faith immunity stan~ard should extend "across the board." I 
also removed the term "settled, indisputable rights." 
Although that formulation did appear in Wood v. Strickland, 
th~ current draft defines the substantive standard in terms 
of "clearly established" statutory and constitutional 
rights. See paqes 17-19. This change is in accord with the 
more recent language in Navar~tte. 
I hesitate to add language that may weakPn our 
renewed a~monition against abuse of discovery in these suits 
against officials. We know from experience that, despite 
what we said in Butz, Oistrict Courts have tended in these 





cc: The Conference 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: SOC's letter in Harlow 
It would be very easy to accommodate SOC's suggestion for 
clarification, in the way indicated on the attached coryy of page 
18 of Harlow. I suggest that we make the change and recirculate. 
S"•rt You then could send a .. note, along the lines of: 
"In response to your question I have redrafted the last sentence on 
page 18 to omit any ambiguity. The sentence was not intended to 
re - introduce a subjective test. I appreciate your well-taken 
suggestion for clarification . " 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,ju.vum:t <!fourt ttf tqt ~ittb ,jtab.ll' 
JlzuYltington, ~. <If. 2ll~~~ 
May 26, 1982 
No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
As you know, I have previously joined this opinion 
and I am still with you. I write this only to seek 
clarification of the last full sentence on page 18. It 
states that ~nowledge by an official that his conduct will 
violate statutory or constitutional rights is sufficient for 
liability. However, on the preceding pages, and at page 17, 
I understood the draft to indicate that the subjective 
element is being discarded and that liability will be 
imposed only when the official conduct violates clearly 
established rights of which a reasonable person would have 









~ttVrttttt <!Jllltrt cf tq t ~nib~ ~ hdt%' 
Jlrurfrington, ~. <q. 2"ll~Jt~ 
May 26, 1982 
As you know, I have previously joined this opinion 
and I am still with you. I write this only to seek 
clarification of the last full sentence on page 18. It 
states that ~nowled~e by an official that his conduct will 
violate statutory or constitutional rights is sufficient for 
liability. However, on the preceding pages, and at page 17, 
I understood the draft to indicate that the subjective 
element is being discarded and that liability will be 
imposed only when the official conduct violates clearly 
established rights of which a reasonable person would have 
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sion to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not 
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of 
subjective intent. 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established 
law,31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine what the law was at the time the ac-
tion occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person 
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this 
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery 
generally should not be allowed. 
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "ob-
jective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. 
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in 
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that fo-
cuses on the objective legal reasonableness .~o~f~a~n~£Of~fi~c~ia~l~' i-J...-----= 
acts. ere an o eta~ that~uct,. violate 
statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to esi-
tate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such knowing 
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's 
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 l : S., at 504. 
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently avail-
able to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of 
this scope. 
31 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
32 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
33 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act ' · 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,juvrtmt Qfllltrt ltf t4t 1!luitt~ ,jbttt.s-
Jht,gftiugt~n. ~. Of. 2llbi~~ 
May 27, 1982 
No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
I continue to join you in this opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
1st DRAFT 
J usuce 1Vlarsnall 
Jystice Blackmun 




From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: .21~ ~ ~2.. 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-945 
BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTER-
FIELD, PETITIONERS v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring. 
I agree with the substantive standard announced by the 
Court today, imposing liability when a public-official defend-
ant "knew or should have known" of the constitutionally vio-
lative effect of his actions. Ante, at 15, 18. I also agree 
that this standard applies "across the board," to all "govern-
ment officials performing discretionary functions." I d., at 
17. I write separately only to note that given this standard, l 
it seems inescapable to me that some measure of discovery 
may sometimes be required to determine exactly what a pub-
lic-official defendant did "know" at the time of his actions. 
In this respect the issue before us is very similar to that ad-
dressed in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153 (1979), in which 
the Court observed that "To erect an impenetrable barrier to 
the plaintiffs use of such evidence on his side of the case is a 
matter of some substance, particularly when defendants 
themselves are prone to assert their good-faith .... " Id., 
at 170. Of course, as the Court has already noted, ante, at 
18, summary judgment will be readily available to public-offi-
cial defendants whenever the state of the law was so ambigu-
ous at the time of the alleged violation that it could not have 
been "known" then, and thus liability could not ensue. In 
my view, summary judgment will also be readily available 
whenever the plaintiff cannot prove, as a threshold matter, 
80-945-CONCUR 
2 HARLOW v. FITZGERALD 
that a violation of his constitutional rights actually occurred. 
I see no reason why discovery of defendants' "knowledge" 
should not be deferred by the trial judge pending decision of 
any motion of defendants for summary judgment on grounds 
such as these. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S., at 180, n. 4 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 
MAY 27 , 1.982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Justice Brennan's concurrence in "Harlow" 
I don't know what to make of this. WJB .._ deliberately 
misreads the opinion as requiring an inquiry--at least in some 
cases--into what a particular official actually knew . This is 
C\. 
"subjective" in the sense of requiring discovery into~ !)articular 
official's knowledge of the law--9ossibly a different inquiry from 
what an official could reasonably have been expected to know. 
In so reading the opinion, WJB cites page 15--aryoarently the quotation 
from Wood concerning the present law, rather than the new standard 
created by the opinion. The quoted words do not aoryear on page 18, 
the other oage that he cites. After Justice O'Connor's requested 
change is made, there will be no ambiguity on ryage 18. 
What to do? WJB has not joined the opinion. According to his 
clerks, he and several others are awaiting the lead of BRW. I think 
it probably is best for now to wait for White. Without strong 
pressure from BRW, I think it may ultimately be im,ortant even to 
point out that WJB is wrong--that the opinion does not contemolate 
the kind of inquiry to which he refers. 
One other point : In the carryover sentence from page 1 to oage 2 , 
WJB suggests his support for a stiffening of the burden of l)roof 
needed to survive a motion for summary judgment. This was the 
approach taken in our early drafts, before JPS suggested that the 
Court lacked power to create an exception of this kind ~ to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It probably is too late to try, 
but it now apoears that there might be a Court for this aporoach--
similar to that of Judge Gesell in Kissinger;-even without JPS. 
If there ... were more time, one oossibility might be to put this 
idea informally to WJB, possibly as a compromise for letting him 
have his way on the "knew or should have known" question. 
Again, in view of the time , the best course is orobably to await 
BRW's response to Harlow and simply take as much as he is willing to 
give. But WJB obviously is "up to something," and I thought 
I should sketch some of the oossibilities that occur to me. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield 
v. Fitzgerald. 
Dear Lewis, 
In case it was not clear from 
my circulation of yesterday, I join in your 
draft of May 26 in this case. 
Justice Powell. 
Copies to the Conference. 
28, 1982. 
No. 80-945 - Har l o w v. F i t z g er ald 
JUSTICE BLAC KMUN, concurring. 
To : The Chief Just i ce 
Justice Brennan 
Justice Whit e 
Justice Marshal l 
Justice Puv.:Pll 
Just" ce R"J,T'<..,u1 st 
Justii}E: Stevens 
Justi :·e 0 Connor 
From: Jnstica Blackmun 
l·'AY 3 1 1S82 Circulated : ~~n~~~------
Recirculated : 
Having joine d the dis s ent in Ni xon v. Fit z g e rald, ante, I, 
like Justice White, di sassocia te myself from any i mplication in 
the Court's opinion in the pre s ent case that Nixon v. Fitzgerald 




.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~u:pttttt.c <!JO"ttrl ttf titt ~mu~ '~f:a.Ug 
~ttgfrington. IB. <!J. 20gt>t.~ 
May 31, 1982 
/ 
Re: No. 80-945 - Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Bill: 
If you will permit me to do so, I would like to have my 
name added to your separate concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
~~ 
' ~I Jf/t-~ ~
' 
Justice Brennan ~~~· 
4YL-r ~~ --0. ~ 
~A-~~~ 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~upumt Qj'ou.rt of tltt ~tb ~taftg 
11lasqinston. tJ. <!J. 2llc?'l-;l 
June 2, 1982 
Re: No. 80-945 - Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
Dear Bill: 




cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 06/03/82 BRENH SALLY-POW v :~ ~ ~ ~ ~) 
80-945 Harlow v. Fitzgerald ~J( ~~~ 
Dear Bill: r -/)_,. f"' 
I must say that your concern over the ~Gbage 
change on page 18 surprises me. ov· ~ 
The common ground that I thought we a~ sh~ , ' 
:::ndt:rd ~do: a: o::o:~:w:b:::t::esu:; :::: vet~aannd s~ . ve 
I would agree, however, that ordinarily an offici wil~ 1\ 
know what he "could be expected to know". This is 
certainly true in cases of egregious violation of 
constitutional rights (e.g.' a wiretap purely for 
political purposes). There will be cases, however, where 
what an official actually knew could invite extensive 
discovery. It is for this reason that I viewed the change 
on page 18 as consistent with our purpose in redefining 
the standard. 
Perhaps the difference in our views could be 
accommodated by returning to the word "knows" on page 18 
as you suggest, and dropping a footnote to the effect that 
a plaintiff must make some objective showing of knowledge 
- ie.g., that a bare averment of it would be insufficient 
to shift the burden. 
2. 
We have been debating these immunity quest ions 
for two Terms. In view of the multiplicity of suits 
brought against officials, and the way in which discovery 
has been exploited to prolong the litigation even of 
frivolous claims, I consider it particularly important to 
have a Court opinion that announces a standard 
unambiguously. Though not necessary, I think also it 
would be beneficial if there could be a strong Court 
rather than a bare margin of five votes. Accordingly, I 
will await the views of the other Justices. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
C HAMBE R S OF 
JU S T ICE W M. J. B R ENNAN, JR. ,June 3, 1982 • 
.:) __q£., aZZ.;b~  - ~ L4 
~~-~~~ 
No. 80-945 -- Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald. ~~~S: 
-~ 
I 
Dear Lewis, <ill-~ 
Most of the changes that you have made in your -4 L()~ .... LJ 
latest circulation in this case give me no difficulty. ~ 
The one exception appears on page 18, near the bottom 
of the page, where one sentence now reads, "Where an ~ 
official could be expected to know that certain conduct -t'/7 
would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he 
should be made to hesitate •••• " In your previous 
draft, this sentence began, "Where an official knows 
that " This change, to my mind, is crucial. 
The change manifestly alters the substantive stan-
dard to which I agreed in my concurrence. Relying upon 
the sentence that you have now changed, I understood 
your previous draft to contain a standard "imposing li-
ability when a public-official defendant 'knew or 
should have known' of the constitutionally violative 
effect of his actions." See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, at 1 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring). My understanding is, I be-
lieve, shared by others in the Harlow majority. See 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, at 19 (WHITE, J., dissenting): 
"Today's decision in Harlow •.• makes clear that the 
President, were he subject to civil liability, could be 
held liable only for an action that he knew, or as an 
objective matter should have known, was illegal anda 
clear abuse of his authority and power." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Moreover, this change in the substantive standard 
contained in Harlow is important in the resolution of 
future cases. As you have changed it, the standard 
would allow the official who actually knew he was vi-
olating the law to escape liability for h1s actions, so 
long as he could not "reasonably have been expected" to 
No. 80-945 -- Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald. 2. 
know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and 
unusually well-informed violator of constitutional 
rights would evade just punishment for his crimes. 
an-
Such a result would be very wrong, to my mind. This is 
particularly so given that the substantive standard 
nounced in Harlow applies "across the board" to all 
public-offical defendants. 
Accordingly, I suggest that 
tence on page 18 to read, "Where 
could be expected to know ...• " 
clear to make this revision? 
Justice Powell. 
Copies to the Conference. 
you revise the sen-
an official knows or 
Could you see your way 
Sincerely, 
~~ Jr. 
June 5, 1982 
DRAFT 
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine 
what the law was at the time an action occurred. If the law at 
that time was not clearly established, summary judgment should be 
entered for the official, since he could not know nor should he 
J -~.. ~~# t 
have known about ~n-existen'§J legai 1standar <;.! ' Until this ~ 
threshold immunity question is resolved, [extensiv~discovery 
should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, 
•' 
however, the immunity defense ( shoul~ordinar ily~ fail since a 
reasonably competent public official should know the law 
governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading 
the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that 
he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal 
standard, the defense should be sutained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
The above, I suggest, should take the place of the last two 
sentences of the first full paragraph on p. 18. 
June 5, 1982 
DRAFT 
On summary "judgment, the judge appropriately may determine 
what the law was at the time an action occurred. If the law at 
that time was not clearly established, summary judgment should be 
entered for the official, since he could not know nor should he 




legal standard. . Until this_-{ 
resolved, ~tensiv~iscovery 
should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, 
however, the immunity defense should ordinarily fail since a 
reasonably competent public official should know the law 
governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading 
the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that 
he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal 
standard, the defense should be sutained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
The above, I suggest, should take the place of the last two 







DRAFT -~ /) /( tAJ (/_ w ~ & • 
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, 
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law 
was "clearly established" at the time an action occurred. 
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an 
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said 
to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously 
identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity 
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If 
the law was clearly established, however, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent 
public official should know the law governing his conduct. 
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims 
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither 
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard, 
the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
lfp/ss 06/07/82 
DRAFT 
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, 
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law 
was "clearly established" at the time an action occurred. 
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an 
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said 
to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously 
identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity 
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If 
the law was clearly established, however, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent 
public official should know the law governing his conduct. 
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims 
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither 
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard, 
the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
. -
rhf June 6, 1982 vV ~J;J 
iV , ~ . I :,);) , , .; 
~ J ~-~/-
DRAFT 9 tvw / 
On summary judgment the judge appropriately may detel mine, 
not only the currently applicable legal standard, but 
whether that standard was "clearly established" at the time 
an action occurred. If the standard at that time was not 
clearly established, an official could not reasonably be 
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor 
could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade 
conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Summary 
~ 
judgment accordingly should be entered. Until this 
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should 
not be allowed. Where the applicable law is clearly 
established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail: 
reasonable official generally should know the law governing 
his official conduct. We do not foreclose the possibility 
A 
that an official pleading qualified immunity might prove the 
existence of extraordinary circumstances, under which he 
neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal 
standard. If so, the immunity defense should be sustained. 




June 6, 1982 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Harlow 
Generally I have no difficulty with BRW's suggested 
"compromise" language. I have attached a slightly redrafted 
version. Most of the changes are stylistic. Two are more 
nearly substantive. First, in accord with your marked copy 
of BRW's draft, I have emphasized that it is a decision for 
the judge whether the law is "clearly established." Second, 
I have added language asserting that unless the law is 
"clearly established," an official could not "fairly be said 
to 'know' that the law forbade [his] conduct." This 
actually tracks some language in WJB's concurring opinion, 
but is intended more to defuse it. WJB wants to make sure 
that officials can be held liable whenever they personally 
know that their conduct is unlawful, even if they could not 
be "expected" to know this. By defining "know" in terms of 
"clearly established" law, the added language would protect 
officials against a claim that they should have anticipated 
the declaration of new constitutional rights. This I think 
is the aspect of the opinion that does most to move the law 
I 
2. 
in your preferred direction. At the same time, this draft--
like BRW's--leaves open the possibility that an official's 
actual personal knowledge would "count" at least in some few 
cases where the law was clearly established. 
As you will see, both of my suggested "substantive" 
changes occur in the first two sentences of BRW's draft. If 
you agree with my suggestions, but think it might be better 
not to depart too far from BRW's draft, you might consider 
changing the first two sentences only. You then could tell 
him that except for changes in the first two sentences, you 




On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, 
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law 
was "clearly established" at the time an action occurred. 
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an 
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said 
to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously 
identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity 
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If 
the law was clearly established, however, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent 
public official should know the law governing his conduct. 
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims 
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither 
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard, 
the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
' · 
/3/(IAJql. <J ~W- ~ 







On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, 
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law 
was "clearly established" at the time an action occurred. 
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an 
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said 
to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously 
identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity 
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If 
the law was clearly established, however, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent 
public official should know the law governing his conduct. 
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims 
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither 
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard, 
the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
~lune 7, 1982 
80-945 'larlow 
Dear Byron: 
over the t.Yeekend ! took a c1 oser look at your 
suggested substitute for the last two sentences of the first 
full paraqraoh on o. 18. 
Its substance is aqreeable to me. I believe it 
would be somewhat clearer, however, if the first two 
sentences were revised as I have indicated on my draft of 
this morning. 
I also ommitted the word "extensive" prior to 
discovery in your third sentence. I have made no further 
changes. 
I agree that it would he a qood idea to talk to 
Bill Brennan, and will join you whenever this is convenient 
for you and him - preferably some ti.me prior to lunch. 
I am grateful to you for your help. At. this 
season of the year, one's own problems more than !=tuffice to 





.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
j;n.prtmt (!Jltltd llf t4t 'Jnib~ j;tldt% 
'Jllht% 4ittgtcn, !9. <1J. 211.?'-t ~ 
June 7, 1982 
No. 80-945 Harlow and Butterfield v. 
Fitzgerald 
Dear Lewis, 
I have no objection to the proposed change 
in Nixon. It is still primarily an objective test. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
J :. .. ~- .1~~ 
()/r~J~- ~~~~ .... 
U vr ~ Th · · · /.t +- h ~ • "" d 1s 1s a compan1on casep o ~--3.UEh.- annoYRE:e • 
It involves the same facts, except • that petiti0ners were 
high White Hou,se aides. ~~s'tion/is what immunity may be 
claimed by these officials. 
The District Court held that they are entitled 
only to qualified immunity - sometimes referred to as "good 
faith immunity". The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia dismissed petitioner's appeal, and we granted 
certiorari. 
u.. 
In Butz v. Economou, involving a damages suit 
1 ~ lf/7ff'-, 
against the Secretary of Agriculture, we held that Cabinet 
A 
officers normally do not possess absolute immunity. We 
think that decision/ is controll iQg : on this issue. While we 
recognize that presidential aides often perform duties of 
great importance and sensitivity,j we can draw no distinction 
between the,;and officials of Cabinet rank. ~~ 
We hold, therefore, that petitioners a.eAentitled 
ncr=n~y to qualified immunity only. We recognize, however, -j as we did in Butz v. Economo~ ,/that a presidential aide may 
~~k~ claim absolute immunity on a functional basis: ~t~at j 5v 
when the challenged act is of such a natureJ'that the public 
interest requires full protection from the threat of suit . 
z. 
An example might be;' discretionary act related to 
national security or foreign affairs. Neithe~~oner ~ 
~~ ' -1 1 A. 
J'on the ~record oefore us,~has satisfied this functional 
standard. 
We do hold, however, that petitioners at least are 
entitled to qualified immunity. Prior decisions of this 
Court have indicated;{hat the qualified immunity defens;lhas 
both "objective" and "subjective" aspects. We take this 
--....... 
occasion to reformulate the applicable standard,J'as 
experience has demonstrated the inappropriateness of the 
subjective component. 
We hold, therefore, that a government officiay/-
entitled to qualified immunity~- can be held liable in 
damages)'only for the violation of clearly est~hed 
: igh~s ;Jof which a reasonable person would have known. 
We remand this case to the District Court for 
application of this standard. 
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun 
~~-'s 
have filed a joint statement~concurring in the Aopinion. 
Justice Brennan has filed a concurring opinion;4n which 
. h d ~ d . Just1ces Mars all an Blackmun JOlne . The Ch1ef Justice 
1\ 
has written a dissent. 
,June 23, 1982 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Cases Held for No. 79-1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, or 
No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas 
In 197S, while working for NASA, the petitioner 
criticized the management of his branch of the NASA program. 
An adverse personnel action ensued, and petitioner suffered 
a demotion. Following an initial denial of administrative 
relief, petitioner ultimately won reinstatement and back pay 
from the Civil Service Commission. In the meantime, 
however, he had instituted this damages action against 
respondent, his a~ministrative superior. The suit alleged a 
conspiracy to deprive petitioner of First Amendment rights. 
The district court summarily dismissed the action, and CAS 
affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided an 
alternative remedy unoer the Civil Service Act. This Court 
then vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914. On the 
remand CAS reaffirmed the decision to grant summary 
judgment. This time it found that "the unique relationship 
between the Federal Government and its civil service 
employees is a special consideration which counsels 
hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of 
affirmative congressional action." The panel also noted 
that inferring a Bivens remedy might encourage employees to 
bypass congressionally created administrative remedies in 
favor of judicial relief. 
The petitioners in No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
also argued that the respondent's capacity as a government 
employee represented a "special factor" defeating his claim 
to a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment. But 
the Court did not reach that issue in Harlow. Nor would the 
circulating opinion in No. 80-1074, Velde v. National Black 
Police Assn., necessarily be dispositive. The four-member 
majority in that case relies on a cumulation of factors not 
all present here. 
2. 
The question raised is an important one. Moreover, the 
CAS deicision in this case is in conflict with the decision 
of CA7 in Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (1981). 
I will vote to GRANT. 
No. 81-872, Turner v. Jordan 
The question here is whether the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency is absolutely immune from 
damages liability for dismissing a CIA employee. The 
employee was dismissed following his public criticism of the 
Agency's personnel practices. His suit in the District 
Court alleged a violation of costitutional rights under the 
First and Fifth Amendments. Ruling on petitioner's claim of 
absolute immunity, the District Court stated that absolute 
immunity might be proper where "defense of a constitutional 
tort action requires the disclosure of classified 
information." Here, however, the District Court found that 
"the defendants have acknowledged that this case involves no 
such issue of secrecy or security." App. 2la. The District 
Court certified the case for interlocutory appeal under the 
collateral order ooctrine. CADC (Tamm, Robb, Edwards) 
affirmed without opinion. 
Harlow, No. 80-945, holds open the possibility that 
federal officials might be entitled to absolute immunity in 
connection with performance of functions "so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability." Slip op., at 12. 
Under Harlow, petitioner thus could establish entitlement to 
absolute immunity in this case if he could "demonstrate that 
he was discharging a protected function when performing the 
act for which liability is asserted." Ibid. Rere, as 
noted, the District Court has found that the case involves 
no issue of "secrecy or security." Nonetheless, the 
Solicitor General argues that the special functions of the 
CIA director require an absolute immunity applicable to all 
personnel actions. Nothing in Harlow suggests that the 
special status of the CIA director might not raise a unique 
and unsettled question. But this question--which does seem 
to me to be unique--of course could be mooted by a decision 
of the question presented in Bush v. Lucas, supra. If 
government employment generally constitutes a special factor 
precluding inference of a Bivens action for adverse 
personnel actions, that rattonale would apply a fortiori to 
suits against the Director of the CIA. Assuming that the 
Court will vote to grant in Bush v. Lucas, supra, I will 
vote to Hold this case for No. 81-469. 
3. 
No. 81-1010, Purt i 11 v. 'schweiker 
Petitioner is a 53-year-old employee of HHS. When his 
superiors failed to promote him, he filed suit in federal 
court, alleging age discrimination. His complaint based one 
count on a federal statute, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), and one directly on the Constitution. 
The District Court dismissed the Bivens count--which alone 
is here--on grounds that it was preempted by the ADEA. See 
Carlson v. Green, supra. CA3 agreed. 
ln this Court there are two possible questions 
presented for decision. The first is the same as that 
presented in No. 81-469, Bush v. Lucas. That is whether the 
government's employment relationship with an employee is a 
"special factor counseling hesitation" in the inference of a 
Bivens action. The other is whether the ADEA preempts a 
Bivens action that might otherwise exist. See Carlson v. 
Green, 446 u.s. 14, 18-19 (1980). There appears to be a 
split on the second question. S~e Sonntat v. Dooley, 650 
F.2d 904 (CA7 1.981) (upholding Bivens c1a m by a former 
federal employee asserting age discrimination by her 
superiors). 
The preemption argument in this case, based on the 
ADEA, appears to be stronger than that made under the 
general civil service law~ in Bush v. Lucas, supra. Yet the 
Bush issue--whether federal employment is a special factor 
precluding Bivens actions for employment decisions--is the 
broader and more important issue. Viewing the "special 
factor" question as the one the court should reach first, I 
would be inclined to Hold this case if Bush is granted. 
Alternatively, I could vote to Grant this case and 
consolidate it for argument with Bush, supra, No. 81-469. 
No. 81-1134, Ashcroft v. National Org. for Women, Inc. 
The petitioner in this case is the Attorney General of 
Missouri. In that capacity he joined other state Attorneys 
General in bringing an antitrust action against respondent 
for its convention boycott of States that had not ratified 
the ERA. Following dismissal of that action, respondent 
sued petitioner under § 1983. Petitioner claimed absolute 
immunity from suit, asserting that prosecutorial immunity 
extended to his initiation of a civil action on behalf of 
the State. Resondent claimed that petitioner's actions in 
arranging for the filing of the civil action all occurred in 
an executive capacity. The District Court denied 
petitioner's immunity claim without opinion, and CAB, in a 
brief per curiam order, concluded that the order appealed 
from was not final within the meaning of 28 u.s.a. § 1291 
and thus not appealable. 
4. 
In No. 79-173S, United States v. Nixon, the Court 
reaffirms that orders denying absolute immunity are 
appealable collateral orders under Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541 (1949). Respondent 
argues that there can be no conflict with this or other 
cases, because the collateral order doctrine is inherently 
flexible and not mandatory. But CAS did not put its 
decision on this basis. It appears to have held as a matter 
of law that there was no appealable, because not "final," 
order. Because our Nixon decision is incompatible with that 
of CAS in this respect, I am inclined to vote to GV & R in 
light of No. 79-173S. 
No. 81-15SO, Sanborn v. Wolfe! 
The petitioners in this S 1983 suit are parole 
officers. As a parolee under their supervision, respondent 
was arrested for intoxication. He subsequently forfeited 
bond when he failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. Upon 
receipt of this and other information, petitioners took 
respondent into custody for parole violations. There was no 
on-site hearing to determine whether there was probable 
cause to revoke his parole, as apparently should have been 
held under our aecision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471 
(1972). After he was released from incarceration 27 days 
after his arrest, respondent brought suit against 
petitioners under § 1983, alleging a violation of due 
process under Morrisse • A jury awarded damages of $1,000. 
On appeal, CA6 re ected petitioners' argument that the trial 
court had erred in imposing on them the buroen of proving 
that they had acted in good faith. And, after reviewing the 
record, the CA found that the jury reasonably could have 
found that petitioners did not act in subjective good faith. 
As evidence of bad faith, the CA appears to have relied on 
evidence that petitioners arrested respondent not in 
response to parole violations, but to secure his detention 
while more serious charges were investigageo. Judge Weick 
dissented. He argued that the petitioners indisputably had 
acted in accordance with the policies of the Audit Parole 
Authority of Ohio and approved as lawful by the Attorney 
General of Ohio. That policy was not to hold on-site 
hearings where the parolee had jumped bail for an offense 
committed while on parole. As laymen, petitioners were 
entitled to rely on the policy adopted by their employer. 
The Court opinion in No. 80-945, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
holds that an official is entitled to good faith immunity 
insofar as his conduct does not violate wclearly established 
5. 
constitutional or statutory rights of, which a reasonable 
person would have known." Slip op., at 17. Harlow further 
provides that an official may establish entitlement to good 
faith immunity where he can prove that he neither knew nor 
should have known of the relevant legal standard. In light 
of petitioner's claimed reliance on established Ohio 
procedures, the immunity inquiry in this case may be in 
tension with Harlow's reformulated standard. 
Unlike Harlow, however, this case arises under ~ 1983, 
and thus presents a technically unsettled question: whether 
the Harlow standard should be applied to cases under that 
statute. But see Slip. Op., at 17, and n. 30 (suggesting 
any distinction would be untenable). 
I believe that the Harlow standard should be applicable 
here. I therefore will vote to Grant, Vacate, and Remand in 
light of No. 80-945, Harlow v. Butterfield. A iudgment 
order in this case might read as follows: 
"The petition is Granted. The judgment is 
vacated and the case remanded for 
r~consideration in light of No. 80-945, 
Harlow v. Butterfield. See Butz v. ~conomou, 
438 u.s. 478, 504 (1978) (deeming it 
"untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under the § 1983 and suits 
brought directly under the Constitution 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-945 
BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. BUTTER-
FIELD, PETITIONERS v. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations.' At the conclusion of discovery the 
1 Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
80-941>--0PINION 
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims 
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President 
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for 
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
3 See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether 
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confus-
ing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The Presi-
dent explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. 
See id., at 220. 
80-945-0PINION 
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
6 The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
'App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic 
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Halde-
man in December 1969 and January 1970. After the Presi-
dent had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitz-
gerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's 
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasiz-
ing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled 
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration 
at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery has failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
tory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 99-100, 180--181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
• See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26. 
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante . Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed 
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respond-
ent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
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§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact 
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petition-
ers were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for Cert. 
1a-3a. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a. Never 
having determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
10 The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
vides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, 
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is 
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners 
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action 
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in 
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the rec-
ognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The 
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, 
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the 
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra. 
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
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protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. To officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have ex-
tended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute 
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508--512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513--517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." !d., at 506. Without discounting the 
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an abso-
lute immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional 
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violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 
564 (1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute 
immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our 
expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a 
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and 
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by friv-
olous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations 
omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
III 
A 
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket ex-
tension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. In decid-
ing this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v. 
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet 
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a de-
fense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-
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ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not ques-
tion the power or the importance of the Secretary's office. 
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal 
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office. 
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify 
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials," 
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of law-
less conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against 
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found 
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials 
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials." I d., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
12 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
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"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 61(H}17. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. Id., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
u. s. 306 (1973). 
'
3 See U. S. Canst., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
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for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125--133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 16 
c 
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
"See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. 
" In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 43(}-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer. " Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions . See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
511Hi17. 
16 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other offi-
cials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-
powers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President 
himself. See ante, at--. 
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such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
est. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18 
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
17 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
18 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 61tH317, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
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sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 19 He then must demon-
strate that he was in fact discharging the protected function 
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 20 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, as-
suming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute 
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that 
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie 
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose 
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the 
standards properly applicable to their claims. 
IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
--, the resolution of immunity questions inherently re-
•• Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at-. 
20 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 
supra. 
80-945-0PINION 
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 13 
quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avail-
able alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action 
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindica-
tion of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in 
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recogni-
tion that has required the denial of absolute immunity to 
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot 
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the 
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the de-
fendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social 
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of offi-
cial energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of 
able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally, 
there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the 
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible 
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties. 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. de-
nied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S., 
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we 
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit 
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 22 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments 
21 See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 
324-327. 
Zl The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Bmndhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
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that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests 
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the 
"good faith" standard established by our decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 23 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury .... " !d., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 24 
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is 
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstan-
tial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508. 
23 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore 
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J ., 
concurring). 
24 In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
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The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 25 Yet an official's subjective good faith 
has been considered to be a question of fact, which some 
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring 
resolution by a jury. 26 
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of 
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard 
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most 
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his con-
duct would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, it follows that the 
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective 
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant 
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but in-
tending to inflict "other [actionable] injury." 
25 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962). 
:.; E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CAS 1978) (good faith 
"is dependent on motivation and conduct ... as established at trial") (em-
phasis added); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 833 (CA2 1977) 
(question of good faith is "peculiarly within the jury's province"); cf. Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 120 n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the 
existence of"actual malice," as an issue offact, may properly be decided on 
summary judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
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the subjective good faith of high officials of the Executive 
Branch. The duties of these officers often require decisions 
on controversial issues of gravest importance, in an environ-
ment in which views inevitably are affected by loyalty, ideol-
ogy, and emotion. This environment in part explains why 
questions of intent so rarely can be decided by summary 
judgment. Yet it also frames a background in which there 
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative of 
subjective intent. Judicial inquiry into subjective motiva-
tion therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the de-
posing of numerous officials. Litigation burdens of this kind 
not only can distract officials from the performance of their 
duties. 2:1 At least in the case of such high officials as the 
27 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided 
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
cient [to force a trial] . . .. The effect of this development upon the willing-
ness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." 
In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect 
the public interest in "encouraging the vigorous exercise of official author-
ity", 438 U. S. at 506, because we believed that qualified immunity would 
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith mistakes. We as-
sumed that such immunity would prove "workable". There are indica-
80-945--0PINION 
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 17 
President's closest aides, separation-of-powers concerns also 
require that such inquiries into executive decisionmaking 
should not be undertaken lightly. 28 
tions, however, that some District Courts may not have understood our ad-
monition in Butz that "insubstantial" suits against high public officials 
should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See Schuck, 
supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admonition. 
In so doing, we continue to recognize that "In situations of abuse, an ac-
tion against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. This con-
cern applies with special force in the case of officials whose "greater power 
... affords a greater potential for lawless conduct." Ibid. We only re-
peat that insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Govern-
ment as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and that "firm appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such 
cases. !d., at 508. Under those rules a plaintiff retains, of course, access 
to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden of raising a material 
issue of fact. And he need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
28 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United 
States v. Nixon 418 U. S., at 705-706, 708: 
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica-
bly rooted in the separation of powers udner the Constitution." 
Many of the policy considerations implicated by Presidential communica-
tions would apply with nearly equal force to communications among Presi-
dential aides and other high Executive officials. The separation-of-powers 
concerns are different in the two cases, being less weighty where the Presi-
dent personally is not involved. As commentators have observed, how-
ever, the "separation of powers" is "a 'political doctrine' and not a technical 
rule of law." Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure 
in Criminal Contempt Cases in "Inferior'' Federal Courts--A Study in 
Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014 (1924) (footnote omit-
ted). Even where the separation-of-powers doctrine imposes no absolute 
barrier to judicial functions intruding on the functioning of the Executive 
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As we affirmed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, there are 
situations in which sufficiently compelling justifications exist. 
In the case of private suits for damages, however, we con-
clude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice 
either to subject high federal officials to the costs of trial or to 
license broad-reaching discovery. Consistently with the bal-
ance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore hold that at 
least high executive officials are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "set-
tled, indisputable" legal rights of which they reasonably 
should have known. Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S., 
at 321. 29 Absent a clear congressional decision to the con-
trary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost 
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 30 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to settled, indisputable 
law,31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
Branch, the doctrine does require a judicial consideration of the constitu-
tional interests at stake in cases of particular kinds. See Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services Administra-
tion, supra, 433 U. S., at 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 
U. S., at 711-712 (1974). 
29 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
defense for lower level officials, nor does it present any question of the im-
munity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 
§ 1983. We do not purport to resolve questions that might be framed by 
cases not properly before us. As we recognized in Scheur v. Rhodes, 
supra, 416 U. S., at 247, the qualified immunity defenses possessed by dif-
ferent officials should be determined by reference to "the scope of discre-
tion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they rea-
sonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be 
based." 
30 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
3
' As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978) , we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
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permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. Charged with decisionmaking under pres-
sures of time and limits of information, not every official 
fairly could be held responsible for areas of the law remote 
from his experience or duties. Nor is it reasonable to expect 
every such official to be familiar with the most recent judicial 
developments. On summary judgment, the judge appropri-
ately may determine what the law was at the time the action 
occurred and in most cases may be able to decide what a par-
ticular high official reasonably could be expected to have 
known about it. 32 
By defining the limits on a high official's qualified immunity 
solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless 
conduct. The public interest in deterrence of constitutional 
violations and in compensation of victims remains protected 
by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of 
an official's acts. 33 Where an official knows that his conduct 
peals, or of the local District Court." 
32 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U.S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
ably be characterized as being in good faith.' ") 
33 A victim of wrongful behavior by a public official frequently may be 
able to obtain compensation by means other than a private suit for damages 
against the individual wrongdoer in a federal court. In this case, for ex-
ample, Fitzgerald invoked civil service remedies that resulted in a judg-
ment entitling him to reinstatement and backpay. See Civil Service Com-
mission, Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973). 
Where relief is available from the Government, as under the Civil Service 
Act, no immunity defense generally will be recognized. Even under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, which pro-
vides certain exemptions from Government liability, including one for "dis-
cretionary functions," see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953), 
this Court has held that "the very purpose of [Congress] was to waive the 
Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity" and that there is "no 
justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those 
provided by Congress," Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 
8{}-94&---0PINION 
20 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to hesi-
tate. Where his duties legitimately require action in which 
established rights are not implicated-even if the. action po-
tentially is harmful to someone that the official dislikes-the 
public interest frequently may be served better by fearless 
and unhesitating action. 34 
c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 35 The 
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
319, 320 (1957). 
34 We emphasize that we hold only that a high federal official is shielded 
against liability for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of 
his duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the con-
ditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available. 
35 Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not view either the statutory or the constitutional question 
as insubstantial. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 
U. 8.630, 63&-639 (1981) (controlling question in implication of statutory 
causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create a 
damages remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming 
on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship 
between the Federal Government and its civil service employees is a spe-
cial consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy"). 
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction of the case 
only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order doctrine. 
We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for fuller consid-
eration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of Appeals. 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
• 
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The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the 
' Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims 
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President 
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for 
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
3 See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether 
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confus-
ing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The Presi-
dent explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. 
See id., at 220. 
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?" , White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
6 The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
7 App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic 
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Halde-
man in December 1969 and January 1970. After the Presi-
dent had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitz-
gerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's 
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasiz-
ing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled 
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration 
at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery has failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
tory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 9S-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26. 
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed 
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respond-
ent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
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§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact 
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petition-
ers were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for Cert. 
1a-3a. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a. Never 
having determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). u 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
10 The first of these statutes, 5 U.S. C. §7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
vides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, 
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is 
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners 
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action 
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in 
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the rec-
ognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The 
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, 
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the 
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra. 
11 As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
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protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. To officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have ex-
tended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute 
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513--517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the 
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an abso-
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violations-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 
564 (1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute 
immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our 
expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a 
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and 
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by friv-
olous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations 
omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." ld., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at --. 
III 
A 
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket ex-
tension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. In decid-
ing this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v. 
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet 
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a de-
fense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-
I 
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ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not ques-
tion the power or the importance of the Secretary's office. 
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal 
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office. 
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify 
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials," 
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of law-
less conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against 
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found 
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials 
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials." I d., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
12 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. Id., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself'3-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
States Servicemen's Fund , 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
u. s. 306 (1973). 
'
3 See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President ... may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments , upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
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for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125-133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 16 
c 
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
14 See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. 
15 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions . See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
515--517. 
16 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule . As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other offi-
cials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-
powers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President 
himself. See ante, at --. 
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such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
est. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18 
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
17 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711}-.711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
18 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 61&-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
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sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 19 He then must demon-
strate that he was in fact discharging the protected function 
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 2Q 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, as-
suming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute 
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that 
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie 
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose 
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the 
standards properly applicable to their claims. 
IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
--, the resolution of immunity questions inherently re-
'
9 Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
20 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 
supra. 
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quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avail-
able alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action 
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindica-
tion of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. 8., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in 
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recogni-
tion that has required the denial of absolute immunity to 
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot 
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the 
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the de-
fendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social 
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of offi-
cial energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of 
able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally, 
there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the 
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible 
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties. 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. de-
nied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. 8., 
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we 
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit 
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz, 
supra, 438 U. 8., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 22 Yet petitioners advance pers~asive arguments 
2
' See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 
324-327. 
22 The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
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that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests 
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the 
"good faith" standard established by our decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 23 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the . 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury .... " I d., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 24 
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is 
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstan-
tial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508. 
23 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore 
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J., 
concurring). 
" In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
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The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 25 Yet an official's subjective good faith 
has been considered to be a question of fact, which some 
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring 
resolution by a jury. 26 
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of 
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard 
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most 
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his con-
duct would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, it follows that the 
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective 
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant 
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but in-
tending to inflict "other [actionable] injury." 
25 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962). 
26 E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978) (good faith 
"is dependent on motivation and conduct ... as established at trial") (em-
phasis added); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 833 (CA2 1977) 
(question of good faith is "peculiarly within the jury's province"); cf. Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 120 n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the 
existence of "actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on 
summary judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
80-94&-0PINION 
16 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
the subjective good faith of high officials of the Executive 
Branch. The duties of these officers often require decisions 
on controversial issues of gravest importance, in an environ-
ment in which views inevitably are affected by loyalty, ideol-
ogy, and emotion. This environment in part explains why 
questions of intent so rarely can be decided by summary 
judgment. Yet it also frames a background in which there 
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative of 
subjective intent. Judicial inquiry into subjective motiva-
tion therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the de-
posing of numerous officials. Litigation burdens of this kind 
not only can distract officials from the performance of their 
duties. 27 At least in the case of such high officials as the 
27 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided 
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
cient [to force a trial] .... The effect of this development upon the willing-
ness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." 
In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect 
the public interest in "encouraging the vigorous exercise of official author-
ity", 438 U. S. at 506, because we believed that qualified immunity would 
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith mistakes. We as-
sumed that such immunity would prove "workable". There are indica-
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President's closest aides, separation-of-powers concerns also 
require that such inquiries into executive decisionmaking 
should not be undertaken lightly. 28 
tions, however, that some District Courts may not have understood our ad-
monition in Butz that "insubstantial" suits against high public officials 
should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See Schuck, 
supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324--327. We reiterate this admonition. 
In so doing, we continue to recognize that "In situations of abuse, an ac-
tion against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. This con-
cern applies with special force in the case of officials whose "greater power 
... affords a greater potential for lawless conduct." Ibid. We only re-
peat that insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Govern-
ment as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and that "firm appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such 
cases. !d., at 508. Under those rules a plaintiff retains, of course, access 
to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden of raising a material 
issue of fact. And he need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
28 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United 
States v. Nixon 418 U. S., at 705-706, 708: 
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica-
bly rooted in the separation of powers udner the Constitution." 
Many of the policy considerations implicated by Presidential communica-
tions would apply with nearly equal force to communications among Presi-
dential aides and other high Executive officials. The separation-of-powers 
concerns are different in the two cases, being less weighty where the Presi-
dent personally is not involved. As commentators have observed, how-
ever, the "separation of powers" is "a 'political doctrine' and not a technical 
rule of law." Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure 
in Criminal Contempt Cases in "Inferior'' Federal Courts-A Study in 
Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014 (1924) (footnote omit-
ted). Even where the separation-of-powers doctrine imposes no absolute 
barrier to judicial functions intruding on the functioning of the Executive 
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As we affirmed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, there are 
situations in which sufficiently compelling justifications exist. 
In the case of private suits for damages, however, we con-
clude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice 
either to subject high federal officials to the costs of trial or to 
license broad-reaching discovery. Consistently with the bal-
ance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore hold that at 
least high executive officials are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "set- ~ 
tled, indisputable" legal rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known. Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S., 
at 321. 29 Absent a clear congressional decision to the con-
trary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost 
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 30 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to settled, indisputable 
law,31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
Branch, the doctrine does require a judicial consideration of the constitu-
tional interests at stake in cases of particular kinds. See Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services Administra-
tion, supra, 433 U. S., at 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 
U. S., at 711-712 (1974). 
29 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
defense for lower level officials, nor does it present any question of the im-
munity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 
§ 1983. We do not purport to resolve questions that might be framed by 
cases not properly before us. As we recognized in Scheur v. Rhodes, 
supra, 416 U. S., at 247, the qualified immunity defenses possessed by dif-
ferent officials should be determined by reference to "the scope of discre-
tion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they rea-
sonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be 
based." 
30 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
31 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
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permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro- /Y)'Yl t ~ 5 I ~ 
priately may determine what the law was at the time the ac-
tion occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person 
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this 
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery 
generally should not be allowed. 
By defining the limits on a high official's qualified immunity 
solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless 
conduct. The public interest in deterrence of constitutional 
violations and in compensation of victims remains protected 
by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of 
an official's acts. 33 Where an official knows that his conduct 
will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to hesi-
tate. Where his duties legitimately require action in which 
established rights are not implicated-even if the action po-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
32 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
ably be characterized as being in good faith.' ") 
33 A victim of wrongful behavior by a public official frequently may be 
able to obtain compensation by means other than a private suit for damages 
against the individual wrongdoer in a federal court. In this case, for ex-
ample, Fitzgerald invoked civil service remedies that resulted in a judg-
ment entitling him to reinstatement and backpay. See Civil Service Com-
mission, Decision on the Appeal of A . Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973). 
Where relief is available from the Government, as under the Civil Service 
Act, no immunity defense generally will be recognized. Even under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, which pro-
vides certain exemptions from Government liability, including one for "dis-
cretionary functions," see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953), 
this Court has held that "the very purpose of [Congress] was to waive the 
Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity" and that there is "no 
justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those 
provided by Congress," Rayonier, Inc . v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 
319, 320 (1957). 
/ 
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tentially is harmful to someone that the official dislikes-the 
public interest frequently may be served better by fearless 
and unhesitating action. 34 
c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 35 The 
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
34 We emphasize that we hold only that a high federal official is shielded 
against liability for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of 
his duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the con-
ditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available. 
35 Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not view either the statutory or the constitutional question 
as insubstantial. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 
U. 8.630, 638-639 (1981) (controlling question in implication of statutory 
causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create a 
damages remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming 
on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relationship 
between the Federal Government and its civil service employees is a spe-
cial consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy"). 
As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction of the case 
only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order doctrine. 
We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for fuller consid-
eration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of Appeals. 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
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[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the,. 
' Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
----- -- -
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims 
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President 
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for 
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164--165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
' See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether 
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confus-
ing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The Presi-
dent explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. 
See id., at 220. 
•. 
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
'See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency'' of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
6 The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
7 App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic' · 
·. 
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. AB evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Halde-
man in December 1969 and January 1970. After the Presi-
dent had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitz-
gerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's 
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasiz-
ing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled 
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration 
at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 99-100, 180--181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26. 
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed 
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respond-
ent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
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tory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact 
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petition-
ers were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1--3. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never hav-
ing determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
10 The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
vides generally that ''The right of employees ... to ... furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, 
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is 
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners 
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action 
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in 
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the rec-
ognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The 
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, 
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the 
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra. 
11 As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recog-
nized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute im-
munity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at 
247- 248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." !d., at 506. Without discounting the' · . 
•. 
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute 
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional viola-
tions-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas, 
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute im-
munity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expec-
tation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion, 
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will en-
sure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous 
lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
III 
A 
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket ex-
tension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. . In decid-
ing this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v. 
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet'·· 
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official directly accountable to the President-asserted a de-
fense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-
ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not ques-
tion the power or the importance of the Secretary's office. 
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal 
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office. 
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify 
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials," 
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of law-
less conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against 
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found 
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials 
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials." I d., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
12 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to , _ 
--- ·--· ---- --- ~ .. 
., 
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616--617. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. I d., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet--Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative imm'lnity 
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have follovJed a 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
u. s. 306 (1973). 
13 See U. S. Canst., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
1
' THE CHIEF JusTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides I 
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a 
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent' 
---------
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 12~133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
u~~u . 
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have 
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger 
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize 
about the role of "offices" in a particular President's administration without 
reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by the 
President. 
15 See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. ~ 
•• In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213--1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
515--517. 
17 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso- ' · 
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
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Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
est. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19 
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other offi-
cials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-
powers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President 
himself. See ante, at --. 
18 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("(C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
Pre~· dent's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 J. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
19 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some· aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 616--{)17, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S. , at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in'· . 
•. 
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demon-
strate that he was in fact discharging the protected function 
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 21 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, as-
suming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute 
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that 
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie 
within the protected area. We do not, however, foreclose 
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the 
standards properly applicable to their claims. 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
"'Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
21 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, ' ·· 
supra. 
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IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
--, the resolution of immunity questions inherently re-
quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avail-
. able alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action 
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindica-
tion of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in 
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recogni-
tion that has required the denial of absolute immunity to 
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot 
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the 
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the de-
fendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 22 These social 
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of offi-
cial energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of 
able citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally, 
there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the 
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible 
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties." 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. de-
nied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
22 See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, ,_ 
324--327. 
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In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S., 
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we 
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit 
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 23 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments 
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests 
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the 
"good faith" standard established by our decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
23 The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is 
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstan-
tial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508. 
24 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore ' · 
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J., 
concurring). 
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420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury .... " !d., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 25 
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 26 Yet an official's subjective good faith 
25 In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,562-563,566 (1978), quoted in 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard 
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most 
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his con-
duct would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights, it follows that the 
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective 
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant 
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but in-
tending to inflict "other [actiqJlable] injury." 
26 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
.. .. 
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has been considered to be a question of fact, which some 
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring 
resolution by a jury. '1:1 
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of 
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of 
the subjective good faith of government officials. Not only 
are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks 
of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental du-
ties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able 
people from public service. There are special costs to "sub-
jective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is avail-
able only to officials performing discretionary functions. In 
contrast with the thought processes accompaning "ministe-
rial" tasks, the judgements leading up to discretionary action 
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's ex-
periences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in 
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de-
cided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a back-
ground in which there often is no clear end to the relevant 
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation there-
fore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of 
numerous persons, including an official's professional col-
leagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive 
of effective government. 29 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., Paller v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962). 
-n E . g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne 
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of 
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary 
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
28 In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind fre-... I 
quently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court rec- · 
ognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974): 
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, 
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not 
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of 
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We 
therefore hold that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not viola 
"clearly established" cons 1 u wna ng s o which a reason-
able person would have known. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 
U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S., 
at 321.30 Absent a clear congressional decision to the con-
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica- · 
bly rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 
29 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided 
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
cient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the will-
ingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." 
30 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
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trary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost 
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intenHt \ 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's c.l (0\f 1 ol 
conduct, as measured by reference to settled,-indisputab e.s -\-~ \) \t' s"(' 
law,31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and --------
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum- · 
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine what the law was at the time the ac-
tion occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person 
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this 
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery 
generally should not be allowed. 
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "ob-
jective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. 
The public interest in deterrence of · · · · 
and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test 
that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an offi-
,-----oi-.ia•l;.;;'s:..:a=:cts. Where an official knows that his conduct will vio-
L----~ late rights, he should be made to hesitate; a 
person who suffers injury caused by such knowing conduct 
may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's duties 
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a 
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504. 
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently avail-
able to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of 
this scope. 
31 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
32 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
33 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
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legitimately require action in whic established rights are not ( 
implicated-even if the action potentially is harmful to some-
one that the official dislikes-the public interest frequently 
may be served better by fearless and unhesitating action. 34 
c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
ably be characterized as being in good faith.' ") 
a. We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages 
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objec-
tive" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunc-
tive or declaratory relief might be available. 
35 In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public 
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See 
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admoni-
tion. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government 
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases. 
Id., at 508. 
36 Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
_,__§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not vi~nel:"'the statutory question as insubstantial. -ef:" 
Te'fciS1'ri11ustries;-I nc...v.-Radcliff M aterials;-45l...U.-S.Q30;-638-639 (.,1.9~) 
----. -- ·----
( eontrolling-!luestionitrimplication.of.8tatutory-causes-of-actiorris-whether 
Gongres~atively-intended .to..create.a..damages.r.emedy); Cf. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Curran,-- U.S.--,--
(1982) (controlling question in implication of statutory cause s of action is 
whether Congress affirmatively intended to create a damages remedy); 
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638-Q39 (1981) 
(same). Nor is the Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 
576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding 
that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civi}· . 
' 
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trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
service employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in in-
ferring a Bivens remedy''). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we 
took jurisdiction of the case only to resolve the immunity question under 
the collateral order doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave 
these questions for fuller consideration by the District Court and, if neces-
sary, by the Court of Appeals. 
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JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the 
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
) 
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims 
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President 
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for 
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, '~we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
3 See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether 
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confus-
ing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The Presi-
dent explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. 
See id., at 220. 
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's ·position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
• The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
7 App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally. . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic 
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Halde-
man in December 1969 and January 1970. After the Presi-
dent had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitz-
gerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's 
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasiz-
ing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled 
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration 
at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 99-100, 180--181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26. 
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed 
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respond-
ent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
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tory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact 
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petition-
ers were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never hav-
ing determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
10 The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
vides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, 
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is 
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners 
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action 
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in 
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the rec-
ognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The 
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, 
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the 
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra. 
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recog-
nized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute im-
munity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. ld., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the 
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute 
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional viola-
tions-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas, 
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute im-
munity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expec-
tation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion, 
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will en-
sure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous 
lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations omitted); 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
III 
A 
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket rec-
ognition of absolute immunity for Presidential aides. In de-
ciding this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz 
v. Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabi-
80-945-0PINION 
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net official directly accountable to the President-asserted a 
defense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-
ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not ques-
tion the power or the importance of the Secretary's office. 
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal 
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office. 
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify 
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials," 
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of law-
less conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against 
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we con-
cluded that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for 
purposes of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under 
the Constitution against federal officials." I d., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enj.oy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal for e to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
12 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
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"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. Id., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
u. s. 306 (1973). 
13 See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
14 THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides 
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a 
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent 
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125--133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 17 
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have 
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger 
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize 
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration with-
out reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by 
the President. 
15 See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. 
16 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F . 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
515--517. 
17 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
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Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
est. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19 
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other offi-
cials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke separation-of-
powers considerations to the same extent as suits against the President 
himself. 
18 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
'
9 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in 
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demon-
strate that he was discharging the protected function when 
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, as-
suming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute 
immunity· would be warranted, could we now conclude that 
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie 
within the protected area. We do not, however, foreclose 
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the 
standards properly applicable to their claims. 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
20 Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
21 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 
supra. 
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IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
--, the resolution of immunity questions inherently re-
quires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available 
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for 
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of 
constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 
U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' 
shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recognition that 
has required the denial of absolute immunity to most public 
officers. At the same time, however, it cannot be disputed 
seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as 
well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant offi-
cials, but to the society as a whole. 22 These social costs in-
clude the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official en-
ergy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able 
citizens from the acceptance of public office. Finally, there 
is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor 
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [pub-
lic officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties." 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. de-
nied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
22 See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 
324-327. 
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. 8., 
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. 8., at 245--248, we 
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit 
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz, 
supra, 438 U. 8., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 
U. 8. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 23 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments 
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests 
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the 
"good faith" standard established by our decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. 8. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U. 8. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
23 The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. 
24 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore 
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d ., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J., 
concurring). 
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stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within"!¢; sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitu'tional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury .... " Id., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 20 
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
· has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith 
26 In Wood ~he Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). The two-pronged standard 
as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat redundant in many if not in most 
cases. If the defendant neither knew nor should have known that his con-
duct would violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights, it follows that the 
defendant could not have acted with a malicious intent to cause a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights of which he knew nothing. The subjective 
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant 
acted without knowing that his conduct violated the Constitution, but in-
tending to inflict "other [actionable] injury." 
26 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcast-
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has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts 
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.27 
In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing 
values, it is now clear that substantial costs attend the litiga-
tion of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not 
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the 
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental 
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of 
able people from public service. There are special costs to 
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is 
available only to officials performing discretionary functions. 
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "minis-
terial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action 
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's ex-
periences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in 
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de-
cided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a back-
ground in ·which there often is no clear end to the relevant 
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation there-
fore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of 
numerous persons, including an official's professional col-
leagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive 
of effective government. 29 
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962). 
27 E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne 
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of 
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary 
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
28 In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind fre-
quently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court rec-
ognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974): 
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, 
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not 
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of 
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We 
therefore hold that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 
supra, 420 U. S., at 321. 30 Absent a clear congressional deci-
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica-
bly rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 
29 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided 
vote, 452 U . . S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. . Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
cient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the will-
ingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." 
30 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983. 
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a 
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
c. ocA.\flt \ot. 
~ ll ~~(;\eel 'to 
"""'ow 
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sion to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not 
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of 
subjective intent. 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established 
law,31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine what the law was at the time the ac-
tion occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person 
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this 
threshold immunity question is resolved, extensive discovery 
generally should not be allowed. 
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "ob-
jective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. 
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in 
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that fo-
cuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official' 
acts. ere an o that con uc ~olate 
statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to fiesi-
tate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such knowing 
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's 
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 l · S., at 504. 
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently avail-
able to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of 
this scope. 
31 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
32 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978) , we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
33 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
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duties legitimately require action in which clearly established 
rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better 
served by action taken "with independence and without fear 
of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 
(1967). 34 
c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. 36 We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The 
ably be characterized as being in good faith.'") 
.. We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages 
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objec-
tive" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunc-
tive or declaratory relief might be available. 
35 In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public 
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See 
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admoni-
tion. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government 
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases. 
Id., at 508. 
36 Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as 
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Cur-
ran, -- U. S. --, -- (1982) (controlling question in implication of 
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to 
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638-Q39 (1981) (same). Nor is the 
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), af-
firming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique rela-
tionship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees 
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens 
remedy''). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction 
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trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order 
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for 
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The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Bt ,terfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the 
' Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims 
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President 
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for 
canning" Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
' The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
3 See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether 
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confus-
ing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The Presi-
dent explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. 
See id., at 220. 
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
'See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
6 The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
7 App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic 
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Halde-
man in December 1969 and January 1970. After the Presi-
dent had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitz-
gerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's 
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasiz-
ing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled 
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration 
at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26. 
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed 
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respond-
ent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
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tory causes of action. under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact 
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petition-
ers were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never hav-
ing determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
10 The first of these statutes, 5 U.S. C. §7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
vides generally that "The right of employees .. . to .. . furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, 
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is 
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners 
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action 
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in 
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the rec-
ognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The 
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, 
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the 
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra. 
11 As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald , ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recog-
nized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute im-
munity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the 
1 
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute 
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional viola-
tions-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas, 
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute im-
munity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expec-
tation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion, 
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will en-
sure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous 
lawsuits." 438 U. 8., at 507-508 (citations omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." Id., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
III 
Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a blanket pro-
tection of absolute immunity as an incident of t~ offices as 
Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on 
an empty page. In Butz v. Economou, supra, the Secretary 
of Agriculture-a Cabinet official directly accountable to the 
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President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity 
from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so 
doing we did not question the power or the importance of the 
Secretary's office. Nor did we doubt the importance to the 
President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his 
duties of office. Yet we found these factors, alone, to be in-
sufficient to justify absolute immunity. "[T]he greater 
power of [high] officials," we reasoned, "affords a greater po-
tential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. 
Damages actions against high officials were therefore "an im-
portant means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." 
Ibid. Moreover, we concluded that it would be "untenable 
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between 
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits 
brought directly under the Constitution against federal offi-
cials." !d., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
'
2 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. ld., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund , 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
u. s. 306 (1973). 
13 See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President ... may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
"THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides 
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a 
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent 
------ ---- --- - --
I 
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125-133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 17 
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have 
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger 
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize 
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration with-
out reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by 
the President. Butz v. Economou cannot be distinguished on this basis. 
"See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. 
'
6 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
515-517. 
17 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all 'of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
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c 
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
est. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19 
from factors unique to his constitutional responsibilities and station. Suits 
against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not in-
voke separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits 
against the President himself. 
'
8 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
19 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in 
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demon-
strate that he was discharging the protected function when 
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, at 506. Nor, assuming that 
petitioners did have functions for which absolute immunity 
would be warranted, could we now conclude that the acts 
charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie within the 
protected area. We do not, however, foreclose the possibil-
ity that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the standards 
properly applicable to their claims. 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
20 Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
21 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 
supra. 
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IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
--, the resolution of immunity questions inherently re-
quires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available 
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for 
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of 
constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at / 
506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 
U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is dam-
ages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required 
the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. At 
the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that 
claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the 
guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the 
society as a whole. 22 These social costs include the expenses 
of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing 
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from the ac-
ceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that 
fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor of all but the most 
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle, 
177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 
(1950). 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
22 See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 
324--327. 
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, at ' 
507-508, as in Scheuer, 416 U. S., at 245--248, we relied on 
the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstan-
tial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 438 U. S., at / 
507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 765 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 23 
Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments that the dis-
missal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a factor pre-
supposed in the balance of competing interests struck by our 
prior cases-requires an adjustment of the "good faith" 
standard established by our decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
23 The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. 
24 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore 
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stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury .... " !d., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 25 
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith 
has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts 
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury. 27 
"" In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette , 434 U.S. 555,562-563,566 (1978), quoted in 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). 
26 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962). 
27 E . g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne 
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of 
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary 
·~- . -------
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In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing 
values, it is now clear that substantial costs attend the litiga-
tion of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not 
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the 
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental 
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of 
able people from public service. There are special costs to 
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is 
available only to officials performing discretionary functions. 
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "minis-
terial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action 
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's ex-
periences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in 
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de-
cided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a back-
ground in which there often is no clear end to the relevant 
evidence. · Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation there-
fore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of 
numerous persons, including an official's professional col-
leagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive 
of effective government. 29 
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
28 In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind fre-
quently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court rec-
ognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974): 
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica-
bly rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 
29 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided 
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, 
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not 
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of 
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We 
therefore hold that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 
supra, 420 U. S., at 321. 30 Absent a clear congressional deci-
sion to the contrary, we conclude that public policy will not 
support the cost of conditioning their immunity on proof of 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
cient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the will-
ingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." 
30 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983. 
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a 
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504. 
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently avail-
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subjective mental factors. 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established 
law/1 should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. ron summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine what the law was at the time an ac-
tion occurred and in most cases what a reasonable person 
could have been expected to know about it. 32 Until this 
thresholdip1munity question is resolved, extensive discovery 
generally should not be allow~ 
By defining the limits of qualified immunity solely in "ob-
jective" terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. 
The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in 
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that fo-
cuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's 
acts. Where an official could be expected to know that cer-
tain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, 
he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers in-
jury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. 33 
But where an official's duties legitimately require action in 
which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public 
"This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
32 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
83 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
ably be characterized as being in good faith.' ") 
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interest may be better served by action taken "with indepen-
dence and without fear of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 
386 u. s. 547, 554 (1967). 34 
c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 35 The 
34 We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages 
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objec-
tive" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunc-
tive or declaratory relief might be available. 
35 In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public 
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See 
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admoni-
tion. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government 
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases. 
Id., at 508. 
36 Petitioners also have m:ged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as 
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Cur-
ran, -- U. S. --, -- (1982) (controlling question in implication of 
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to 
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638--639 (1981) (same). Nor is the 
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), af-
firming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique rela-
tionship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees 
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens 
remedy"). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction 
of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order 
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for 
80-945-0PINION 
20 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alle~ ~d to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations.' At the conclusion of discovery the 
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President. a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims 
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President 
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for 
canning" Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secre 1ry Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public; announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
~ See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation-with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether 
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confus-
ing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The Presi-
dent explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. 
See id., at 220. 
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volvement in any wrongful activity.~ Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159--160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
u The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
'App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic 
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Halde-
man in December 1969 and January 1970. After the Presi-
dent had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitz-
gerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's 
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasiz-
ing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled 
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration 
at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
Coalition and , while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
• App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26. 
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed 
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respond-
ent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
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tory causes of action under 5 U. 8. C. § 7211 and 18 U. 8. C. 
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact 
remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petition-
ers were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never hav-
ing determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. 8. 957 (1981). 11 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
'"The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
vides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, 
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is 
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners 
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action 
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in 
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the rec-
ognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The 
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, 
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the 
present posture of this case. See note 35, infra. 
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
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entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recog-
nized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute im-
munity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economo~t, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. 8., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the 
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adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute 
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional viola-
tions-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas, 
161 U. 8. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. 8. 564 
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute im-
munity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expec-
tation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion, 
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will en-
sure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous 
lawsuits." 438 U. 8., at 507-508 (citations omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgemld, ante, at--. 
III 
Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a blanket pro-
tection of absolute immunity as an incident of their offices as 
Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on 
an empty page. In Butz v. Economou, supra, the Secretary 
of Agriculture-a Cabinet official directly accountable to the 
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President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity 
from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so 
doing we did not question the power or the importance of the 
Secretary's office. Nor did we doubt the importance to the 
President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his 
duties of office. Yet we found these factors, alone, to be in-
sufficient to justify absolute immunity. "[T]he greater 
power of [high] officials," we reasoned, "affords a greater po-
tential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. 
Damages actions against high officials were therefore "an im-
portant means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." 
Ibid. Moreover, we concluded that it would be "untenable 
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between 
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits 
brought directly under the Constitution against federal offi-
cials." I d., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
12 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
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"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " Id., at 616-617. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. Id., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
u. s. 306 (1973). 
'"See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President ... may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
"THE CHIEF JusTICE, post, at 7, argues that senior Presidential aides 
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a 
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In re<;ent 
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"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125--133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 17 
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have 
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger 
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize 
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration with-
out reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by 
the President. Butz v. Economou cannot be distinguished on this basis. 
15 See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union , 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. 
16 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g. , Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
515-517. 
17 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
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Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
est. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19 
from factors unique to his constitutional responsibilities and station. Suits 
against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not in-
voke separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits 
against the President himself. 
18 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege. in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
19 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 61fH>17, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in 
c 
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Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demon-
strate that he was discharging the protected function when 
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, at 506. Nor, assuming that 
petitioners did have functions for which absolute immunity 
would be warranted, could we now conclude that the acts 
charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie within the 
protected area. We do not, however, foreclose the possibil-
ity that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the standards 
properly applicable to their claims. 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
20 Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
21 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 
supra. 
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IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
--, the resolution of immunity questions inherently re-
quires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available 
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for 
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of 
constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 
506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 
U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is dam-
ages or nothing."). It is this recognition that has required 
the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. At 
the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that 
claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the 
guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the 
society as a whole. 22 These social costs include the expenses 
of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing 
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from the ac-
ceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that 
fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor of all but the most 
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle, 
177, F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 
(1950). 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
22 See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 
324-327. 
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, at 
507-508, as in Scheuer, 416 U. S., at 245--248, we relied on 
the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstan-
tial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 438 U. S., at 
507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 765 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 23 
Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments that the dis-
missal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a factor pre-
supposed in the balance of competing interests struck by our 
prior cases-requires an adjustment of the "good faith" 
standard established by our decisio~s. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
23 The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. 
24 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore 
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J., 
concurring). 
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stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury .... " ld., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 25 
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
has prove~ incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith 
has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts 
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury. 27 
25 In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). 
26 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., PolZer v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962). 
27 E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CAS 1978); Duchesne 
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of 
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary 
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In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing 
values, it is now clear that substantial costs attend the litiga-
tion of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not 
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the 
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental 
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of 
able people from public service. There are special costs to 
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is 
available only to officials performing discretionary functions. 
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "minis-
terial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action 
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's ex-
periences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in 
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de-
cided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a back-
ground in which there often is no clear end to the relevant 
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation there-
fore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of 
numerous persons, including an official's professional col-
leagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive 
of effective government. 29 
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
28 In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind fre-
quently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court rec-
ognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974): 
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica-
bly rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 
29 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided 
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, 
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not 
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of 
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We 
therefore hold that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v. r • 
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland, / fYJ/ sl'tJ;I 
supra, 420 U. S., at 321.30 () 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established 
law,3' should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
cient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the will-
ingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." 
30 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983. 
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a 
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504. 
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently avail-
able to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of 
this scope. 
31 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
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permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine, not only the currently applicable 
law, but whether that law was "clearly established" at the 
time an action occurred. 32 If the law at that time was not 
clearly established, an official could not reasonably be ex-
pected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor 
could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct 
not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold 
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be al-
lowed. If the law was clearly established, however, the im-
munity defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably com-
petent public official should know the law governing his 
conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense 
claims extraordinary circumstances and can rove that he 
neither knew nor should have kno o the relevant ega 
standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the 
defense would turn primarily on objective factors. 
By defining the limits of qualified immunity in "objective" 
terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public 
interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensa-
tion of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the 
objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an 
official could be expected to know that certain conduct would 
violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made 
to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such 
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
32 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court. " 
33 Cf. Procunier v. N avarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
80-945--0PINION 
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 19 
duties legitimately require action in which clearly established 
rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better 
served by action taken "with independence and without fear 
of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 
(1967). 34 
c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
ably be characterized as being in good faith.' ") 
34 We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages 
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objec-
tive" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunc-
tive or declaratory relief might be available. 
35 In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public 
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See 
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admoni-
tion. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government 
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases. 
Id. , at 508. 
"" Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as 
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Snmith, Inc. v. Cur-
ran, -- U. S. --, -- (1982) (controlling question in implication of 
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to 
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638--639 (1981) (same). Nor is the 
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), af-
firming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique rela-
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trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
tionship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees 
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens 
remedy"). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction 
of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order 
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for 
fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of 
Appeals. 
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No. 80-945 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the 
1 Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claims 
consists in a recorded conversation in which the President 
later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for 
canning'' Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." I d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
3 See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see id., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute whether 
Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was confus-
ing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The Presi-
dent explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been confused. 
See id., at 220. 
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment) , at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way. " App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
6 The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
7 App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic 
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald cites com-
munications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 
1969 and January 1970. After the President had promised at 
a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal, 
Haldeman solicited Butterfield's recommendations. In a 
subsequent memorandum emphasizing the importance of 
"loyalty," Butterfield counselled against offering Fitzgerald 
another job in the Administration at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969-more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery have failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
tory causes of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1505. 10 The court found that genuine issues of disputed fact 
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum, quoted in Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, ante, at 3, was not sent to the Defense Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra, at 26. 
The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial civil action filed 
by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the first time in respond-
ent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
10 The first of these statutes, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), pro-
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remained for resolution at trial. It also ruled that petition-
ers were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. App. 1-3. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. App. 11-12. Never hav-
ing determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981). 11 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
vides generally that "The right of employees ... to ... furnish informa-
tion to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, 
may not be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is 
a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. Petitioners 
argue that the District Court erred in finding that a private cause of action 
could be inferred under either statute, and that "special factors" present in 
the context of the federal employer-employee relationship preclude the rec-
ognition of respondent's Bivens action under the First Amendment. The 
legal sufficiency or respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, 
a question that we view as properly presented for our decision in the 
present posture of this case. See note 36, infra. 
11 As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
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Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. For officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have recog-
nized the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute im-
munity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive Branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. E cono-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative.functions, id., at 513-517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. Id., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
Branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." Id., at 506. Without discounting the 
adverse consequences of denying high officials an absolute 
immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional viola-
tions-consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas, 
161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
80-945--0PINION 
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 7 
(1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute im-
munity from suits at common law-we emphasized our expec-
tation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity. . . . In responding to such a motion, 
plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will en-
sure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous 
lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 15. 
III 
Petitioners argue that they are entitled to a blanket pro-
tection of absolute immunity as an incident of their offices as 
Presidential aides. In deciding this claim we do not write on 
an empty page. In Butz v. Economou, supra, the Secretary 
of Agriculture-a Cabinet official directly accountable to the 
President-asserted a defense of absolute official immunity 
from suit for civil damages. We rejected his claim. In so 
doing we did not question the power or the importance of the 
Secretary's office. Nor did we doubt the importance to the 
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President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his 
duties of office. Yet we found these factors, alone, to be in-
sufficient to justify absolute immunity. "[T]he greater 
power of [high] officials," we reasoned, "affords a greater po-
tential for a regime of lawless conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. 
Damages actions against high officials were therefore "an im-
portant means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." 
Ibid. Moreover, we concluded that it would be "untenable 
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between 
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits 
brought directly under the Constitution against federal offi-
cials." Id., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
12 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund , 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
u. s. 306 (1973). 
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " /d., at 616-617. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. /d., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itselfl3-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. 14 Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
13 See U. S. Const., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
14 THE CHIEF JuSTICE, post, at 9, argues that senior Presidential aides 
work "more intimately on a daily basis [with the President] than does a 
Cabinet officer," and that Butz therefore is not controlling. In recent 
years, however, such men as Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger have 
served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions. Kissinger 
held both posts simultaneously. In our view it is impossible to generalize 
about the role of "offices" in an individual President's administration with-
80-945--0PINION 
10 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justificat1on would warrant. In Gravel, 
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 12&-133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 15 and prosecutors 16 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 17 
c 
out reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by 
the President. Butz v. Economou cannot be distinguished on this basis. 
15 See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. 
16 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
515--517. 
17 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
from factors unique to his constitutional responsibilities and station. Suits 
against other officials-including Presidential aides-generally do not in-
voke separation-of-powers considerations to the same extent as suits 
against the President himself. 
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Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument accords with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
est. 18 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 19 
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
18 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (WHITE, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
19 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a ,derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
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course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 20 He then must demon-
strate that he was discharging the protected function when 
performing the act for which liability is asserted. 21 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, at 506. Nor, assuming that 
petitioners did have functions for which absolute immunity 
would be warranted, could we now conclude that the acts 
charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie within the 
protected area. We do not, however, foreclose the possibil-
ity that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the standards 
properly applicable to their claims. 
IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
20 Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at-. 
21 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430--431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 
supra. 
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without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a ( 
balance between the evils inevitable in any available alterna-
tive. In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages 
may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitu-
tional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 506; see 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 
388, 410 (1971) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or 
nothing."). It is this recognition that has required the denial 
of absolute immunity to most public officers. At the same 
time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that claims 
frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at a 
cost not only to the defendant officials, but to the society as a 
whole. 22 These social costs include the expenses of litigation, 
the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, 
and the deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of 
public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being 
sued will "damp~n the ardor of all but the most resolute, or 
the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching 
discharge of their duties." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177, F. 2d 
579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950). 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, at 
507-508, as in Scheuer, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we relied on 
the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstan-
tial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." 438 U. S., at 
507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 765 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 23 
22 See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 
324-327. 
!!.'!The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
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Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments that the dis-
missal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a factor pre-
supposed in the bal:;mce of competing interests struck by our 
prior cases-requires an adjustment of the "good faith" 
standard established by our decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 24 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury .... " !d., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 25 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed ... and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. 
24 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore 
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d., at 642 (REHNQUIST, J., 
concurring). 
25 In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
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The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 26 And an official's subjective good faith 
has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts 
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.2:1 
In the context of Butz's attempted balancing of competing 
values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litiga-
tion of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not 
only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the 
risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental 
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of 
able people from public service. There are special costs to 
"subjective" inquiries of this kind. Immunity generally is 
available only to officials performing discretionary functions. 
In contrast with the thought processes accompaning "minis-
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunierv. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555,562-563,566 (1978), quoted in 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). 
26 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962). 
27 E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne 
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 433 U. S. 111, 120, n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of 
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary 
judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
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terial" tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action 
almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's ex-
periences, values, and emotions. These variables explain in 
part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de-
cided by summary judgment. Yet they also frame a back-
ground in which there often is no clear end to the relevant 
evidence. Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation there-
fore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of 
numerous persons, including an official's professional col-
leagues. 28 Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive 
of effective government. 29 
28 In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind fre-
quently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court rec-
ognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708 (1974): 
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica-
bly rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 
29 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F . 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), affd by an equally divided 
vote, 452 U. S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
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Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, 
we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not 
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of 
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We 
therefore hold that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
"clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known. Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565, (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 
supra, 420 U. S., at 321.30 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established 
law,31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appro-
priately may determine, not only the currently applicable 
law, but whether that law was "clearly established" at the 
time an action occurred. 32 If the law at that time was not 
cient [to force a trial] . . . . The effect of this development upon the will-
ingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." 
30 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983. 
We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw a 
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 504. 
Our decision in no way diminishes the absolute immunity currently avail-
able to officials whose functions have been held to require a protection of 
this scope. 
31 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
32 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
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clearly established, an official could not reasonably be ex-
pected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor 
could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct 
not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold 
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be al-
lowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity de-
fense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent 
public official should know the law governing his conduct. 
Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims ex-
traordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither 
knew nor should have know of the relevant legal standard, 
the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors. 
By defining the limits of qualified immunity in "objective" 
terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public 
interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensa-
tion of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the 
objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an 
official could be expected to know that certain conduct would 
violate statutory or constitutional rights, he sh9uld be made 
to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such 
conduct may have a cause of action. 33 But where an official's 
duties legitimately require action in which clearly established 
rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better 
served by action taken "with independence and without fear 
of consequences." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 
(1967). 34 
33 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, at 565 (footnote omitted) ("Because 
they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a constitu-
tional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act with 
such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be 
characterized as being in good faith .' ") 
34 We emphasize that our decision applies only to suits for civil damages 
arising from actions within the scope of an official's duties and in "objec-
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c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. 35 We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 36 The 
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
tive" good faith. We express no view as to the conditions in which injunc-
tive or declaratory relief might be available. 
35 In Butz, we admonished that "insubstantial" suits against high public 
officials should not be allowed to proceed to trial. 438 U. S., at 438. See 
Schuck, supra, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 324-327. We reiterate this admoni-
tion. Insubstantial lawsuits undermine the effectiveness of Government 
as contemplated by our constitutional structure, and "firm application of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" is fully warranted in such cases. 
!d., at 508. 
36 Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as 
insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cur-
ran, -- U. S. --, -- (1982) (controlling question in implication of 
statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to 
create a damages remedy); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, (1981) (same) Texas Industries, Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U. S. 630, 638-639 (1981) (same). Nor is the 
Bivens question. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), af-
firming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique rela-
tionship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees 
is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens 
remedy''). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction 
of the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order 
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for 
fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of 
Appeals. 
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v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
BRYCE N. HARLOW AND ALEXANDER P. 
BUTTERFIELD, PETITIONERS v. 
A. ERNEST FITZGERALD 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their acts in 
office. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations. 1 At the conclusion of discovery the 
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
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supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
the history of communication between Harlow and Air Force 
Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 The other evidence most sup-
portive of Fitzgerald's claim consists in a recorded conversa-
tion in which the President later voiced a tentative recollec-
tion that Harlow was "all for canning'' Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
3 See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see ibid., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute 
whether Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was 
confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The 
President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been con-
fused. See ibid., at 220. 
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 5 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H. R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memo-
randum in that month in which he claimed to have learned 
that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some 
"shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to 
public view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as 
' See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that he re-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
6 The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
7 App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memordandum 
Butterfield reported that he had received the information "by word of sev-
eral mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally .. . . 
Evidently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Demo-
/ 
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evidence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure 
Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butter-
field participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful 
discharge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and 
Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the 
President had promised at a press conference to inquire into 
Fitzgerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's rec-
ommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasizing 
the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled against of-
fering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration at that 
time.8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
discovery has failed to turn up any evidence that he caused 
any inju y to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
tory actions under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. 10 
cratic Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor repre-
sentative who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 99-100, 180-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment, supra, at 26. 
10 Neither of these s es expressly confers a private right to sue for 
relief in damage0 he first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides 
generally that "The right of employees ... to . . . furnish information to 
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The court found that there were genuine issues of disputed 
fact remaining for resolution at trial. It also ruled that peti-
tioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for 
Cert. 1a-3a. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. T~~ Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion8.. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a. 
Never having determined the immunity available to the se-
nior aides and advisers of the President of the United States, 
we granted certiorari. -- U. S. --, -- (1981).~ 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not 
be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a crimi-
nal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. s 1 
n . , n e, we gran e ce 1 n 1s case so e y to ad-
ress the "collateral" question whether petitioners enjoyed an immunity 
from this suit that would be defeated if they were forced to stand trial, 
even if they subsequently were to prevail in the litigation. In this posture 
we do not consider the correctness of the District Court's "implication" 
11 As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
I 
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kinds. To officials whose special functions or constitutional 
status requires complete protection from suit, we have ex-
tended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute 
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. 
Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 508-512, executive officers 
engaged in adjudicative functions, ibid., at 513-517, and the 
President of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. Id., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decisiot·n Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualifie mmunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt o balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. S., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." Id., at 506. Without discounting the 
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an abso-
lute immunity from private lawsuitrconsequences found 
sufficient in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), to warrant extension to such 
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officials of absolute immunity from suits at common law-we 
emphasized our expectation that insubstantial suits need not 
proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief . . . , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a 
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and 
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by friv-
olous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations 
omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." I d., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
III 
A 
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket ex-
tension of absolute immunity to presidential aides. In decid- a.~ 
ing this claim we do not write on aR-em~ .l\ 
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet 
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a de-
fense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-
ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not ques-
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tion the JX"Wer or the importance of the Secretary's office. 
Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal 
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office. 
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify 
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials," 
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of law-
less conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions against 
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found 
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials 
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials," id., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every presidential subordi-
nate lodged in the White House. Members of the Cabinet 
are direct subordinates of the President, frequently with 
greater responsibilities, both to the President and to the N a-
tion, than White House staff. The considerations that sup-
ported our decision in Butz apply with equal force to this 
case. It is no disparagement of the offices held by petition-
ers to hold that presidential aides, like members of the Cabi-
net, generally are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
12 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
T 
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"it is literally impossible . . . for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " !d., at 61(H)17. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause 
derivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's 
aide that would have been privileged if performed by the 
Senator himself. Id., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute ( r ~ ( Co)') ... ,~' •....., 
_ the duties of his office, they argue thatl 'derivative" absolute - "--....: 
immunity is"essentialj~~ all the policies supporting 
- absolute immunity for the President himself. -
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
--qurrethls protection. But absolute imm.Jlulty has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
u. s. 306 (1973). 
13 See U. S. Canst. , Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
J 
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tive in nature," and not when taking other act' even "in their 
official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625/ 0ur cases involving 
judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line. The 
.undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" immunity 
to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled 
with the "functional" approach that has characterized the im-
munity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 16 
c " 
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to~mmunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
14 See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
--U.S.--,-- (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U.S., at 
362. 
15 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F . 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
515-517. 
16 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other offi-
cials-including presidential aides-generally do not invoke the special 
separation-of-powers considerations implicated by suits against the Presi-
dent himself. See ante t 
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tating performance of functions so vital to the national inter-
est. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket extension of absolute immunity to all presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18 
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a presidential aide might 
meet this test. But the general requisites are familiar in our 
cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute immu-
nity a presidential aide first must show that the responsibil-
ities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to re-
17 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
18 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 6HHi17, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to presidential immunity would be strongest in 
such "central" presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
I 
80-94&--0PINION 
12 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
quire a total shield from liability. 19 He then must 
demonstrate that he was in fact discharging the protected 
function when he performed the act for which liability is 
asserted. 20 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, as-
suming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute 
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that 
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie 
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose 
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the 
standards properly applicable to their claims. 
IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
19 Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante "" "-
2<)The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Jlconomou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 50S-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). This inquiry has a familiar analogue in the common law: Was the 
action within the outer perimeter of the official's protected function? 
See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896) (immunity extends to all 
matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 575 (1959) (fact "that the action taken here was 
within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render 
the privilege applicable"). Cases involving immunity under the Speech 
and Debate Clause have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts 
and activities qualified for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Gravel 
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As we recogniz~d tod~y in N_ixon v. ~itzg~rald, ante, at 7"~~,6_,_ 
--, the resolutiOn of 1mmumty questwns mherently re- ~ ...!1====-
quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avail- H ~ 
able alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action -~
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindica- -
tion of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, ~ ~ .nL-
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in ~- ~ 
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recogni- ~ 
tion that has required the denial of absolute immunity to 
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot 
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the 
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defen-
dant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social 
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of offi-
cial energy from pressing public issues, and-perhaps most 
important of all-the deterrence of able citizens from the ac-
ceptance of public o ce. A 'I!be ia court examiaati6n of Ll:Ia•21 
aets aad-meHt-al tweee~tseS-Df bigh e:f:fieials of the Exeeutive ,.-- _ ~ 
~raaea ie potentially destructive ofJgovernment. In the case 
of high officials of the Executive Branch, separation-of-pow-
ers concerns require that such an examination not be 
undertaken lightly. 22 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
21 See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281. 
22 As distinguished commentators have observed, the "separation of pow-
ers" is "a 'political doctrine' and not a technical rule of law." Frankfurter 
and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempt 
Cases in "Inferior" Federal Courts--A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 
Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014 (1924). Even where the separation-of-powers 
doctrine imposes no absolute legal barrier to judicial actions intruding on 
the functioning of. the Executive Branch, the doctrine does require a judi-
cial consideration of the constitutional interests at stake in cases of particu-
lar kinds. See Nixon v. Administrator of GSA, 433 U. S.425, 443 (1977); 
United States v. Nixon , 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974). 
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commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S., 
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245-248, we 
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit 
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 23 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments 
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests 
struck by our prior cases-requires a clarification of the stan-
dards of pleading and proof to be applied in cases involving 
immunity claims by high officials of the federal government. 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure disputed ques-
tions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 24 Applying this standard in suits 
against public officials, courts have hesitated to grant sum-
mary judgment even in cases in which plaintiffs have offered 
little or no evidence controverting a defendant's affidavits. 25 
23 The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their~ before a jury. See Lake Country Estates , Inc . v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 
341 U. S. 367, 377 (1951). As the Court observed in Tenney, "In times of 
political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed ... 
and as readily believed." 341 U. S., at 378. It is for this among other rea-
sons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstantial suits should "not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508. 
24 Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary 
judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a 
court ordinarily must look at the record in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing tl~e motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that 
party. E. g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 
25 Under a standard of qualified immunity, an official will not be liable for 
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Because an officials' subjective "good faith" is a question of 
fact, some courts have regarded this issue as inherently re-
quiring resolution by a jury/6 and sometimes have found a 
plaintiff's unsupported averment sufficient to force a trial. 27 
In short, the balance contemplated by Butz has not proved 
damages unless he "knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility" was unconstitutional or 
he "took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
constitutional rights or other injury .... " Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 
308, 322 (1975). Cases involving immunity claims under this standard fre-
quently present two distinct kinds of factual issues. The first kind is con-
cerned with whether the alleged conduct actually occurred at all. For dis-
cussions of the requisites for establishing a "jury question" on this issue, 
see, e. g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, supra, 446 U. S., at 764-765 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting); Barker v. Nonnan, 651 F. 2d 1107, 1122-1124 (CA5 1981). 
The second kind of issue is whether the conduct-assuming that it did 
occur-is entitled to the protections of good faith immunity. See, e. g., 
Barker v. Nonnan, supra, 651 F. 2d, at 1125-1127. In cases raising these 
questions, which are concerned with subjective perceptions and motives, it 
has proved especially difficult to avoid the costs-in time, money, and anxi-
ety-of trial before a jury. As Judge Gesell explained in his concurring 
opinion in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 606 F. 2d, at 1214: 
"It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to create a material issue 
of fact on some element of the immunity defense where subtle questions of 
constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. A 
sentence from a casual document or a difference in recollection with regard 
to a particular policy conversation held long ago would usually, under the 
normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient. In short, if these 
standards are those to be followed in these cases, trial judges will almost 
automatically have to send such cases to full trials on the merits." 
For cases in which qualified immunity was granted only after trial or evi-
dentiary hearings, see Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F. 2d 720 (CA7 1975); 
Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979). 
26 E. g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne 
v. Sugannan, 566 F. 2d 817, 832-833 (CA2 1977). 
27 See Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1092-1093 n. 5 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1979), appeal dismissed in part and stayed in part, 624 F. 2d 3, 4 
(CA2 1980) (mere· pleading of malice sufficient to prevent dismissal on im-
munity ground); Schuck, supra, at 324-325. 
16 
workable in practice wi~oQt arification by this Court of the 
applicable evidentiary standa: ds. 28 
B 
In Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980), this Court held 
in the context of a suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 that a claim 
of "good faith" immunity is an affirmative defense that must 
be pleaded by the defendant. 29 But we did not reach the 
question of the burden of proof on this issue. See ibid., at 
642 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). Petitioners urge that the 
burden of showing lack of good faith should be placed on the 
plaintiff. Further, where a defendant-by affidavits or oth-
erwise-effectively controverts a plaintiff's factual aver-
ments, petitioners argue that the plaintiff should be required 
to make some substantial evidentiary showing in order to 
survive a motion for summary judgment. We are generally 
in accord with these views. 
In order to provide an effective barrier to trial of claims 
lacking in substance, we believe that a high federal official's 
claimed entitlement to qualified immunity must be given sub-
stantial weight, not only at trial but on a motion for summary 
judgment.:ro Consistently with this view, we hold that a de-
fendant's assertion of this defense shifts the burden to the 
:?B Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 
U. S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (translation of constitutional 
principles into "workable constitutional rule[s]" sometimes may require ad-
justment of burdens of pleading and proof). 
29 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. See 446 U. S., at 640. 
00 Cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 606 F. 2d, at 1215 (Gesell, J., 
concurring): 
"In order to give the immunity doctrine some genuine force and effect, it 
appears to me that a plaintiff should be required to make a stronger show-
ing than the Court's opinion requires on the immunity question before 
being permitted to proceed to trial. I would hold that the plaintiff must 
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plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
official did not act either in objective or subjective good faith. 
Moreover, to effectuate our admonition that insubstantial 
claims should be rejected without resort to trial, we think a 
plaintiff must show some capacity to meet this burden-as 
well as to establish all other elements of his affirmative 
case-in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. 
Thus, at the summary judgment stage in a case involving im-
munity claims by high federal officials, we think it appropri-
ate to require a showing of evidence by the plaintiff-with al-
lowance for the uncertainty of developments at trial-from 
which a rational factfinder reasonably could conclude that the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard was satisfied. 
In allocating the burden of proof to the plaintiff after an im-
munity defense is raised, we protect the public interest in the 
effective administration of government-an interest that in-
disputably is threatened when insubstantial claims against of-
ficials result in protracted and vexatious litigation. Requir-
ing proof of substantiality will not deter or frustrate 
meritorious claims. The requirements for pleading, as for 
proof at trial, remain the same. If the defendant advances 
the defense of good faith immunity, the plaintiff will retain 
access to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden. 
And he need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for 
summary judgment, but only make a showing of substantial-
ity adequate to justify the cost-both public and private-of 
subjecting a high federal official to trial. 
establish after the completion of discovery and before the trial commences, 
not merely the existence of a genuine dispute as to some material issue of 
fact but also, by the preponderance of the evidence or through clear and 
convincing evidence, that the official failed to act with subjective or objec-
tive good faith." 
See also Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: 
An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L.R. 526, 563 (1977) ("the better rule 
would be to require the plaintiff to establish subjective bad faith or malice 
and the defendant to establish the reasonableness of his action"). 
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c 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropri-
ate, however, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion. 31 The 
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
31 Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
sufficiency of respondent's ''implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not wish to intimate that either the statutory, cf. Texas In-
dustries, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, 451 U. S. -,-(May 26, 1981) 
(controlling question is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create 
a damages remedy), or the Bivens question, cf. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 
573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirming on remand 598 F. 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (hold-
ing that the "unique relationship between the Federal Government and its 
civil service employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation 
in inferring a Bivens remedy''), is insubstantial. ~
--:-~t.---:r.i;...:ct;:;:to:.;::n:.:o~t:-;e:..c::.as..:..;e.;,. . ~f to resolve the immunity question under the col-
lateral order doctrine• \flee think it appropriate to leave these issues for 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity available 
to the senior aides and advisers of the President of the 
United States in a suit for damages based upon their official 
acts. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce Harlow and 
Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have participated in a 
conspiracy to violate the constitutional and statutory rights 
of the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent avers 
that petitioners entered the conspiracy in their capacities as 
senior White House aides to former President Richard M. 
Nixon. As the alleged conspiracy is the same as that in-
volved in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be re-
peated in detail. 
Respondent claims that Harlow joined the conspiracy in his 
role as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-
gressional relations.' At the conclusion of discovery the 
'Harlow held this position from the beginning of the Nixon Administra-
tion on January 20, 1969 through November 4, 1969. On that date he was 
designated as Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet sta-
tus. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, when he returned 
to private life. Harlow later resumed the duties of Counsellor for the pe-
" . 
80-945---0PINION 
2 HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
supporting evidence remained inferential. As evidence of 
Harlow's conspiratorial activity respondent relies heavily on 
a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzger-
ald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. 2 
The other evidence most supportive of Fitzgerald's claim con-
sists in a recorded conversation in which the President later· 
voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for can-
ning'' Fitzgerald. 3 
Disputing Fitzgerald's contentions, Harlow argues that ex-
haustive discovery has adduced no direct evidence of his in-
riod from July 1, 1973 through April14, 1974. Respondent appears to al-
lege that Harlow continued in a consiracy against him throughout the vari-
ous changes of official assignment. 
2 The record reveals that Secretary Seamans called Harlow in May, 
1969, to inquire about likely congressional reaction to a draft reorganiza-
tion plan that would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. According to Seamans' 
testimony, "we [the Air Force] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on the 
action itself. We just asked him what the impact would be in the relation-
ship with the Congress." App. 153, 164-165 (Deposition of Robert Sea-
mans). Through an aide Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive 
item on the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that [the Air 
Force] not proceed to make such a change at that time." !d., at 152. But 
the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to Harlow on at least one subse-
quent occasion during the spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 4, 1969, shortly after the 
public announcement of Fitzgerald's impending dismissal, and again in De-
cember 1969. See App. 186. 
3 See App. 284. (Transcript of a Recorded Conversation between Rich-
ard Nixon and Ronald Ziegler, February 26, 1973). In a conversation with 
the President on January 31, 1973, John Ehrlichman also recalled that Har-
low had discussed the Fitzgerald case with the President. See App. 
218-221. (Transcript of Recorded Conversation between Richard Nixon 
and John Ehrlichman, January 31, 1973). In the same conversation the 
President himself asserted that he had spoken to Harlow about the Fitz-
gerald matter, see ibid., at 218, but the parties continue to dispute 
whether Mr. Nixon-at the most relevant moments in the discussion-was 
confusing Fitzgerald's case with that of another dismissed employee. The 
President explicitly stated at one point that he previously had been con-
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volvement in any wrongful activity. 4 Petitioner avers that · 
Secretary Seamans advised him that considerations of effi-
ciency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force, 
despite anticipated adverse congressional reaction. Harlow 
asserts he had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. 
He contends that he took all his actions in good faith. 6 
Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the 
conspiracy not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. 
Haldeman, 6 Butterfield circulated a White House memoran-
dum in that month in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public 
view. 7 Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum as evi-
4 See Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum in Support of Sum-
mary Judgment), at 7 (Civil No. 74-178, Feb. 12, 1980). 
5 In support of his version of events Harlow relies particularly on the de-
position testimony of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who stated that here-
garded abolition of Fitzgerald's position as necessary "to improve the effi-
ciency" of the Financial Management Office of the Air Force and that he 
never received any White House instruction regarding the Fitzgerald case. 
App. 159-160. Petitioner also disputes the probative value of Richard 
Nixon's recorded remark that Harlow had supported Fitzgerald's firing. 
Harlow emphasizes the tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning [Fitzgerald], wasn't 
he?", White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative 
reply: "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." App. 284. The 
President did not respond to Ziegler's comment. 
'The record establishes that Butterfield worked from an office immedi-
ately adjacent to the oval office. He had almost daily contact with the 
President until March 1973, when he left the White House to become Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 
7 App. 274. Butterfield reported that this information had been re-
ferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the memorandum But-
terfield reported that he had received the information "by word of several 
mouths, but allegedly from a senior AFL-CIO official originally . . . . Ev-
idently, Fitzgerald attended a recent meeting of the National Democratic 
~ ~ -- - --- --~ --~ -- .. -
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dence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure Fitz-
gerald's retaliatory dismissal. As evidence that Butterfield 
participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful dis-
charge and prevent his reemployment, Fitzgerald relies 
heavily on communications between Butterfield and Halde-
man in December 1969 and January 1970. After the Presi-
dent had promised at a press conference to inquire into Fitz-
gerald's dismissal, Haldeman solicited Butterfield's 
recommendations. In a subsequent memorandum emphasiz-
ing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield counselled 
against offering Fitzgerald another job in the Administration 
at that time. 8 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he was involved in any 
decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until 
Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969---more than a 
month after Fitzgerald's termination had been scheduled and 
announced publicly by the Air Force. Butterfield states that 
he never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any of-
ficial of the Defense Department. He argues generally that 
nearly eight years of discovery has failed to turn up any evi-
dence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 9 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, petition-
ers Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment on 
February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the District 
Court upheld the legal sufficiency of Fitzgerald's Bivens 
claim under the First Amendment and his "inferred" statu-
Coalition and, while there, revealed his intentions to a labor representative 
who, fortunately for us, was unsympathetic." Ibid. 
8 App. 99-100, 18{}-181. This memorandum was not sent to the Defense 
Department. 
9 See Memorandum in Support of Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment, supra, at 26. The history of Fitzgerald's litigation is recounted 
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. Butterfield was named as a defendant in the 
initial civil action filed by Fitzgerald in 1974. Harlow was named for the 
first time in respondent's Second Amended Complaint of July 5, 1978. 
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tory actions under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. 10 
The court found that there were genuine issues of disputed 
fact remaining for resolution at trial. It also ruled that peti-
tioners were not entitled to absolute immunity. Pet. for 
Cert. 1a-3a. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners in-
voked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the denial of 
their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal without opinion. Pet. for Cert. lla-12a. Never 
having determined the immunity available to the senior aides 
and advisers of the President of the United States, we 
granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 957 (1981).U 
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our 
decisions consistently have held that government officials are 
entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. 
As recognized at common law, public officers require this 
protection to shield them from undue interference with their 
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two 
kinds. To offiCials whose special functions or constitutional 
'" Merthe~ f these statutes e-xpressly-confers<i")n"ivate-right-to~ue-.fm­
reliefin damagss. The firs 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979), provides 
generally that "The right o employees ... to . . . furnish information to 
either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, -may not 
be interfered with or denied." The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a crimi-
nal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. 
oote ---;-inj'IYJt: 
"As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, our jurisdiction has been challenged on 
the basis that the District Court's order denying petitioners' claim of abso-
lute immunity was not an appealable final order and that the Court of Ap-
peals' dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this case was never 
"in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254. As 
the discussion in Nixon establishes our jurisdiction in this case as well, we 
need not consider those challenges in this opinion. 
Neither expressly creates a private right to sue for damages. 
Pe titioners argue that the District Court e rred in finding that 
a private cause of action could be inferred under either statute, 
and that "special factors" present in the context of the federal 
employer-employee relationship preclude the recognition of respondent's 
Bivens action under the First Amendment. The legal sufficiency of 
respondent's asserted causes of action is not, however, a question 
that we view as properly presented for our decision in the present 
posture of this case. See note 3~ infra. 
-------
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status requires complete protection from suit, we have ex-
tended the defense of "absolute immunity." The absolute 
immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions, see, 
e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 (1975), and of judges, in their judicial functions, 
see, e. g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978), now is 
well settled. Our decisions also have extended absolute im-
munity to certain officials of the Executive branch. These 
include prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U. S. 478, 508-512 (1978), executive officers en-
gaged in adjudicative functions, id., at 513-517, and the Pres-
ident of the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make 
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm. In 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), we acknowledged 
that high officials require greater protection than those with 
less complex discretionary responsibilities. Nonetheless, we 
held that a governor and his aides could receive the requisite 
protection from qualified or good-faith immunity. I d., at 
247-248. In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the ap-
proach of Scheur to high federal officials of the Executive 
branch. Discussing in detail the considerations that also had 
underlain our decision in Scheuer, we explained that the rec-
ognition of a qualified immunity defense for high executives 
reflected an attempt to balance competing values: not only 
the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of 
citizens, 438 U. 8., at 504-505, but also "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise 
of official authority." I d., at 506. Without discounting the 
adverse policy consequences of denying high officials an abso-
lute immunity from private lawsuits alleging constitutional 
violations--consequences found sufficient in Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 
564 (1959), to warrant extension to such officials of absolute 
80-945-0PINION 
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immunity from suits at common law-we emphasized our 
expectation that insubstantial suits need not proceed to trial: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by fed-
eral courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. 
Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for re-
lief ... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that damages 
suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the de-
fense of immunity . . . . In responding to such a 
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and 
firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by friv-
olous lawsuits." 438 U. S., at 507-508 (citations 
omitted). 
Butz continued to acknowledge that the special functions of 
some officials might require absolute immunity. But the 
Court held that "federal officials who seek absolute exemp-
tion from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must 
bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an ex-
emption of that scope." !d., at 506. This we reaffirmed 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--. 
III 
A 
Petitioners argue that public policy requires a blanket ex-
tension of absolute immunity to Presidential aides. In decid-
ing this claim we do not write on an empty page. In Butz v. 
Economou, supra, the Secretary of Agriculture-a Cabinet 
official directly accountable to the President-asserted a de-
fense of absolute official immunity from suit for civil dam-
ages. We rejected his claim. In so doing we did not ques-
tion the power or the importance of the Secretary's office. 
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Nor did we doubt the importance to the President of loyal 
and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office. 
Yet we found these factors, alone, to be insufficient to justify 
absolute immunity. "[T]he greater power of [high] officials," 
we reasoned, "affords a greater potential for a regime of law-
less conduct." 438 U. S., at 506. Damages actions · against 
high officials were therefore "an important means of vindicat-
ing constitutional guarantees." Ibid. Moreover, we found 
that it would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials 
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials," id., at 504. 
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordi-
narily enjoy only qualified immunity from suit, we conclude 
today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute im-
munity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordi-
nate based in the White House. Members of the Cabinet are 
direct subordinates of the President, frequently with greater 
responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than 
White House staff. The considerations that supported our 
decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case. It is no 
disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that 
Presidential aides, like members of the Cabinet, generally 
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 
B 
In disputing the controlling authority of Butz, petitioners 
rely on the principles developed in Gravel v. United States, 
408 U. S. 606 (1972). 12 In Gravel we endorsed the view that 
"it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to per-
'
2 Petitioners also claim support from other cases that have followed 
Gravel in holding that Congressional employees are derivatively entitled to 
the legislative immunity provided to United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives under the Speech and Debate Clause. See Eastland v. United 
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 
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form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and as-
sistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so 
critical to the Members' performance that they must be 
treated as the latter's alter egos .... " ld., at 616-617. 
Having done so, we held the Speech and Debate Clause de-
rivately applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide 
that would have been privileged if performed by the Senator 
himself. I d., at 621-622. 
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel mandates a 
similar "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States. Emphasizing that the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute 
the duties of his office, they argue that recognition of deriva-
tive absolute immunity is made essential by all the consider-
ations that support absolute immunity for the President 
himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, 
however, it sweeps too far. If the President's aides are de-
rivatively immune because essential to the functioning of the 
Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet-Presi-
dential subordinates some of whose essential roles are ac-
knowledged by the Constitution itself 13-be absolutely im-
mune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity 
in Butz. Moreover, in general our cases have followed a 
"functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized 
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions re-
quire absolute immunity. But this protection has extended 
no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, 
for example, we emphasized that Senators and their aides 
were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legisla-
tive in nature," and not when taking other acts even "in their 
13 See U. S. Canst., Art. 2, § 2 ("The President . . . may require the 
Opinion, in writing, or the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their respective Offices . 
. . . "). 
•' 
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official capacity." 408 U. S., at 625. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 125-133 (1979). Our cases involv-
ing judges 14 and prosecutors 15 have followed a similar line. 
The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative" im-
munity to the President's aides therefore could not be recon-
ciled with the "functional" approach that has characterized 
the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel 
itself. 16 
c 
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity based 
on the "special functions" of White House aides. This form 
of argument is in accord with the analytical approach of our 
cases. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in 
such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy, ab-
solute immunity might well be justified to protect the unhesi-
tating performance of functions vital to the national inter-
"See, e. g., Supreme Court ofVirginia v. Virginia Consumers Union, 
446 U. S. 719, 731-737 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 438 U. S., at 
362. 
15 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431 (1973), this Court re-
served the question whether absolute immunity would extend to "those as-
pects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an ad-
ministrator or investigative officer." Since that time the courts of appeals 
generally have ruled prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for acts 
taken in those capacities. See, e. g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F. 2d 990, 992 
(CA3 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindeinst, 599 F. 2d 1203, 1213-1214 (CA3 1979). 
This Court at least implicitly has drawn the same distinction in extending 
absolute immunity to executive officials when they are engaged in quasi-
prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U. S., at 
51fHJ17. 
16 Our decision today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, in no way abrogates 
this general rule. As we explained in that opinion, the recognition of abso-
lute immunity for all of a President's acts in office derives in principal part 
from factors unique to his constitutional station. Suits against other offi-
to the same 
extent as 
cials-including Presidential aides-generally do not invoke Hte-special-'l ....- ------
separation-of-powers considerations iH<pli~7 sm s agamst t e resi-
dent himself. See ante, at --. '-<-
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est. 17 But a "special functions" rationale does not warrant a 
blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all Presidential 
aides in the performance of all their duties. This conclusion 
too follows from our decision in Butz, which establishes that 
an executive official's claim to absolute immunity must be 
justified by reference to the public interest in the special 
functions of his office, not the mere fact of high station. 18 
Butz also identifies the location of the burden of proof. 
The burden of justifying absolute immunity rests on the offi-
cial asserting the claim. 438 U. S., at 506. We have not of 
course had occasion to identify how a Presidential aide might 
carry this burden. But the general requisites are familiar in 
our cases. In order to establish entitlement to absolute im-
munity a Presidential aide first must show that the respon-
sibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to 
require a total shield from liability. 19 He then must demon-
,; Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710-711 (1974) ("[C]ourts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibil-
ities" for foreign policy and military affairs, and claims of privilege in this 
area would receive a higher degree of deference than invocations of "a 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality."); Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require 
the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of 
the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.") (emphasis added). 
'
8 Gravel, supra, points to a similar conclusion. We fairly may assume 
that some aides are assigned to act as Presidential "alter egos," Gravel, 
supra, 408 U. S., at 616-617, in the exercise of functions for which absolute 
immunity is "essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, supra, 
438 U. S., at 507. Cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at 620 (derivative immu-
nity extends only to acts within the "central role" of the Speech and Debate 
Clause in permitting free legislative speech and debate). By analogy to 
Gravel, a derivative claim to Presidential immunity would be strongest in 
such "central" Presidential domains as foreign policy and national security, 
in which the President could not discharge his singularly vital mandate 
without delegating functions nearly as sensitive as his own. 
•• Here as elsewhere the relevant judicial inquiries would encompass con-
I • 
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strate that he was in fact discharging the protected function 
when he performed the act for which liability is asserted. 20 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by peti-
tioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on the 
record before us that either has shown that "public policy re-
quires [for any of the functions of his office] an exemption of 
[absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 U. S., at 506. Nor, as-
suming that petitioners did have functions for which absolute 
immunity would be warranted, could we now conclude that 
the acts charged in this lawsuit-if taken at all-would lie 
within the protected area. We do not, howover, foreclose 
the possibility that petitioners, on remand, could satisfy the 
standards properly applicable to their claims. 
IV 
Even if they cannot establish that their official functions 
require absolute immunity, petitioners assert that public pol-
icy at least mandates an application of the qualified immunity 
standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims 
without resort to trial. We agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at 
--, the resolution of immunity questions inherently re-
quires "a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avail-
able alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action 
siderations of public policy, the importance of which should be confirmed 
either by reference to the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at-. 
20 The need for such an inquiry is implicit in Butz v. Economou, supra, 
438 U. S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 
(1976). Cases involving immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 
have inquired explicitly into whether particular acts and activities qualified 
for the protection of the Clause. See, e. g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
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for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindica-
tion of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. Economou, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 506; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971) ("For people in 
Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). It is this recogni-
tion that has required the denial of absolute immunity to 
most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot 
be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the 
innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the de-
fendant officials, but to the society as a whole. 21 These social 
costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of offi~ ~ 
, Q cial energy from pressing public issues, and.....,.--pexhaps--Rio~ 
'---"''-.i~nt=ar-aH-the deterrence of able citizens from the ac-
ceptance of public office. ~-------------
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable ac-
commodation of competing values, in Butz, supra, 438 U. S., 
at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 U. S., at 245--248, we 
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit 
"[i]nsubstantiallawsuits [to] be quickly terminated." Butz, 
supra, 438 U. S., at 507-508; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 
U. S. 754, 765 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 22 Yet petitioners advance persuasive arguments 
that the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a 
"See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and 
the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 
324--327. 
22 The importance of this consideration hardly needs emphasis. This 
Court has noted the risk imposed upon political officials who must defend 
their actions and motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe R egional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405 (1979); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the Court observed in Ten-
ney, "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are 
readily attributed . . . and as readily believed." 341 U. S. , at 378. It is 
for this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that insubstan-
tial suits should "not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment." 438 U. S., at 508. 
Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the 
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public 
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Gregoire 
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949). See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
ante, at 
80,...945-0PINION 
14 HARLOW & BU'ITERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interes~s 9-"-------_.J 
t I) struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the ~ 
~ti'le~ standard established by our 
decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative de-
fense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U. S. 635 (1980). 23 Decisions of this Court have 
established that the "good faith" defense has both an "objec-
tive" and a "subjective" aspect. The objective element in-
volves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for "basic, 
unquestioned constitutional rights." Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U. S. 308, 320 (1975). The subjective component refers 
to "permissible intentions." Ibid. Characteristically the 
Court has defined these elements by identifying the circum-
stances in which qualified immunity would not be available. 
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we 
have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an of-
ficial "knew or reasonably should have known th~t the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would vio-
late the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury. . " Id., at 321-322 (em-
phasis added). 24 • 
23 Although Gomez presented the question in the context of an action 
under § 1983, the Court's analysis indicates that "immunity" must also be 
pleaded as a defense in actions under the Constution and laws of the United 
States. See 446 U. S., at 640. Gomez did not decide which party bore 
the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. I d . , at 642 (REHNQUIST, J., 
concurring). 
24 In Wood the Court explicitly limited its holding to the circumstances in 
which a school board member, "in the specific context of school discipline," 
420 U. S., at 321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an action 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the Wood for-
mulation as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard. See, 
e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in 
80-945-0PINION 
HARLOW & BUTTERFIELD v. FITZGERALD 15 
The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently 
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that in-
substantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed 
questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for 
summary judgment. 25 Yet an official's subjective good faith 
has been considered to be a question of fact, which some 
courts apparently have regarded as inherently requiring 
resolution by a jury. 26 
Viewed in the context of Butz's attempted balancing of 
competing values, substantial costs attend the litigation of 
the subjective good faith of high officials of the Executive 
Branch. The duties of these officers often require decisions 
on controversial issues of gravest importance, in an environ-
ment in which views inevitably are affected by loyalty, ideol-
ogy, and emotion. This environment in part explains why 
questions of intent so rarely can be decided by summary 
· judgment. Yet it also frames a background in which there 
often is no clear end to the evidence that may be probative of 
subjective intent. Judicial inquiry into subjective motiva-
tion therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the de-
posing of numerous officials. Litigation burdens of this kind 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139 (1979). 
25 The Rule states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether sum-
mary judgment is proper, a court ordinarily must look at the record in the 
· vorable to the art o osi the motion, drawing all infer-
ences most favorable to that party. E. g., Po e lumbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., 368 U. S. 464, 473 (1962) . 
. Landrum v. Moats, 576 F. 2d 1320, 1329 1978 Duchesne 
v. Sugarman, 566 F. 2 , 33 (CA21977) cf. Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 443 U. S. 111, 120 n. 9 (1979) (questioning whether the existence of 
"actual malice," as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary 
, _ ________ judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public figure). 
The two-pronged standard as phrased in Wood actually is somewhat 
redundant in many if not in most cases.--rf the defendant neither 
knew nor should have known that his conduct would violate the 
plaintiff's constitutional rights, it follows that the defendant 
could no~ ha~e acte~ with a ma~icious intent to cause a deprivation 
of const1tut1onal r1ghts of wh1ch he knew noth~ng. The subjective 
standard thus would be meaningful only in a case in which a defendant 
acted without knowing this his conduct violated the Constitution, but 
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not only can distract officials from the performance of their 
duties. 27 At least in the case of such high officials as the 
President's closest aides, separation-of-powers concerns also 
require that such inquiries into executive decisionmaking 
should not be undertaken lightly. 28 
27 As Judge Gesell observed in his concurring opinion in Kissinger v. 
Halperin, 606 F. 2d 1192, 1214 (CADC 1979), aff'd by an equally divided 
court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981): 
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency 
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits 
seeking damage awards against high government officials based on alleged 
constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these offi-
cials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into tradi-
tionally protected areas, such as their deliberations preparatory to the for-
mulation of government policy and their intimate thought processes and 
communications at the presidential and cabinet levels. Such discover [sic] 
is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not without considerable cost to the 
officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to cre-
ate a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where 
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental pro-
cesses are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference in 
recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago 
would usually, under the normal summary judgment standards, be suffi-
cient [to force a trial] .... The effect of this development upon the willing-
ness of individuals to serve their country is obvious." i:;~-------
28 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services Administration, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United 
States v. Nixon: 
"A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives 
in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way 
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are consider-
ations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. 
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextrica-
bly rooted in the separation of powers udner the Constitution." 
418 U. S., at 705-706, 708. Many of the policy considerations implicated 
by Presidential communications would apply with nearly equal force to 
communications among Presidential aides and other high Executive offi-
cials. The separation-of-powers concerns are different in the two cases, 
-1'-'s t:...-+ 
l4 tfo. C l-, -t" q# II 
''R,of ft" A 
\, -e rt 
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As we affirmed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, there are 
situations in which sufficiently compelling justifications exist. 
In the case of private suits for damages, however, we con-
clude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice 
either to subject high federal officials to the costs of trial or to 
license broad-reaching discovery. Consistently with the bal-
ance at which we aimed in Butz, we therefore hold that at 
least high executive officials are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "set-
tled, indisputable" legal rights of which they reasonably 
should have known. Wood v. Strickland, supra, 420 U. S., 
at 321. 29 Absent a clear congressional decision to the con-
trary, we conclude that public policy will not support the cost 
of conditioning their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 30 
being less weighty where the President personally is not involved. As 
commentators have observed, however, the "separation of powers" is "a 
'political doctrine' and not a technical rule of law." Frankfurter & Landis, 
Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempt Cases in "Infe-
rior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 
1010, 1014 (1924) (footnote omitted). Even where the separation-of-pow-
ers doctrine imposes no absolute barrier to judicial functions intruding on 
the functioning of the Executive Branch, the doctrine does require a judi-
cial consideration of the constitutional interests at stake in cases of particu-
lar kinds. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at--; Nixon v. Administrator 
of General Services Administration, supra, 433 U. S., at 443 (1977); 
United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S., at 711-712 (1974). 
29 This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity 
defense for lower level officials, nor does it present any question of the im-
munity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 
§ 1983. We do not purport to resolve questions that might be framed by 
cases not properly before us. As we recognized in Scheur v. Rhodes, 
supra, 416 U. S., at 247, the qualified immunity defenses possessed by dif-
ferent officials should be determined by reference to "the scope of discre-
tion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they rea-
sonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be 
based." 
30 This case involves no claim that Congress has expressed its intent to 
impose "no fault" tort liability on high federal officials for violations of par-
80-945-0PINION 
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Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's 
conduct, as measured by reference to settled, indisputable 
law,31 should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment. Charged with decisionmaking under pres-
sures of time and limits of information, not every official 
fairly could be held responsible for areas of the law remote 
from his experience or duties. Nor is it reasonable to expect 
every such official to be familiar with the most recent judicial 
developments. On summary judgment, the j~dge appropri-
~ maJ::;e what the law was ~t the time the ~ction 
occurred · -may be able to decide what a particular 
high official reasonably could be expected to have known 
about it. 32 
By defining the limits on a high official's qualified immunity 
solely in "objective" terms, we provide no license to lawless 
conduct. The public interest in deterrence of constitutional 
..-' 
violations and in compensation of victims remains protected 
by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of 
an official's acts. l\ Where an official knows that his conduct 
will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to hesi-
tate. Where his duties legitimately require action in which 
established rights are not implicated-even if the action po-
tentially is harmful to someone that the official dislikes-the 
public interest frequently may be served better by fearless 
ticular statutes or the Constitution. 
31 As in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 565 (1978), we need not 
define here the circumstances under which "the state of the law" should be 
"evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Ap-
peals, or of the local District Court." 
32 Cf. Procunier v. Navarette, supra, 434 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted) 
("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a 
constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act 
with such disregard for established law that their conduct 'cannot reason-
ably be characterized as being in good faith.' ") 
(Footnote 33 appears on the following page) 
- /8o.._ -
Footnote 33: 
A victim of wrongful behavior by a public official 
frequently may be able to obtain compensation by means other than 
a private suit for damages against the individual wrongdoer in a 
federal court. In this case, for example, Fitzgerald invoked 
civil service remedies that resulted in a judgment entitling him 
to reinstatement and backpay. See Decision of Civil Service 
Commission Chief Appeals Examiner: Decision on the Appeal of A. 
Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973). Where relief is available 
from the Government, as under the Civil Service Act, no immunity 
defense generally will be recognized. Even under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, which 
provides certain exemptions from Government liability, including 
one for "discretionary functions," see Dalehite v. United States, 
346 u.s. 15 (1953), this Court has held that "the very purpose of 
[Congress] was to waive the Government's traditional all-
encompassing immunity" and that there is "no justification for 
this Court to read exempti ons into the Act beyond those provided 
by Congress," Rayonier v. United States, 352 u.s. 315, 319, 320 
(1957). 
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In addition to the question of good faith, cases involving 
claim~ of qualified immunity frequently involve disputes over 
whether the official's allegedly wrongful actions ever oc-
curred at all. Where a defendant-by affidavits or other-
wise--effectively controverts a plaintiff's factual averments, 
petitioners argue that the plaintiff should be required to 
make some substantial showing in order to survive a motion 
for summa _ judg-Q!ent by a high federal official. o~s-
'-tently with our view that a clrum of 1mmuru y should yo vide 
an eff~tive barrier to trial of claims lacking in substance, we 
agree. at the summary judgment stage in a£se involving 
immunity claims by high federal officials~ think it appro-
priate to require a snowing_ of evide~ by the plaintiff-with 
allowance for the uncertainty-o-fctevelopments at trial-from 
which a rational factfindeti=easo~ly C,QEld conclude that the 
"preponderance of tbe evidence" standara w~ satisfied. 35 
Requiring this proof of substantiality will not deter or frus-
trate meritorious claims. The requirements for pleading, as 
Jor'Proof at trial, remain unchanged. Further, the plamt.!!!._ 
~We emphasize that we hold only that a high federal official is shielded 
against liability for civil damages arising from actions within the scope of 
his duties and in "objective" good faith. We express no view as to the con-
ditions in which injunctive or declaratory relief might be available. 
~For discussions of the requisites for establishing a "jury question" on 
this issue, see, e. g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, supra, 446 U. S., at 764--765 
(POWELL, J., dissenting); Barker v. Norman, 651 F. 2d 1107, 1122-1124 
(CA5 98D------------:::::::::::=o------, 
35 Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independen!.J?:m unity School Dist., 393 
U. S:"-'50~26 (1969) (Harlan, J., di~nting) (translation of constitutional 
principles into "workable constitutional rule[s]" sometimes may require ad-
justment of rules ~roof ancrpJeading); Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 616 
F. 2d, at 1215 (Gesell, J., co~ng)-(summary judgment standards 
should be a ·usted to "give the immunity d~ne-some enuine force and 
In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is 
unnecessary to protect the public interest in "encouraging 
s 
the vigorous exercise of official authority", 43f u.s. at 
506, because we believed 'that qualified immunity would 
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith 
mistakes. We assumed that such immunity would prove 
"workable". There are indications, however, that some 
District Courts have not understood our admoni tion in 
Jt. J -t I • \ 
Butz tha~ \ suits against high public officials should not 
4 cvt..tr¥fl"--t/ 1 ,. < 
Aproceed to trial t i; the absence of a showing of 
substantialit~ l we reiterate this admonition. A 
/ 
See /Hanrahan v. Hampton, supra, 446 u.s., at 763-766 .. 
I 




plaintiff retains, of course, access to reasonable 
discovery to aid in carrying his burden. And he need not 
prove the merits
0
of his case on a motion for summary 
V~'-. 
judgment J But there should be a showing of sufficient .., 
substantiality to justify the costs - both public and 
private - of subjecting officials to protracted trials 
when it is evident at the summary judgment stage that the 
claims are insubstantial. 
Ct. Rev., at 324-327; ' cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 
606 F.2d, at 1214-1215 {Gesell. J., concurring) {quoted at 
note 27 supra)=) -.,; 
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retains access to reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his 
burden. And he need not prove the merits of his case on a 
motion for summary judgment, but only make a showing of 
substantiality adequate to justify the cost-both public and 
private-of subjecting a high federal official to trial. 
D 
In this case petitioners have asked us to hold that the re-
spondent's pre-trial showings were insufficient to survive 
their motion for summary judgment. We think it appropri-
\ .., r-J \ ate, !;2,wever, to remand the case to the District Court, for its 
\:_:)-reconsideration of this issue in light of this opinion.~ The 
trial court is more familiar with the record so far developed 
and also is better situated to make any such further findings 
as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
\ ,.., n L----"J~etitioners also have urged us, prior to the remand, to rule on the legal 
~ sufficiency of respondent's "implied" causes of action under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7211 and 18 U. S. C. § 1505 and his Bivens claim under the First Amend-
ment. We do not view either the statutory or the constitutional question 
as insubstantial. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 
U. 8.630, 638--6 91¥.}81-) (1981) (controlling question in implication of statu-
tory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create 
a damages remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 647 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1981), affirm-
ing on remand 598 F . 2d 958 (CA5 1979) (holding that the "unique relation-
ship between the Federal Government and its civil service employees is a 
special consideration which counsels hesitation in inferring a Bivens rem-
edy"). As in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, however, we took jurisdiction of 
the case only to resolve the immunity question under the collateral order 
doctrine. We therefore think it appropriate to leave these questions for 
fuller consideration by the District Court and, if necessary, by the Court of 
Appeals . 
February 8, 1982 
5 
No. 80-945, Harlow and Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 
The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity 10 
available to the senior aides and advisers of the 
President of the United States in a suit for damages based 
on their acts in office. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce 15 
~~t~la~ 
Harlow and Alexander Butterfield stand aee-us-e.d of 
..-\ 
participat~ in a conspiracy to violate the 
constitutional and statutory rights of the respondent A. 
~ 
Ernest Fitzgerald. Respondent a-lleges that oeti tioners 
2. 
alleged conspiracy is the same as that involved in No. 79-
1738, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the facts need not be repeated 
in detail. 
Respondent alleges that Harlow entered the conspiracy 25 
in his role as the presidential aide principally 
responsible for congressional relations. 1 The record 
reveals that Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans called 
Harlow in May, 1969, to inquire about likely congressional 
reaction to a draft reorganization plan that would cause 30 
Fitzgerald's dismissa1. 2 Harlow responded that "this was a 
very sensitive item on the Hill and that it would be [his] 
recommendation that [the Air Force] not proceed to make 
such a change at that time." 3 But the Air Force 
1Harlow held this position from the beginning of 
the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through 
November 4, 1969. On that date he was designated as 
Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet 
status. He served ih that capacity until December 9, 1970, 
when he -'teturned to private life. Harlow later resumed 
the duties of Counsellor for the period from July 1, 1973 
through April 14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that 
Harlow continued in a consiracy against!\ throughout the 
various changes of official assignment. 
2According to Seamans' testimony, "we [the Air 
Force Department] didn't ask [Harlow] to pass judgment on 
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at least two subsequent 
occasions during the spring of 1969. The record also 
establishes that the Secretary called Harlow on November 
5, 1969, shortly after the Defense Department had 40 
announced Fitzgerald's impending dismissal. 4 On at least 
one occasion, petitioner alleges, Harlow discussed the 
Fitzgerald matter directly with the President. 5 
Harlow's role--both in these and possibly other 
discussions during this period--remains substantially in 45 
dispute. Harlow cites the testimony of Air Force 
Secretary Seamans, who has sworn that he "never received 
any instruction" regarding Fitzgerald's dismissal. 6 Yet 
;)J!n his complain~-the factual allegations of which we must 
accept as true for purposes of our decision ) -Fitzgerald 
4see JA, at 186a. 
5The evidence of this discussion consists entirely 
in a taped conversation, some three years later, in which 
Richard Nixon recollected that Harlow "was all for 
50 
4. 
alleges that Harlow acted in concert with other officialz~ 
to cause Fitzgerald's unlawful dismissal. In support of 
this allegation Fitzgerald relies heavily on a recorded 
conversation in which the President later voiced a 
tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" 
Fi1;zgerald. 7 
~ .... t 
Petitioner Butterfield allegedly entered the 
conspiracy in his White House roles as Deputy Assistant to 
the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. Haldeman. 8 
55 
In May 1969 Butterfield concededly circulated a White 60 
House memorandum in which he claimed to have learned that 
Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy 
purchasing practices" by leaking documents to a 
congressional committee. 9 Butterfield reported that this 
information had been referred to the -< f~deral Bureau of 65 
7see JA, at 284a. Petitioners emphasized the 
tentativeness of the President's query. To the President's 
question White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler 
replied, "No, I think Bryce may have been the other way." 
Id. Nixon did not respond to Ziegler's remark. 
8The record establishes that Butterfield worked 
from an off ice immediately adjacent to the oval off ice. 
5. 
Investigation. Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum 
as evidence that by May 1969 Butterfield had commenced 
efforts to secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. 
~1 though Butterfield's role in the Fitzgerald dismissal 
also is much in controversy, for purposes of our decision 70 
we again must assume this allegation to 
r+-'\)1- -v) ,_.. i 
record 
,/\9-<--..f r ,, ;t ,~-,.,. .~ ~ < .f 
"\ ~~ ·~ 
be true·_) Tl1.a 
also shows that White House chief of staff H.R. 
f 
' Haldeman solicited Butterfield's recommendations in 
December 1970, shortly after the President had promised at 
a press conference to inquire into Fitzgerald's dismissal. 75 
Emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," Butterfield 
counselled against offering Fitzgerald another job within 
the Aministration. 1 0 
Butterfield was named as a defendant in the initial 
I 
ctvil complaint filed by respondent in the District Court 80 
in January 1974. 11 Harlow was first cited in the Second 
10see JA, at 99a-100a, 180a. 
not sent to the Defense Department. 
This memorandum was 
\ 
11see Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (DDC 
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 553 F.2d 220 (CADC 
6. 
Amended complaint of July 1978. Together with their 
codefendant Richard Nixon, petitioners both moved for 
summary judgment on February 12, 1980. In denying the 
motion the District Court upheld the legal sufficiency of 85 
Fitzgerald's Bivens claim under the First Amendment and 
his "inferred" statutory actions under 5 u.s.c. § 7211 and 
18 U.S.C. § 1505. The court also ruled that petitioner's 
were not absolutely immune from suit for ci vi 1 damages. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners 90 
invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the 
~.,; Jf' 
denial of so1.~e immunity to the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals 
entered an order of dismissal. 
Never having determined the scope of the immunity 95 
available to the senior aides and advisers of the 





Nixon, ante, our jurisdiction has been 
the basis that the District Court's order 
.., 
7. ~r, 
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{lfr {)(,;;0 /F~ ~ ':. , I .P~JA_...J . 
{;tJ I'Y ~ .. ') ""J I c~~ ~· (01 ~' ,-t... t<. Jlf II 
I As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, 100 
our decisions consistently have recognized that government 
I officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits 
for damages. As recognized at common law, public officers 
require this protection to shield them from undue 
interference with their duties and to alleviate 105 
potentially incapacitating fears of liability. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), this Court 
s 
stablished the principle that the immunity available to 
state executive officials generally should vary with the , 
complexity and sensitivity of their duties. 416 u.s., at 110 
247. In Scheuer we noted that high executive officials 
frequently must make decisions in an "atmosphere of 
confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events." Id., at 
247. The range of required decisions may be "virtually 
infinite," yet promptness essential. Vacillation entails 115 
the risk that "action deferred will be futile or 
COJ;l.Sti tute virtual abdication of office." Id., at 246. 
8. 
"In short," we concluded, "since the options which a chief 
executive and his principal subordinates must consider are 
far broader and more subtle than those made by officials 120 
with less responsibility, the range of discretion must be 
comparably broad . " Ibid. Nonetheless, despite our 
perception that high officials will require greater 
protection than those with less complex discretionary 
responsibilities, we held in Scheuer that a governor and 125 
his chief subordinates could receive the requisite 
protection from a limited or good-faith immunity. Ibid., 
at 247-248. 
In Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 503 (1978), we 
applied the "governing principles" of Scheuer to federal 130 
officials. For them as for state executive personnel, we 
acknowledged the need for official immunity even from 
suits alleging constitutional violations. But we clearly 
established that good faith immunity would represent the 
norm. We continued to acknowledge that the special 135 
functions of some officials might require absolute 
9. 
that "federal officials who seek absolute exemption from 
personal liability must bear the burden of showing that 140 
public policy requires an exemption of that scope." Butz, 
supra, 438 u.s., at 506. This too we reaffirmed in Nixon. 
III 
In attempting to carry the burden established by our 
cases, petitioners undertake to derive an entitlement to 145 
absolute immunity from the absolute immunity possessed by 
the President. They also advance a related argument that 
the functions of White House aides are invested with a 
special sensitivity, which entitles them to absolute 
immunity under the Butz reservation of absolute immunity 150 
for "those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated 
that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the 
public business." 438 U.S., at 507. 
A 
Petitioners' claim to "derivative" immunity rests 155 
heavily on the decision of this Court in Gravel v. United 
States, 408 u.s. 606 (1972). In Gravel we held that the 
10. 
In so holding we looked to the "central role" of the 160 
Speech and Debate Clause, which we identified as being "to 
prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." 408 
U.S., at 617. Both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals had concluded that "it was literally impossible 165 
... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative 
tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that 
"the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the 
Members' performance that they must be treated as the 
latter's alter egos •••• " Id., at 616. we substantially 170 
endorsed that view. Having done so, we held the Speech 
and Debate Clause applicable to the "legislative acts" of 
a Senate aide that would have been privileged if performed 
by the Senator himself. Id., at 621-622. 
In arguing that the analysis of Gravel mandates a 175 
similarly "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States, petitioners correctly 
assert that the President must delegate a large measure of 
necessary in order to promote all of the policies 
supporting absolute immunity for the President himself. 
tao f a r. As we 
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, supra, the 
President's absolute immunity derives in principal part 185 
from factors unique to his constitutional station. No 
other official has responsibilities nearly so broad. No 
other official approaches the President's status in the 
constitutional scheme. Suits against presidential aides 
therefore do not invoke the special separation-of-powers 190 
considerations implicated by suits against the President 
himself. Moreover, petitioners have not shown that a 
blanket prohibition of suits against presidential 
subordinates is necessary to the President's effective 
performance of his constitutional functions. Presidential 195 
aides perform a range of tasks from the sensitive and 
discretionary to the routine and ministerial. The duties 
of some are essentially political. The undifferentiated 
extension of absolute "derivative" immunity therefore 
12. 
we emphasized that the protection of the Speech and Debate 
Clause does not extend to all acts within the outer 
perimter of a legislator's official duties. Applicable 
only to acts performed in Congress's "central role" of 205 
proposing and debating legislation, the Clause does not 
"privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct beyond that 
essential to foreclose executive control of legislative 
speech and debate " 408 u.s., at 620 (emphasis added). 
By construing the Speech and Debate Clause in these 210 
"functional" terms, Gravel employs an analytical approach 
closely analogous to that of Scheuer and Butz. Clearly 
Gravel in no way denies the principle that the scope of an 
official's immunity generally should depend on the 
sensitivity and the complexity of his official functions. 215 
B 
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity 
based on the "special functions" of White House aides. 
Their argument again claims more than our cases will 
support. / For aides entrusted with discretionary authority 220 
13. 
the public business." Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 u.s., 
at 507. But a "special functions" rationale does not 
warrant a blanket extension of absolute immunity to all 225 
presidential aides in the performance of all their 
offices. This conclusion follows inescapably from our 
decision in Butz, in which we held that a Cabinet officer 
generally could not claim absolute immunity from suits 
alleging constitutional violations. Immunity must be 230 
justified by the special functions of offices, not the 
mere fact of high executive station. It would be 
anomalous at best to hold that White House aides generally 
enjoy absolute immunity, which they actually might forfeit 
if appointed to assume greater and more sensitive 235 
responsibilities as a member of the Cabinet. 
IV 
The approaches of Butz and Gravel both indicate that 
the scope of an aide's immunity should vary with the 
functions of the office assigned him by the President of 240 
the United States. Our cases indicate that two inquiries 
' 
14. 
entitlement to absolute immunity must be roofed in 
~ 
_,1-..t?'r. ,. 
functions of offices, not based solely on discrete acts. 245 
This is necessary to achieve some minimum of certainty and 
predictability--both for citizens believing that their 
rights have been violated and for officials anxious that 
their conduct may be called in question. 13 At the second 
stage, however, it does become necessary to examine 250 
particular acts, in order to determine whether a 
presidential aide in fact was discharging a protected 
function when he performed the act on which liability is 
predicated. 14 The inquiry here has a familiar analogue in 
the common law: was the action within the outer perimeter 255 
13As Professor Schuck has written, "To minimize 
uncertainty, rules should be simple, predictable, and so 
easily applied that the immunity questions can be resolved 
at a very early stage of the trial." Schuck, Suing Our 
Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public 
Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 325. This 
aim would be defeated entirely if every presidential aide-
-regardless of his duties of office--could invoke a claim 
that a particular act was somehow related to a 
presidential function of great sensitivity. By the same 
token, the deterrent purpose of damage actions would be 
undermined if all White House officials believed 
themselves possessed of a colorable claim to absolute 
immunity. 
1 4The need for such an inquiry 
in this Court's decision in Butz v. 
15. 
of the official's protected function? 15 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by 
petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we conclude that 
neither has shown that "public policy requires [for his 
office] an exemption of [absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 260 
438 u.s., at 506. Although an important discretionary 
post, Harlow's position as the senior aide for 
congressional relations did not entail regular 
responsibilities in any such especially sensitive areas as (? 
adjudication, or national security. 1 
Petitioner Butterfield is sued on the basis of actions 
allegedly taken during his tenure as Deputy Assistant to 
the President and Deputy Chief of Staff. Despite being 
senior level assignments, these posts also do not appear 
I 
to have included functions requiring absolute immunity as l 
a matter of compelling public policy. 
v 
15cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 u.s. 483, 498 (1896) 
(immunity extends to all matters "committed by law to [an 
265 
16. 
As we recognized today in Nixon, supra, the 
resolution of immunity questions inherently requires "a 
balance between the evils inevitable" in any avaliable 275 
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action 
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for 
vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz, supra, 
438 u.s., at 506. It is this recognition that has 
required the denial of absolute immunity to most public 280 
officers. At the same time, history has taught that 
claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the 
guilty--at a cost not only to innocent officials, but to 
the society as a whole. These social costs include ,...t.b.e 
/ 
of litigation-, --~e_jdiversion of official energy 285 
;.c.-."".r.."WA 
pressing public issues, aft(! the deterrence of able 
citizens from the acceptance of public office. 
,. 
In Butz, supra, we emphasized the protections 
available to public officials under a rule of qualified 
immunity. Experience indicates that these protections may 290 
work less effectively in practice than our decision had 
17. 
evils as we do, we must continue to rely on the principles 
stated in Butz, supra, 438 U.S., at 507-508: 
/ 
,.. .. Insubstantial lawsuits [should] be quickly 
terminated by federal courts alert to the 
possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the 
complaint states a compensable claim for relief 
... , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheuer that 
damages suits concerning constitutional 
violations need not proceed to trial, but can be 
terminated on a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment based on the defense of 
immunity. See 416 u.s., at 250. In responding 
to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in 
the manger; and firm application of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that 
federal officials are not harassed by frivolous 
lawsuits." 438 U.S., at 507-508 (footnote 
mitted}. 
VI 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case remanded 
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The issue in this case is the scope of the immunity 10 
available to the senior aides and advisers of the 
President of the United States in a suit for damages based 
on their acts in office. 
I 
In this suit for civil damages petitioners Bryce 15 
Harlow and Alexander Butterfield are alleged to have 
participated in a conspiracy to violate the constitutional 
and statutory rights of the respondent A. Ernest 
Fitzgerald. Respondent avers that petitioners entered the 
2. 
conspiracy is the same as that involved in Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, ante, the facts need not be repeated in 
detail. 
Respondent alleges that Harlow entered the conspiracy 25 
in his role as the presidential aide principally 
responsible for congressional relations. 1 At the 
conclusion of discovery the supporting evidence remained 
inferential. As evidence of Harlow's conspiratorial 
activity respondent relies heavily on the history of 30 
communication between Harlow and Air Force Secretary 
Robert Seamans. The record reveals that Secretary Seamans 
cailed Harlow in May, 1969, to inquire about likely 
congressional reaction to a draft reorganization plan that 
would cause Fitzgerald's dismissal. 2 Through an aide 
1Harlow held this position from the beginning of 
the Nixon Administration on January 20, 1969 through 
November 4, 1969. On that date he was designated as 
Counsellor to the President, a position accorded Cabinet 
status. He served in that capacity until December 9, 1970, 
when he ....-t:eturned to private life. Harlow later resumed 
the duties of Counsellor for the period from July 1, 1973 
35 
through April 14, 1974. Respondent appears to allege that ~ \ 
Harlow continued in a consiracy against throughout the  
various changes of official assignment. ~ 
2.,. ____ ..:1!--
.L.- ~------· .&...--~.:--- ..... "·-·-
3. 
Harlow responded that "this was a very sensitive item on 
the Hill and that it would be [his] recommendation that 
[the Air Force] not proceed to make such a change at that 
time. n3 But the Air Force persisted. Seamans spoke to 
Harlow on at least two subsequent occasions during the 40 
spring of 1969. The record also establishes that 
Secretary Seamans called Harlow on November 5, 1969, 
shortly after the public announcement of Fitzgerald's 
impending dismissal. 4 The other evidence most supportive 
of Fitzgerald's claim consists in a recorded conversation 45 
in which the President later voiced a tentative 
recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" 
Fitzgerald. 5 
In his motion for summary judgment Harlow argued that 
exhaustive discover1 had adduced no direct evidence of 50 
his involvement in any conspiratorial activity. In his 
brief in this Court Harlow cites the depostion testimony 
3 Id. , at 15 2a. 
4. 
of Air Force Secretary Seamans, who averred that he "never 
received any instruction" regarding Fitzgerald's 
dismissa1. 6 Disputing the probative value of Richard 55 
Nixon's recorded remark, Harlow emphasizes the 
tentativeness of the President' statement. To the 
President's query whether Harlow was "all for canning 
[Fitzgerald] , wasn't he?", White House Press Secretary 
Ronald Ziegler in fact gave a negative reply: "No, I think 60 
Bryce may have been the other way."7 
According to the averment's of respondent's 
complaint, petitioner Butterfield also entered the 
conspiracy not later than May of 1969. Employed as Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to 65 
H.R. Haldeman, 8 Butterfield circulated a White House 
memorandum in that month in which he claimed to have 
learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on 
6JA, at 159a-160a. 
7see JA, at 284a. The President did not respond to 
Ziegler's remark. 
5. 
some "shoddy purchasing practices" by leaking documents to 
a congressional committee. 9 Butterfield reported that this 70 
information had been referred to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. Fitzgerald characterizes this memorandum 
as evidence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to 
secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal. Fitzgerald 
also relies heavily on communications between Butterfield 75 
and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970. After the 
President had promised at a press conference to 
into Fitzgerald's dismissal, chief~~ff -
inquire 
Haldeman 
solicited Butterfield's recommendations. In a subsequent 
memorandum emphasizing the importance of "loyalty," 
Butterfield counselled against offering Fitzgerald another 
job within the Aministration.l0 
For his part, Butterfield denies that he took part in 
any decision involving Fitzgerald's employment status 
80 
until Haldeman sought his advice in December 1969--more 85 
than a month after Fitzgerald's termination had been 
6. 
scheduled and announced publicly by the Air Force. 
According to Butterfield, eight years of litigation11 have 
established a basis for the conclusion that his May 
memorandum concerning Fitzgerald's alleged "whistle-
blowing" cannot be connected with the Air Force decision 
to terminate Fitzgerald's employment. Butterfield also 
argues generally that discovery has failed to adduce any 
evidence that he caused injury to Fitzgerald. 
Together with their codefendant Richard Nixon, 
petitioners Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary 
judgment on February 12, 1980. In denying the motion the 
District Court upheld the legal sufficiency of 
Fitzgerald's Bivens claim under the First Amendment and 
(\ 
his "inferred" statutory actions under 5 u.s.c. § 7211 and 
r, v 
18 u.s.c. § 1505. The court found that there were genuine 
I 
issues of disputed fact remaining for resolution at trial. 
11see Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (DDC 
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 553 F.2d 220 (CADC 
1977). Together with eight officials of the Department of 
Defense, Butterfield was accused in Fitzgerald's initial 
complaint of conspiring to cause Fitzgerald's retaliatory 






It also ruled that petitioner did not possess absolute 
tv 
immunity from this suit for civil damages. 
Independently of former President Nixon, petitioners 105 
invoked the collateral order doctrine and appealed the 
denial of their immunity defense to the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of 
. ~J:d_ 
Appeals~~4er~ dismissal. Never having 
determined the immunity available to the senior aides and 110 
advisers of the President of the United States, we granted 
certiorari. u.s. {1981) . 12 --
II 
As we reiterated today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, 
our decisions ~onsistently have recognized that government 115 
officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits 
for damages. As recognized at common law, public officers 
require this protection to shield them from undue 
12As in Nixon, ante, our jurisdiction has been 
challenged on the basis that the District Court's order 
denying petitioners' claim of absolute immunity was not an 
appealable final order and that the Court of Appeals' 
dismissal of petitioners' appeal establishes that this 
11!-11 .Lt...- ,..... ____ .._ -~ ~----,- --!L..'L..!- .L.t....-. 
8. 
interference with their duties and to alleviate 
potentially incapacitating fears of liability. 120 
Our decisions have recognized immunity defenses of 
two . kinds. For some officials whose special status or 
functions have been thought to require complete protection 
from suit, we have recognized the defense of "absolute 
immunity." The absolute immunity of prosecutors, in their 125 
prosecutorial function, and of judges, in the performance 
of judicial functions, now is well settled. See, e.g., 
Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478 (1978). We have not held __,s-
that executive and administrative officials never may 
enjoy absolute immunity. On the contrary, we have held 130 
explicitly that this factor is not determinative, Butz, 
supra, 438 U.S., at 511-512, and in fact have extended 
' 
absolute immunity to prosecutors, to executive officials 
~ 
~ engaged in adjudicative functions, ibid. , at 513-517, and 
to the President of the United States, see Nixon v. 135 
Fitzgerald, ante. For executive officials, however, our 
cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the 
9. 
considered the scope of the immunity available to the 140 
Governor of a State and his chief subordinates. In 
Scheuer we noted that high executive officials frequently 
must make decisions in an "atmosphere of confusion, 
ambiguity, and swiftly moving events." Id., at 247. 
"[S]ince the options which a chief executive and his 145 
principal subordinates must consider are far broader and 
more subtle than those made by officials with less 
responsibility," we reasoned, "the range of discretion 
must be comparably broad." Ibid. Nonetheless, despite 
our perception that high officials will require greater 150 
protection than those with less complex discretionary 
~ ~uJ.-t ;;..., ~ _.f,.c~c~ 
responsibilities, we hei~ in Scheuer that a governor and 
1\ 
his aides could receive the requisite protection from .a-y-
good-faith immunity. Ibid., at 247-248. 
In Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 503 (1978), we 155 
applied the "governing principles" of Scheuer to federal 
officials. Concluding that a blanket grant of immunity 
would be anomalous in light of the qualified immunity 
10. 
by basic constitutional guarantees," id., at 508, we 
determined that public policy generally would be served 
best by affording to federal executive officers a defense 
of qualified immunity. In Butz as in Scheuer this 
standard reflected an attempt to balance competing 165 
principles. Cognizant not only of the importance of a 
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, 438 
U.S., at 504-505, but also of "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion 
and the related public interest in encouraging the 170 
vigorous exercise of official authority," id., at 506, we 
expressed our choice of qualified immunity in balancing 
terms. Without discounting the adverse pol icy 
consequnces of private lawsuits, we relied on procedural 
guarantees that frivolous suits could be terminated 175 
quickly: 
"Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly 
terminated by federal courts alert to the 
possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the 
complaint states a compensable claim for relief 
.•• , it should not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheur that 
damages suits concerning constitutional 





Nevertheless, despite our decision that qualified 
immunity should be the norm, Butz continued to acknowledge 195 
that the special functions of some officials might require 
absolute immunity, and in fact extended such immunity to 
administrative officials with prosecutorial and 
adjudicative functions. Id., at 513-517. We emphasized, 
however, that "federal officials who seek absolute 200 
exemption from personal liability must bear the burden of 
showing that public policy requires an exempt1un o f tha t 
s cope." I d ., at 506. This we reaffirmed today in Nixon 
v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
III 205 
In attempting to justify an extension to them of 
absolute immunity, petitioners, as presidential aides and 
advisors, undertake to derive an ~unity of this 
scope from the absolute immunity possessed by the 
President himself. They also advance a related argument 210 
12. 
A 
Petitioners' claim to "derivative" immunity rests 215 
heavily on the decision of this Court in Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) •13 In Gravel we held that the 
congressional privelege under the Speech and Debate Clause 
extended to certain acts per formed by a Senatorial a ide. 
In so holding we looked to the "central role" of the 220 
Speech and Debate Clause, which we identified as being "to 
prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." 408 
u.s., at 617. Both the District court and the Court of 
Appeals had concluded that "it was literally impossible 225 
... for Members of Congress to perform their legislative 
tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that 
"the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the 
Members' performance that they must be treated as the 
latter's alter egos .••• " !d., at 616. We substantially 230 
13Petitioners also rely on other cases in which this 
Court has held that Congressional employees are 
~,....W'".:YY .... ~.: .... _,.U' -""".J-..:~1-~ """" .a.""-- , __ ,:,....,_.._.: .... - .:'"" ..... ,_.: ..... "" ._._,....'I''I'.:,.:J-,:1 
13. 
endorsed that view. Having done so, we held the Speech 
and Debate Clause applicable to the "legislative acts" of 
a Senate aide that would have been privileged if performed 
by the Senator himself. Id., at 621-622. 
In arguing that the analysis of Gravel mandates a 235 
" similarly "derivative" immunity for the chief aides of the 
President of the United States, petitioners correctly 
assert that the President must delegate a large measure of 
authority merely to execute the duties of his office. For 
this reason, they argue, "derivative" immunity is 
necessary in order to promote all of the policies 
supporting absolute immunity for the President himself. 
Petitioners' argument is not without force. 
Ultimately, however, it sweeps too far. As we explained 
----.__/ 
240 
today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the President's 245 
absolute immunity derives in principal part from factors 
unique to his constitutional station. No other official 
approaches the President's status in the constitutional 
scheme. No other official has responsibilities nearly so 
14. 
immunity for all his official acts. No further inquiry is 
needed to determine the particular presidential function 
/ 
an act was taken. In contrast with the 
claiming congressional immunity in Gravel and 
similar cases, petitioners here fail to establish that 
public policy requires an extension to them of an immunity 
equal to that of their principal. Suits against 
presidential aides do not invoke the special separation-
255 
tJ/::; tt~r? of-powers considerations implicated by suits against the 260 
f 
President himself. Moreover, petitioners have not shown 
that a blanket prohibition of suits against presidential 
subordinates is necessary to the President's effective 
performance of his constitutional functions. Presidential 
aides perform a range of tasks from the sensitive and 265 
discretionary to the routine and ministerial.~~uties 
~ 
of some are ees~;i,a~~¥ political. The undifferentiated 
extension of absolute "derivative" immunity therefore 
could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach of 
Scheuer a~~J indeed with Gravel itself. 270 
15. 
e.-
within the outer perimter of a legislator's official 
~ 
duties. Applicable only to acts performed in Congress's 
"central role" of proposing and debating legislation, the 275 
Clause does not "privilege illegal or unconstitutional 
conduct beyond that essentiaYt l to foreclose executive 
control of legislative speech and debate •..• " 408 u.s., 
at 620 {emphasis added) . 14 By construing the Speech and 
Debate Clause in these "functional" terms, Gravel employs 280 
an analytical approach closely analogous to that of 
Scheuer and Bu~ Gravel in no way denies the 
principle that the scope of an official's immunity 
generally should depend on the sensitivity and the 
complexity of his official functions. 285 
B 
Petitioners also assert an entitlement to immunity 
based on the "special functions" of White House aides. 
Their argument again claims more than our cases will 
support. For aides entrusted with discretionary authority 290 
in such sensitive areas as national security or ~ 
"\ 
~ 
immunity might'\ be justified to protect 
their unhesitating performance of functions so vital to 
the national interest. But a "special functions" 
rationale does not warrant a blanket extension of absolute 295 
immunity to all presidential aides in the performance of 
~ 
all their oHice-s. 
·I\ 
This conclusion follows inescapably 
from our decision in Butz, in which we held that a Cabinet 
officer--a high officer of the executive branch directly 
accountable to the President--generally could not claim 300 
absolute immunity from suits alleging constitutional 
violations. Butz plainly affirms that an executive 
official's claim to absolute immunity must be justified by 
reference to the public interest in the special functions 
of his office, not the mere fact of high executive 305 
station. 
IV 
The approaches of Butz and Gravel both indicate that 
the nature and scope of an aide's immunity must depend 
17. 
some aides are assigned to act as presidential "alter 
egos," cf. Gravel, supra, 408 U.S., at 616-617, in the 
exercise of functions for which absolute immunity is 
"essential for the conduct of the public business," Butz, 315 
supra, 438 U.S., at 507. It is clear from our cases, 
however, that the burden to establish this claim rests on 
the official asserting a right to absolute immunity. In 
order to carry this burden, a presidential aide first 
would need to show that the responsibilities of his office 320 
did in fact embrace functions so sensitive as to require a 
total shield from liability. Our dec is ion of this case 
requires no~neral enumeration of protected functions. 
Our cases make plain, however, that the relevant inquiries 
would encompass considerations of public policy and of 325 
either the common law or, more likely, our constitutional 
heritage and structure. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante. 
Having established that his duties of office included 
functions warranting the protection of absolute immunity, 
the presidential aide then would need to establish that he 330 
18. 
inquiry here has a familiar analogue in the common law: 
Was the action within the outer perimeter of the 
official's protected function?l6 335 
Applying these standards to the claims advanced by 
petitioners Harlow and Butterfield, we cannot conclude on 
the record before us that either has shown that "public 
policy requires [for any of the functions of his office] 
an exemption of [absolute] scope." Butz, supra, 438 u.s., 340 
at 506. Nor, assuming that petitioners did have functions 
for which absolute immunity would be warranted, could we 
now conclude that the acts charged in this lawsuit--if 
taken at all--would lie within the protected area. we do 
not, however, foreclose the possibility that petitioners, 345 
on remand, could satisfy the standards properly applicable 
15The need for such an inquiry is at least implicit 
in this Court's decision in Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 
u.S., at 508-517; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.S. 409, 
430-431 (1976). Cases 1nvolv1ng immun1ty under the Speech 
and Debate Clause have inquired explicitly into whether a 
particular acts and activities qualified for the 
protection of the Clause. See, e.g., Gravel v. United 
States, supra; Doe v. McMillan, 412 u.s. 306 (1973) 
16see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 u.s. 483, 498 (1896) 
(immunity extends to all rna tter s "commit ted by law to [an 
,.._,,.:,f=~,.,.;~, lol ~n'l"'_~-.- .. .:e.:""' ... -- ___ ,_ __ , .. \- n--- .... .._._.L.L.--- ~L:_I\ 
19 • .. 
to their 
functions require absolute immunity, petitioners assert 350 
that public policy at least mandates an application of the 
qualified immunity standard that would permit the defeat 
~
of'\,frivr cws claims without resort to trial. we agree. 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, 355 
the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires 
"a balance between the evils inevitable" in any avaliable 
alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action 
for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for 
vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz, supra, 360 
438 u.s., at 506. It is this recognition that has 
required the denial of absolute immunity to most public 
officers. At the same time, however, it cannot be 
disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the 
innocent as well as the guilty--at a cost not only to the 365 
20. 
These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the 
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, 
- - tu~~ ~f ~!.-:;:/ ,~--
and~the deterrence of able citizens from the acceptance of 
public office. 
In Butz, supra, 438 u.s., at 507-508, as in Scheuer, 
~
supra, 416 u.s., at 245-248, we uRdertO&k-aA i:Rqniry 4:R~ 
-1 
the protections available to public officials under a rule 
a.... 
370 
of qualified immunity. In striking " ..the balance J ~ 
we relied on the assumption that qualified 
immunity would permit "[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be 
quickly terminated." Butz, supra, 438 U.S., at 507-508; 




Q¥Q-r-&~ t a ted • 
in part and dissenting in part) • The 
of this consideration 
.. ~ • ., ~ & c'l-:-/ 
This Court has noted the risk .ftazarcled by 
"" ~~ 
~ political officials who must defend their motives before a 
jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 




Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951) •18 We therefore 385 
have admonished that insubstantial suits should "not 
proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment." Butz, supra, 438 
u.s., at 507-508. 
Petitioners present persuasive arguments that the 390 
implementation of this admonition--a factor presupposed in 
the balance of competing interests struck by our prior 
cases--requires a clarification of the standards of 
pleading and proof to be applied to the immunity claims of 
high officials. Under the Federal Rules of Civil 395 
Procedure disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be 
decided on motions for summary judgment. 19 Applying this 
standard in suits against public officials, courts have 
hesitated to dismiss by summary judgment even claims for 
which plaintiffs have adduced little or no factual 400 
18As the Court observed in Tenne1, "In times of 
passion, dishonest and vindictive mot1ves are readily 
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asoning that an officials's "good faith" 
of fact' tfie r r federal courts 
y judgment on this issue, sometimes 
nsupported averment sufficient to 
If high officials cannot avoid trial even on 
frivolous claims against them, the "balance of evils" 
contemplated by our cases cannot be attained in fact. 
'Having reasoned from the empirical premise that vacuous 
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in his concurring 
supra, 606 F.2d, at 
a ~t ;;c· "It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff Is 
,1 ' counsel to create a material issue of fact on 
~~~ ~ some element of the immunity defense where 
lf"''"i-... subtle quest ions of constitutional law and a 
dec isionmaker 's mental processes are involved. 
""" ~~~ ~ A sentence from a casual document or a 
~ ~ •. ~ difference in recollection with regard to a 
~ · 1 .~/ particular policy conversation held long ago 
,~-  would usually, under the normal summary judgment 
~ 
standards, be sufficient. In short, if these 
v •. ~ standards are those to be followed in these 
p·_-r cases' trial judges will almost automatically 
· .. ~ ~)11; ' have to send such cases to full trials on the tv'w· \ merits." 
IV 
For cases in which qualified immunity was granted only 
after trial, see Knell v. Bewnsinger, 522 F. 2d 7 20 (CA 7 






the counsel of distinguished jurists, 22 and academic 
commentators 23 that high public officials not only can 
but frequently are, harassed by frivolous lawsuits. 
B 
In Gomez v. Toldeo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980), this Court 415 
held that a claim of "good faith" immunity is an 
affirmative defense, which must be pleaded by the 
defendant. 24 But we did not reach the question of the 
burden of proof on this issue. See ibid., at 642 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Petitioners urge that the 420 
burden of showing lack of good faith should be placed on 
the plaintiff. Further, where a defendant--by affidavits 
or otherwise--effectively controverts a plaintiff's 
factual averments, petitioners argue that the plaintiff 
~~kL 
should be required to make some 1 evidentiary 
showing in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. 
W~ ~ 22see Halperin v. Kissinger, 
-~~ 1214-1215 (Gesell, J., concurring). 
~ ~ 23see, e.g., Schuck, supra. 
~ ~ 24 ~1 .._t,.,.,.,.l"'t,.,. ro~-~- ----~-.._~..J 
supra, 606 F.2d, at 
J..\.....- -- .. --.1. .!--- .! - .._,_ __ 
425 
24. 
We are views. 
In order to provide an effective barrier to trial of 
·~ 
kivej,g.ys clai~ieve that an oflicial's claimed 
entitlement to qualified immunity must be accorded 430 
substantial weight, not only at trial but on a motion for 
summary judgment. 25 Consistently with 'this view, we hold 
25There is implicit support for this view in 
decisions in which this Court has contemplated that an 
official's perception of events generally would provide 
the basis for judging his actions. As the Court stated in 
Scheur v. Rhodes, supra, 416 u.s., at 247-278 (emphasis 
added}: 
"These considerations suggest that, in varying 
scope, a qualified immunity is available to 
officers of the executive branch of government, 
the variation being dependent upon the scope of 
the responsibilities of the office and all the 
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the 
time of the action on which liability is sought 
to be based. " 
Emphasizing the necessity for judicial deferenc·e to the 
official's invocation of an immunity defense, the court in 
Scheuer quoted from Justice Holmes's opinion in Moyer v. 
Peabody, 212 u.s. 78, 85 (1909}: 
"No doubt there are cases where the expert on 
the spot may be called upon to justify his 
conduct later in court, notwithstanding the fact 
that he had sole command at the time and acted 
to the best of his knowledge. That is the 
position of the captain of a ship. But even in 
that case great weight is to be given to his 
determination and the matter is to be judged on 
the facts as they appeared then and not merely 
in the light of the event." (emphasis added}. 
(
As has been observed of Mr. Justice Harlan and Judge 
Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes was neither an 
:t~;~r:r~~nc~~~!~:op~!:e!-~~~!~~~c~:~~-~~: visi~~, -~r .~~~ 
25. 
t! 
that a defendant's assertion of this defense shifts the 
burden to the plaintiff to ~y a preponderance of the 
I\ 
evidence that the official did not act either in objective 43 ~ 
Ck...,tl 
or subjective good faith. ~F~fie~, ~R ~Ede~ to effectuate 
 ., 
~f~ ~ -u 
our admonitions that ~ ~:ivoleous claims should be .e ~ 
~ ~ ~ 
without resort to trial, we ~l4~ th~intiff~ 
""' 
~ pt..__., ~,.AJ&-v- ~ 
J order to survive a motion for summary judgment. 26 440 
carry his burden at trial, a plaintiff 
~~-
wett.ld Rees to prove all elements of his affirmative case 
~ 
/.1.~ 
summary judgment in a case involving 
1 
immunity claims by 
high government officials, we think it appropriate to 445 
26cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, supra, 606 F.2d, at 
1215 {Gesell, J., concurring}: 
"In order to give the immunity doctrine some 
genuine force and effect, it appears to me that 
a plaintiff should be required to make a 
stronger showing than the court's op1n1on 
requires on the immunity question before being 
permitted to proceed to trial. I would hold 
that the plaintiff must establish after the 
completion of discovery and before the trial 
commences, not merely the existence of a genuine 
dispute as to some material issue of fact, but 
also, by the preponderance of the evidence or 
------ ---------zo:-
showing of allowance the 
uncertainty of dev~lopments at trial--from which a 
~ 
rational juror reasonably m~ ~~ to conclude that 
1'\ 
the preponderance standard was satisfied. 
c 
w~~~~ 
There ca~ doJ,l.b.t: .g£ eY£- ~ower to fashion 
" 
procedural and evidentiary rules necessary to the 
implementation of the law of official immunity. As we 
affirmed today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, the law of 
451 
immunity remains, as it "has been, largely of judicial 45~ 
making." Moreover, courts traditionally have determined 
the methods of pleading, proof, and procedure 
appropriately applied to claims of different kinds. 
Neither do we view today's decision as a departure 
' 
from the principles of our prior cases. On the contrary, 460 
we act in implementation of one of the central tenets on 
which previous decisions have rested: "Qualified immunity" 
should afford realistic protection, not only against 
adverse judgments, but against the expense, annoyance, and 
lfpjss 02/16/82 Rider A, p. 27 (Harlow) ~) 
( a~l~ k p z..u ~~ '/ 
HAR27 SALLY-POW 
In allocating the burden of proof to the 
plaintiff when immunity is put in issue, we protect the 
public interest in the effective administration of 
government -- an interest that indisputably is threatened 
when insubstantial claims against officials result in 
protracted and vexatious litigation. Requiring proof of 
substantiality will in so way deter or frustrate 
meritorious claims. The requirements for pleading remain 
the same. If the defendant advances the defense of good 
faith immunity, the plaintiff will retain access to 
reasonable discovery to aid in carrying his burden. And 
t:LL-~l ~~~ 
~ need not prove the merits of his case on a motion for 
i\. 
summary judgment, ~t must make a showing of 
-'\ 
2. 
substantiality adequate to justify the cost -- both public 




_rules for the pre-trial dismissal ,. 
~~ 
27. 
suits, we a-Hr principally to protect the public 
"" 
in the effective administration of government--an 'nterest 470 
that indisputably is threatened by vexatiou lawsuits. 
~~~~;( 
0 
In order to 
commence a lawsuit a plaintiff only plead the 
tortious behavior of a By entering a 
defense of good faith, official then may shift the 
burden of proof on th · s issue, and further may require 
some showing of in order to demonstr·ate that 
summary judgmen is not appropriate. But the plaintiff, 
in undertak' g to meet his burdens, will retain access to 480 
And he need not prove his case on a 
motion for summary judgment, but merely make a showing 
l of subjecting the defendant to trial. 
~--~~~------------------~ 
sufficient to warrant the costs--both public and private--
28. 
survive for summary judgment ... 1:1nder~ 
&~ 
' we think it appropriate to remand 
-'\ 




so far developed andA i~ ~Qee&&«Fy, eoaid 
~~k 
further findings 
on the record before us 
VI 
..--;---"1 
J he judgment 
of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case remanded 
for further action consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
500 




Even if they cannot establish that their official 10 
functions require absolute immunity, petitioners assert 
that public policy at least mandates an application of the 
qualified immunity standard that would permit the defeat 
of insubstantial claims without resort to trial. We 
agree. 15 
A 
As we recognized today in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, 
at __ , the resolution of immunity questions inherently 
2. 
for vindication of constitutional guarantees. Butz v. 
Economou, supra, 438 u.s., at 506; see Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) 
("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or 25 
nothing."). It is this recognition that has required the 
denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. At 
the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously 
that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as 
the guilty--at a cost not only to the defendant officials, 30 
but to the society as a whole. 1 These social costs 
include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of 
official energy from pressing public issues, and--perhaps 
most important of all--the deterrence of able citizens 
from the acceptance of public office. 35 
In identifying qualified immunity as the best 
attainable accommodation of competing values, in Butz, 
supra, 438 U.S., at 507-508, as in Scheuer, supra, 416 
U.s., at 245-248, we relied on the assumption that this 
3. 
standard would permit "[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be 40 
quickly terminated." Butz, supra, 4 38 U.S. , at 507-508; 
see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 u.s. 754, 765 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) • 2 Yet 
petitioners advance persuasive arguments that the 
dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits without trial--a 45 
factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests 
struck by our prior cases--requires an adjustment of the 
substantive and evidentiary standards established by our 
decisions. 
B 
Qualified or "good faith" immunity is an affirmative 
defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. 
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 u.s. 635 (1980) • 3 Decisions of this 
2The importance of this consideration hardly needs 
emphasis. This Court has noted the risk imposed upon 
political officials who must defend their actions and 
motives before a jury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 (1979); 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951). As the 
Court observed in Tenney, "In times of political passion, 
dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed ••• 
and as readily believed." 341 U.S., at 378. It is for 
this among other reasons that Butz, supra, admonished that 
50 
4. 
Court have established that the "good faith" defense has 
both an "objective" and a "subjective" aspect. The 55 
objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and 
respect for "basic, unquestioned constitutional rights." 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 320 (1975). The 
subjective component refers to "permissible intentions." 
Id. Characteristically the Court has defined these 60 
elements by identifying the circumstances in which 
qualified immunity would not be available. Referring both 
to the objective and subjective elements, we have held 
that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official 
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he 65 
took within his sphere of official responsibility would 
violate the Constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or 
if he took the action with malicious intention to cause a 
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury 
Ibid., at 321-322 (emphasis added) • 4 
II 





~ t.Re---o~tiu.Q iU=ld subjective element# of the good 
A 
de fens~ the has proved 
particularly unamenable to summary judgment. Rule 56 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided 75 
on motions for summary judgment. 5 Because an official's 
subjective "good faith" has been considered a question of 
fact, some courts apparently have regarded this issue as 
inherently requiring resolution by a jury. 6 
For this reason the "subjective" component of the 
321, would be stripped on claimed immunity in an act ion 
under § 1983. Subsequent cases, however, have quoted the 
Wood formulation as a general statement of the qualified 
1mmunity standard. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 
U.S. 555, 562-563, 566 (1978), quoted in Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 u.s. 1 37, 139 (1979). 
~{e-1-- ~ of tl:le Federal R~leo ef Civil P£QSeEhue 
states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court 
ordinarily must look at the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all 
inferences most favorable to that party. E.g., Poller v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 u.s. 464, 473 
(1962). 




qualified immunity defense frequently has 
proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that 
insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. 
Viewed in the context of Butz 's attempted balancing 
~~~ 
of competing values, eftormous costs attend the litigation 85 
of the subjective good faith of high officials of the 
* ~ Executive Branch. The duties of higa ~Guti'ft! officers 
--1 
.~ often require decisions on controversial issues of gravest 
t1 "' 1·- I 
)f~ ' importance, in an environment in which views inevitably 
are affected by loyalty, ideology, and emotion. This 90 
environment in part explains why questions of intent so 
rarely can be d~e~~~r;'e7~t also frames a 
'\ 
background in which there often is no clear end to the 
evidence that may be probative of subjective intent. 
Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may 95 
entail broad-ranging 
~officials. ~t:l:~rdens of this kind not 
only can distract officials from the performance of their 
7. 
decisionmaking should not be undertaken lightly. 7 
As we affirmed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, · ante, there 
are situations in which sufficiently compelling 
justifications exist. In the case of private suits for 
damages, however, we conclude today that bare allegations 
of malice should not suffice either to subject high 
federal officials to the costs of trial or to 1 icense 
7 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, at Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services Administral::L<)n, 433 U.S. 
425, 433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
711-712 (1974). As the Court recognized in United States 
v. Nixon: 
"A President and those who assist him must be 
free to explore alternatives in the process of 
shaping policies and making decisions and to do 
so in a way many would be unwilling to express 
except privately. These are considerations 
justifying a presumptive privilege for 
Presidential communications. The privilege is 
fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers 
udner the Constitution." 
418 u.s., at 705-706, 708. Many of the policy 
considerations implicated by Presidential communications 
would apply with nearly equal force to communications 
among Presidential aides and other high Executive 
officials. The separation-of-powers concerns are different 
in the two cases, being less weighty where the President 
personally is not involved. As digtiR9YieaeQ commentators 
have observed, however, the "separation of powers" is "a 
'political doctrine' and not a technical rule of law." 
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in 
Criminal Contempt Cases in "Inferior" Federal Courts--A 
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1014 
(1924) (footnote omitted). Even where the separation-of-





,~~-" & ~ 
IV t.t..J-ft.L.~,)_~ 
/ ""' ' ,; 
broad-reaching discovery. t:hat eerr.gaee- s01:2fl6 / gov er nmen L. 71 
~~t...fk>~ 
Consistently with the balance a-t ..wb.icb WQ aimed in Butz, ,.., 
u-1 
we therefore hold that 
1 
high executive officials are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 




violateA~ed le9~l rights of which 
UJ~ vS"~Ue-e•A.~4--I-.Jzt!), 
they reasonably should have known.!\ Absent a clear 
congressional decision to the contrary, we conclude that 115 
public policy will not support the cost of conditioning 
their immunity on proof of subjective intent. 8 
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an 
official's conduct, as measured by reference to settled 
~ 
law, 9 w.i-:H. avoid 
/\ 
excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of~ insubstantial claims on 
summary judgment. The identification of established legal 
lies within the competence of 
be a factual question what 
8This case involves no 
expressed its intent to impose 
on high federal officials for 











sonably could be expected to know. 10 Charged 125 
decisionmaking under pressures of time and limits of 
information, not every official could be held responsible 
for the most recent judicial developments. But the judge 
appropriately may determine what the law was at the time 
an action occurred, reserving for the jury only if 130 
necessary the question what a particular high official 
L 
reasonably could be expected to know. 
By defining__;{ the limits on a high official's 
/ 
qualified immunity solely in "objective" terms, we provide 
no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in 135 
deterrence of constitutional violations and in 
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that 
focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an 
official's acts. Where an official knows that his conduct 
will violate constitutional rights, he should be made to 140 
hesitate. Where his duties legitimately require action in 
J~ 10cf. Procunier v. Navarette. suora. 434 U.S .• at 
10. 
which established rights are not implicated--even if the 
action potentially is harmful to someone that the official 
dislikes--the public interest frequently may be served 
better by fearless and unhesitating action. 11 145 
c 
In addition to the question of good faith, cases 
involving claims of qualified immunity frequently involve 
disputes over whether the official's allegedly wrongful 
actions ever occurred at a11. 12 Where a defendant--by 150 
affidavits or otherwise--effectively controverts a 
plaintiff's factual averments, petitioners argue that the 
plaintiff should be required to make some substantial 
showing in order to survive a motion for summary judgment 
by a high federal official. Consistently with our view 155 
that a claim of immunity should provide an effective 
-4~~~~-~-o 
11we emphasize that w~old only that a high federal 
official is shielded again liability for civil damages 
arising from actions within t e scope of his duties and in 
"objective" good faith. We .i-ftt!imabs >11\iiiWiiJ.R9 •li;a,Qy-t the 




barrier to trial of claims lacking in substance, we agree. 
At the summary judgment stage in a case involving immunity 
claims by high federal officials, we think it appropriate 
to require a showing of evidence by the plaintiff--with 160 
allowance for the uncertainty of developments at trial--
from which a rational factfinder reasonably could conclude 
that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard was 
satisfied. 
Requiring this proof of substantiality will not deter 165 
or frustrate meritorious claims. The requirements for 
pleading, as for proof at trial, remain unchanged. 
Further, the plaintiff retains access to reasonable 
discovery to aid in carrying his burden. And he need not 
prove the merits of his case on a motion for summary 170 
judgment, but only make a showing of substantiality 
adequate to justify the cost--both public and private--of 
subjecting a high federal official to trial. 
D 
12. 
appropriate, however, to remand the case to the District 
Court, for its reconsideration of this issue in light of 
this opinion. 13 The trial court is more familiar with the 180 
record so far developed and also is better situated to 
make any such further findings as may be necessary. 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and 
the case remanded for further action consistent with this 185 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
w~ 4 /JA...D-f ~~~ ~ 
~~~~1.-.- ~~ 
13Petitioners also have urged us, prior to the 
remand, to ule on the legal sufficiency of respondent's 
"implied" c uses of action under 5 U.S.C. § 7211 and 18 
U.S.C. § 505 and his Bivens claim under the First 
Amendment. we do not ~Q. to i:ntima.t:e that ei:ther tne 
!Ita~~ f f. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 638-639 (1981) (1981) (controlling 
question is whether Congress affirmatively intended to 
create a damages remedy), or the Bivens question, cf. Bush 
v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576 (CAS 1981), affirming on 
remand 598 F. 2d 9 58 (CAS 1979) (holding that the "unique 
relationship between the Federal Government and its civil 
service employees is a soecial consideration which 
lfp/ss 03/12/82 Rider A, p. 19 (Harlow) 
HARL19 SALLY-POW 
In Butz we concluded that absolute immunity is unnecessary 
to protect the public interest in "encouraging the 
vigorous exercise of official authority", 435 U.S. at 506, 
because we believed that qualified immunity would 
adequately shield officials from liability for good faith 
mistakes. We assumed that such immunity would prove 
"workable". There are indications, however, that some 
District Courts have not understood our admonistion in 
Butz that suits against high public officials should not 
proceed to trial in the absence of a showing of 
substantiality. We reiterate this admonition. A 
plaintiff retains, of course, access to reasonable 
discovery to aid in carrying his burden. And he need not 
2. 
prove the merits of his case on a motion for summary 
judgment. But there should be a showing of sufficient 
substantiality to justify the costs - both public and 
private - of subjecting officials to protracted trials 
when it is evident at the summary judgment stage that the 
claims are insubstantial. 
Note to Dick: I would like to try on Justice Stevens 
something along the foregoing lines. I agree with you 
that without Subpart C, the full force of our Part IV is 
somewhat diluted. 
I repeat that I would like to include in a 
footnote much of what Gesell said at 608 F.2d at 1214, 
that I quoted on page 17 of the 6th draft of my memorandum 
(Version I) last spring. 
